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In this thesis I argue that the major philosophical arguments in the field of animal ethics, 
as it has developed in the twentieth century, are inadequate without a robust theological 
foundation.  While these arguments for greater moral respect for animals have acquired some 
cultural purchase in relation to systematic abuses of animals in factory farming and some forms 
of hunting, they lack the resources for articulating the many complexities inherent in human 
relationships with other animals.  These positions, expounded most prominently by Peter Singer 
and Tom Regan, seek to extend to animals the moral frames of earlier Enlightenment thinkers 
and are thus bound by the same concerns and constraints; they therefore do not sufficiently 
problematise the modern distinction between humans and other animals that has advanced the 
modern mistreatment of animals to a degree of systematic cruelty unknown in human history.  I 
argue that the Christian tradition has richer resources for articulating human moral relationships 
with other animals – and for problematising the modern framing of the human-animal distinction 
– than these secular theories possess on their own.  This is by no means the first theological 
foray into the field of animal ethics.  Previous theological accounts, however, still work 
predominantly within the confines set by secular philosophers.  For example, Andrew Linzey 
clearly articulates his concept of “Theos-rights” for animals from within the conceptual 
framework of deontological categories.  I will argue instead that a richer theological account of 
human relationships with other animals can be made by embracing the foundational love ethic 
found in Christianity.  The Christian category of neighborly love represents a normative moral 
position in its own right rather than a simple addition to or reinterpretation of earlier 
consequentialist or deontological accounts.  Using the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 
10:25-37), I outline a theologically informed animal ethic in which animals are seen as potential 
neighbors.  My argument proceeds in two stages.  The first and largest section identifies and 
explores three themes key to interpreting the parable with a view toward animal ethics.  First, I 
explore the theme of responsibility and employ the thought of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth in 
asking to what degree humans, as imago Dei, are responsible for their relationships with animals.  
Second, I argue for the importance of caring in human moral encounters with animals.  Here, I 
explore the similarities and deficiencies of feminist theory in relation to the Christian concept of 
neighborly love.  Third, I consider the moral relevance of nearness, or proximity, in human 
relationships with animals.  Here, I outline the different responsibilities inherent in human 
relationships with wild, domestic working, and pet animals.  After expounding these three 
themes, the second stage of my thesis employs them in critiquing two specific theological issues.  
I first compare the Christian concept of dominion over animals found in Genesis 1:28 with 
competing claims from Christian stewardship ethics and environmental land ethics.  Then, 
primarily in conversation with Barth, I conclude with a discussion of the theological arguments 
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In a brief digression in his Histories, the ancient Greek historian Herodotus tells the tale 
of Arion and the dolphin.  Arion, the famous poet and lyrist, boarded a boat journeying from 
Tarsus to Corinth.  On the way, the sailors plotted to kill him and steal his money.  After singing 
one last song, Arion jumped overboard into the sea.  “But according to what they say, a dolphin 
took up Arion on its back and brought him to shore at Tainaron.”1  Arion then made his way to 
Corinth and confronted the shocked sailors when they arrived.  
 
In 2006 a beagle named Belle became the first nonhuman animal to receive the annual 
VITA Wireless Samaritan Award.  This award recognizes individuals in the United States who 
use their “wireless phones to save lives, stop crime and help in other emergency situations.”2  
Belle had received special training to recognize when her diabetic owner’s blood sugar dropped 
to dangerous levels and to respond.  One morning when her owner slipped into a diabetic 
seizure, Belle retrieved his wireless phone and pushed the preprogrammed button to dial 
emergency medical services.  “I am convinced that if Belle wasn’t with me that morning, I 
wouldn’t be alive today,” her owner claimed. “Belle is more than just a life-saver; she’s my best 
friend.”3   
  
Narratives, whether based in fact or fiction, possess a unique ability to draw human 
attention to realities or individuals that other modes of thinking tend to overlook.  While humans 
have long told stories where animals enjoy a place of prominence, until the twentieth century 
animals have been largely ignored by philosophical and ethical texts.  Before this time period, 
philosophers and ethicists concerned themselves primarily with human-human relationships, or 
perhaps human-divine relationships.  Human relationships with animals were treated on a largely 
piecemeal basis, if at all, and were often viewed as ancillary to those relationships truly 
                                                
1 Herodotus, The Histories, Book 1.23-4, in The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. 
Srassler, trans. Andrea L. Purvis (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 16.  Augustine refers to this story as 
proof of the credibility of the biblical story of Jonah.  Augustine, City of God, Book 1.4, trans. Henry 
Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
2 “Beagle Wins 2006 VITA Wireless Samaritan Award for Saving Owner's Life,” Wireless News 
(2006). http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-15413636_ITM (accessed Nov. 2009).  
This story is also referenced in Barbara Brown Taylor, “The Dominion of Love,” Journal For Preachers 
31, no. 4 (2008): 27. 
3 Ibid. 
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deserving our moral attention – those with other humans.  In the twentieth century, however, we 
find a flowering of philosophical texts dedicated significantly, if not entirely, to the question of 
human moral relationships with animals.  In this thesis I argue that, while these philosophical 
arguments for greater moral respect for animals have acquired some cultural purchase in relation 
to systematic abuses of animals in factory farming4 and some forms of hunting, they lack the 
resources for articulating the many complexities inherent in human relationships with other 
animals.  The most prominent of these arguments, expounded by Peter Singer and Tom Regan, 
represent an extension of earlier Enlightenment moral frames and are thus bound by the same 
Enlightenment concerns and constraints.  They do not sufficiently problematise the modern 
distinction between humans and animals that has advanced the modern mistreatment of animals 
to a degree of systematic cruelty unknown in human history.  I argue in this thesis that the 
Christian tradition has richer resources for articulating human moral relationships with other 
animals – and for problematising the modern framing of the human-animal distinction – than 
these secular theories possess on their own.   
 
In this way, I offer an answer to David Clough’s recent charge: “Theologians should 
note the shaky foundations of the secular arguments in favour of better standards of non-human 
animal welfare, and work on developing a better theological account of non-human animals in 
order to ground a new theological ethical approach to their treatment by humans.”5  My thesis is 
by no means the first theological foray into the field of animal ethics.  Previous theological 
accounts, however, still tend to work predominantly within the confines set by secular 
philosophers.  For example, Andrew Linzey clearly articulates his concept of “Theos-rights” for 
animals from within the conceptual framework of deontological categories.  I will argue instead 
that a richer theological account of human relationships with other animals can be made by 
embracing the foundational love ethic found in Christianity.  The Christian category of 
                                                
4 Ruth Harrison coined the phrase “factory farm” in her 1964 exposé of such systems in Britain.  This 
method of “farming” has taken the mechanical exploitation of animals “to the degree where the animal is 
not allowed to live before it dies,” she writes. Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (London: Vincent Stuart 
LTD, 1964), 3.  
5 David Clough, “Playing Chicken: Theology, Economics, Politics and Ethics in the Campaign for 
Better Conditions for Poultry,” Epworth Review 35, no. 4 (2008): 47.  Yet, this does not mean that a 
theological account cannot benefit from conversation with secular arguments.  Clough states that it is not 
“inappropriate for Christians to make strategic alliance with those who oppose this cruelty to non-human 
animals for whatever reason.”  Theologians, however, must take care to establish their theories in scripture 
and Church teachings; thus, even when their interests do coincide these secular accounts will be afforded a 
conversational, supportive role rather than foundational one. 
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neighborly love represents a normative moral position in its own right rather than a simple 
addition to or reinterpretation of earlier consequentialist or deontological accounts.  I use Jesus’ 
parabolic narrative of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) to open up a new way of thinking 
theologically about animals as potential neighbors.  This Introduction will proceed in three 
stages.  I first provide a tour of the major philosophical and theological contributions to animal 
ethics in the twentieth century.  Second, I introduce my theological case for placing animals in 
the ethical category of neighbor.  I conclude thirdly by outlining the questions my main chapters 
will address as I further explicate this idea. 
 
Yet, before we embark, a note on terminology is appropriate.  Our moral thinking is 
influenced by the complex interaction between linguistic and conceptual spheres and this 
necessitates a brief comment.  The terms that I use to describe something will necessarily affect 
the concepts that I form of it.  Conversely, the concepts I have will likely have an influence on 
the descriptive language I choose.  Thus, the term animal, as referring to nonhuman creatures 
that are neither plants nor inanimate natural phenomena like rocks, cannot be spoken without 
some trepidation and qualification.  I do not believe we must contrive completely new 
terminology in this regard; we need only be aware of the potential problems in our current usage.  
I want to draw attention to three specific hazards with this language.  First, by naming these 
creatures, and not ourselves, as “animal” we are in danger of obscuring or forgetting our own 
deep connection to these creatures.  Humans are fond of imagining ourselves as other than 
animal.  Alasdair MacIntyre notes, “Such defective modes of self-understanding and imagination 
at the level of everyday thought and practice” are still prominent even in light of a modern 
theoretical acknowledgement of our shared evolutionary history with animals.6  Human moral 
thinking, he believes, requires a “reassertion of human animality.”7  Accordingly, his own 
position in Dependent Rational Animals draws upon Aristotle, who he believes takes human 
animality more seriously than most modern philosophers.  Aristotelian influence, he points out, 
caused Thomas Aquinas often to refer to nonhuman animals as “other animals.”  This phrase is 
significant for our concepts of both humans and animals (perhaps even more so after Darwin) 
and one that I will attempt to imitate throughout my later discussions.  The second danger is 
closely aligned with the first.  By placing humans as separate and in distinction from other 
                                                
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: 
Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1999), 4. 
7 Ibid., 5. 
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animals, we are able to more easily place them outside the scope of our moral thinking.  Paul 
Waldau is especially concerned with this danger: “It causes humans as moral agents not to notice 
other animals.”8  Yet, even when we do speak explicitly of animals, it is possible to do so 
without truly noticing them as morally considerable.  Outlining the various ways humans have 
conceived of their relationship with animals in the Judeao-Christian tradition, Clough notes that 
many prominent thinkers simply talk about animals in order to talk about humans.  They “have 
used ‘animal’ to prop up constructions of the human, and are usually not discussing ‘animals’ 
even when they appear to be doing so.”9   Finally, the third problem with this term lies in its 
broad application.  As Waldau notes, it implies sameness between all other animals and thereby 
obscures significant differences among them.10  Similarly, Mary Midgley writes that “it is 
vacuous to talk of ‘the difference between man and animal’ without saying which animal.”11  In 
naming these other animals as neighbors, I am less concerned with the differing mental abilities 
that many philosophers find significant for distinguishing between different animal species.12  I 
show in chapters two-four that dependency and nearness prove more significant for establishing 
relationships of neighborly care with other animals.  With these dangers now articulated and in 
mind we now turn to the major philosophical and theological contributions to animal ethics in 






                                                
8 Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 91. 
9 David Clough, “Angels, Beasts, Machines and Men: Configuring the Human and Nonhuman in 
Judeao-Christian Tradition,” in Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspective on Vegetarianism and 
Theology, ed. David Grumett and Rachel Muers (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 68.  Clough reviews the 
thought of Philo, Talmudic and Midrashic texts, Moses Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, and René 
Descartes. 
10 Waldau, Specter of Speciesism, 91. 
11 Mary Midgley, Beast and Man, Rev. Ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 323. 
12 For example: MacIntyre focuses on dolphins because of their complex mental and social natures; 
Peter Singer finds greater opportunities for experiences of pleasure and pain for his utilitarian calculus as 
species progress from sentience to self-awareness; Stephen M. Wise, making a legal rather than 
philosophical case, proposes that animals like gorillas, dolphins, and some parrots should be granted 
similar dignity rights as humans, but that “as the minds of nonhuman animals resemble less and less the 
minds of human preschoolers, toddlers, and infants, either because they become simpler or just 
different…the argument for equality rights weakens.” Stephen M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and 
the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), 236. 
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Tour of Animal Ethics in the 20th Century 
 
 Although the twentieth century has witnessed the most explicit and prolific ethical 
treatments on other animals, philosophical and theological moral discourse regarding them is not 
limited to this century.  We do well to heed Karl Barth’s qualifying remarks in this regard in his 
own discussion of Protestant theology in the nineteenth century: “But make no mistake, there are 
in reality no completely closed periods of history that are not in the course of development; this 
only seems to be the case when, as a result of adequate source material, living men cease to play 
any part as subjects of history and therefore fail to gain a hearing and fall from view.”13  Many of 
the ethical views of animals developed in the twentieth century, as we will see, involve revisions 
of earlier ideas about animals proposed in previous centuries.  Many modern theories are, in part, 
a reaction against René  Descartes’s now infamous theory, or rather lack there of, of animal 
minds.  In 1646 Descartes wrote a letter to the Marquess of New Castle expressing his opinion 
that because animals lack linguistic abilities they must also lack minds.  “This seems to me a 
very strong argument to prove that the reason why animals do not speak as we do is not that they 
lack the organs but that they have no thoughts.”14  Animals, he later repeats, are “natural 
automata” which move without thought.15  In the eighteenth century, questions about the ethical 
treatment of animals were notably taken up by Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham.  Although 
these figures only discussed animals as an aside to their larger concern for proper moral 
relationships between fellow humans, their thinking has proved especially influential for animal 
ethics in the twentieth century.  Kant’s deontological approach to ethics provides the 
                                                
13 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: It’s Background and History, trans. 
Brian Cozenst and John Bowden (London: SCM Press 1972), 18. 
14 René Descartes, Letter to the Marquess, in The Animal Reader: The Essential Classic and 
Contemporary Writings, eds. Linda Kalof & Amy Fitzgerald (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 60. 
15 René Descartes, Letter to Moore, 61. 
Some philosophers in the twentieth century appear to follow Descartes’s denial of language, and thus 
concepts or interests to animals, notably R.G. Frey, Interests and Rights (1980) and Anthony Kenny, 
Aquinas on Mind (1993).  Others, however, have mounted cogent and lengthy defenses of the continuity 
between human and animal mental abilities and I refer the reader to their arguments for further 
consideration.  Notable works include: Mary Midgley, Beast and Man (1979); Peter Singer, Animal 
Liberation (1975); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983) (especially chapters 1-3); Bernard E. 
Rollin, The Unheeded Cry (1990); Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (1993); David 
DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (1996) (especially chapters 5-7); For an introduction to the 
philosophy and methods of the growing field of cognitive ethology, see Allen and Bekoff, Species of Mind 
(1997); See also Goodall, In the Shadow of Man (1971); Donald R. Griffin, Animal Minds (1992); Bekoff, 
The Emotional Lives of Animals (2007). 
As the questions of animal consciousness, intentionality, communication, etc., are not the primary 
area of concern in my thesis I will engage them where they prove relevant to my immediate arguments. 
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philosophical foundation for many advocates of animal rights, like Tom Regan, despite the fact 
that Kant himself denied direct duties to animals.  In a footnote in his An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (first printed in 1780), Bentham intuited the possibility of 
his utilitarian ethics extending to encompass both humans and other animals.  “The question,” he 
writes,” “is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”16  This question 
marks the starting point for Peter Singer’s later work in Animal Liberation.  We further cannot 
over emphasize the enduring influence on animal ethics of Charles Darwin’s work in the 
nineteenth century.  Although we would be mistaken to assume that before Darwin humans 
failed to see a connection between human and animal life, the significance of Darwin’s work lies 
in the scientific support he gives to the idea that the difference between “man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.”17  This observation has 
provided considerable influence and strength to modern philosophical and theological 
conceptions of human relationships with other animals.  With this brief sketch of their significant 
predecessors and influences, we can now proceed in our tour of animal ethics in the twentieth 
century.  
 
 Albert Schweitzer’s ethic of respect for life marks the first explicit attempt in the 
twentieth century to include nonhuman creatures in normal human ethical thinking.  In a short 
article Schweitzer notes the novelty of his proposal.  “The movement for the protection of 
animals has received no support from European philosophy,” he asserts.18  Instead, he finds 
human moral responsibility for animals playing a much greater role in Chinese and Indian 
thought.  He directs his criticisms here explicitly at Kant and Bentham.  Neither, he claims, 
regarded kindness to animals as anything more than practice for kindness to humans.  Although 
his assessment of Bentham is questionable, he is surely correct in his criticism of Kant.  Earlier 
in the second volume of his uncompleted Philosophy of Civilization, he asserts that Kant “never 
gets beyond an utterly limited conception of the ethical.  He obstinately persists in drawing the 
boundary of his ethics as narrow as possible, making them concerned with no duties beyond 
                                                
16 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and 
H.L. Hart (London: University of London Athlone Press, 1970), 283. 
17 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2nd Ed. (London: John 
Murray, 1875), 126. 
18 “Die Tierschutzbewegung hat von der europäischen Philosophie Keine Unterstützung erfahren.” 
Albert Schweitzer, “Philosophy and the Movement for the Protection of Animals,” International Journal 
of Animal Protection 1, no. 2 (May 1936): 5, 9. 
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those of man to man.”19  In this and the previous volume, Schweitzer looks for a grand theory of 
life or worldview (Weltanschauung) that he feels has eluded earlier thinkers.  Such a theory, 
Schweitzer claims, must view life as possessing value in itself.20  “If there really is a basic 
principle for the moral, it must be concerned in some way or other with the relations between 
man and life as such in all its manifestations.”21  While sitting in a canoe surrounded by a heard 
of hippopotamuses in Africa, he conceived of the solution to this problem in the concept 
“reverence for life.”22  In sum, the ethic of reverence for life means: “It is good to maintain and 
to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it.”23   With this principle, Schweitzer 
topples the narrow, anthropocentric walls within which he believes earlier philosophers had 
bound human moral thinking.  “Ethics are responsibility without limit towards all that lives,” he 
writes.24  Schweitzer in this way makes the possession of life, rather than human nature, reason, 
or language, the final criteria for direct moral consideration. 
 
 Schweitzer’s principle may represent a step forward by pushing ethics outside the 
narrow sphere of human-human relationships, but this broad extension also proves to be 
problematic both theoretically and practically.  This is because respect for life provides no means 
of distinguishing between respectful treatment of different forms of life.  It is not only 
responsibility without limit; it is responsibility without direction.  The ethics of reverence for life 
insist that “only the maintenance and promotion of life rank as good.  All destruction of and 
injury to life, under whatever circumstance they take place, they condemn as evil.”25  This holds 
true for all forms of life from humans to animals, insects, plants, and even bacteria.  The problem 
with Schweitzer’s universal ethic, Andrew Linzey notes, is that “even if we do our best most of 
the time, we are guilty, and guilty most of the time.”26  Even though Schweitzer acknowledges 
that humans must destroy other forms of life in order to continue living themselves, he only 
accepts actions that uphold life as morally good.  The ethics of respect for life compel the human 
                                                
19 Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics in The Philosophy of Civilization, Part II, trans. C.T. 
Campion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 183. 
20 Albert Schweitzer, The Decay and Restoration of Civilization in The Philosophy of Civilization, 
Part I, trans. C.T. Campion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 57. 
21 Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, 184. 
22 Charles R. Joy, trans. and ed., The Animal World of Albert Schweitzer: Jungle Insights into 
Reverence for Life (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 30. 
23 Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, 309. 
24 Ibid., 311. 
25 Ibid., 317. 
26 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 6. 
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“to decide for himself in each case how far he can remain ethical and how far he must submit 
himself to the necessity for destruction of and injury to life, and therewith incur guilt.”27  The 
problem with this indiscriminant ethic is that it makes human life itself an immoral endeavor.  
We need instead an ethic that takes nonhuman life into account while still allowing humans to 
pursue their own life in a morally credible manner.  Later thinkers, as we will see, accomplish 
this by distinguishing between those living creatures that possess sentience or the capacity to feel 
pain and those creatures that do not.  For example, in an article aptly titled “Painism,” 
philosopher Richard D. Ryder insists that humans need not incur guilt from our use and 
consumption of plants because plants cannot feel pain.  We can, thus, “confidently draw the 
circumference of our moral circle around consciousness and yet still be able to live 
comfortably.”28  Karl Barth also issues a notable criticism of Schweitzer’s ethic that I will 
reserve for fuller discussion in chapter six. 
 
 In his survey of recent texts on animal ethics, David DeGrazia writes, “More than any 
other work, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation brought questions about the moral status of 
animals into intellectual respectability.”29  In this book, first published in 1975, Singer elaborates 
Bentham’s earlier intuition that an utilitarian ethic based on the capacity to suffer must include 
nonhuman animals.  Singer asserts, “If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for 
refusing to take that suffering into consideration.”30  Sentience, Singer’s shorthand for the 
capacity to experience suffering or enjoyment, therefore, marks the boundary in our moral 
consideration of the interests of other creatures.  Singer couples this boundary with a principle of 
equality to argue that similar interests possess equal moral weight regardless of whose interests 
they are.31  Anything less, he claims, amounts to speciesism, a term he adopts from Ryder.32  
Singer defines speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members 
                                                
27 Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, 317. 
28 Richard D. Ryder, “Painism: The Ethics of Animal Rights and the Environment,” in Animal 
Welfare and the Environment, ed. Richard D. Ryder (London: Duckworth, 1992), 197. 
29 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 2. 
30 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd Ed. (London: Pimlico, 1995), 8. 
31 Singer elucidates this idea in later writings: “The principle of equal consideration of interests acts 
like a pair of scales, weighing interests impartially.  True scales favour the side where the interest is 
stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but they 
take no account of whose interests they are weighing.” Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd Ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22. 
32 Ryder coined this term in 1970 “as a parallel with racism and sexism.” Ryder, “Painism,” 197. 
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of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”33  To avoid this charge, 
therefore, the utilitarian must take into account all comparable interests equally before 
determining the overall good or evil of a given course of action.   
 
 While it introduces a helpful discriminatory element that Schweizter’s ethic lacks, this 
utilitarian system is not without its own problems.  The primary difficulty with the utilitarian 
approach lies in its emphasis on the experiences of individuals rather than on the actual 
individuals who do the experiencing.  The problem with the hedonistic utilitarianism of 
Bentham, Tom Regan writes, is that it reduces moral agents and patients to “mere receptacles” 
of pleasure and pain.34  The utilitarian does not value these individuals for their own sakes, but 
rather for the pleasure and pain they aggregate.  This kind of calculus, Regan notes, offers no 
way to distinguish between victims and persecutors.  The pleasure one individual receives from 
inflicting pain must be weighed equally with the suffering another individual receives from 
inflicting pain.  Regan uses slavery as an example: “The interests of those who profit from 
slavery should play no role whatsoever in deciding whether to abolish the institution that 
furthers those interests.”35  Similarly, Regan argues, those who profit by exploiting animals do 
not deserve to have their interests counted with those of the animals they cause to suffer.  This 
emphasis on experiences over individuals also leads to the problem of replaceability.  Singer 
modifies Bentham’s hedonistic approach by introducing preferences into the utilitarian calculus.  
“Preference utilitarians count the killing of a being with a preference for continued life as worse 
than the killing of a being without any such preference,” he writes.36  Therefore, killing those 
animals, and presumably humans, that lack self-consciousness presents no moral qualms 
provided that we replace their lives with other unself-conscious beings that will experience an 
equal amount of pleasure or pain.  Michael Lockwood’s adaptation of Christina Hoff’s 
“Disposapup Ltd” provides a striking illustration of the counterintuitive implications of Singer’s 
position.37  The utilitarian reduction of all the diverse aspects of life into experienced pleasure 
                                                
33 Singer, Animal Liberation, 6. 
34 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2004), 205. 
35 Tom Regan, “Animal Liberation: What's in a Name?” in Defending Animal Rights (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 37. Italics original. 
36 Peter Singer, “Killing Humans and Killing Animals,” Inquiry 22 (1979): 152. 
37 In the example, a family realizes that, while a puppy adds pleasure to their lives, it presents an 
inconvenience when the family wants to go on vacation and becomes an increasing liability as it grows 
older and loses its youthful allure.  A company, Disposapup Ltd., capitalizes on this state of affairs and 
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and pain presents an additional difficulty in this approach.  Martha Nussbaum draws attention to 
this problem: “But we might think that a good life, for an animal as for a human, has many 
different aspects: movement, affection, health, community, dignity, bodily integrity, as well as 
the avoidance of pain.”38  The utilitarian’s inability to account for the differences in these goods 
and the kinds of pleasure and pain they produce represents a clear shortcoming.  The utilitarian 
calculus, furthermore, makes no room for the moral value of social relationships among 
individuals.  I address this final criticism in chapters two-four where we will find that humans 
and other animals exist in a series of complex, dependent, and historic relationships that entail 
unique ethical concern and responsibilities. 
 
 In an attempt to overcome these difficulties in utilitarianism, Tom Regan looks to Kant’s 
deontological ethical approach as the foundation for his theory of animal rights.  A moral 
response is right, in this approach, “because it is right,”39 rather than because it aggregates 
pleasant experiences or results in beneficial consequences.  “A good will is good not because of 
what it performs or effects, . . . but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself,” 
Kant claims.40  Regan states approvingly that a deonotological approach “denies that moral right, 
wrong, and duty depend only on the value of consequences of what we do, either for ourselves 
individually (ethical egoism) or for everyone affected by the outcome (utilitarianism).”41  The 
deontological approach has an obvious advantage over consequentialist approaches in that 
humans, as finite creatures, lack an ability to consistently and reliably predict what the 
consequences of their actions will be.  This is a particularly relevant concern with regard to 
human actions toward wild animals.42  I do not attempt to argue that a consideration of effects 
                                                                                                                                           
raises puppies, “house-trains them, supplies them to any willing purchaser, takes them back, [painlessly] 
exterminates them and supplies replacements, on demand.” Michael Lockwood, “Singer on Killing and the 
Preference for Life,” Inquiry 22 (1979), 169.  Rights gets us around the Disposapup problem by insisting 
on the intrinsic value of individual animals rather than on their aggregated experiences of pleasure and 
pain.  The feminist ethics of care discussed in chapters two and three addresses this problem in a different 
way by placing value on the relationships that exist between the human family and the adopted pet animal 
so that simply exchanging it for another is a violation of the responsibility inherent in the relationship. 
38 Martha Nussbaum, “The Moral Status of Animals,” in Linda Kalof & Amy Fitzgerald, eds., The 
Animal Reader: The Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 32. 
39 Phillip Stratta-Lake, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth (London: Routledge, 2000), 11. 
40 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas Kingmill 
Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900), 9. 
41 Regan, The Case, 143. 
42 Human manipulation of wild ecosystems is problematic, Michael Northcott writes, because they are 
“affected dramatically by human actions but these actions frequently produce consequences which are 
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and planning are of no value in the raising of domestics animals or wildlife preservation.  I wish 
only to draw attention to the fact that these cannot be the sole conditions on which the good or 
evil of such intention is judged.  Additionally, as I will demonstrate in chapter three, both 
consequentialist and rights based positions are unable to adequately account for the spontaneous 
type of neighborly care sometimes necessitated under a Christian neighborly love ethic. 
 
 In developing his theory of animal rights, Regan makes a significant revision of Kant’s 
original thought.43  Kant denies direct duties to animals because animals, as irrational, lack full 
moral autonomy.  Kant writes, “Our duties to animals are indirect duties to humanity.”44  We 
have already noted Schweitzer’s criticism of Kant’s ethics as being too narrowly focused on 
humanity and we see a similar, though more developed, criticism in Regan.  Kant’s position, 
Regan insists, “rests on an impoverished understanding of what animals are.”45  Just like non-
rational human “moral patients,” animals possess lives of their own that fare better or worse for 
them, independently of their utility for rational moral agents.  “To deny that we have direct 
duties to those animals who have an experiential welfare, but to affirm this in the case of human 
moral patients like these animals in the relevant respects, would be symptomatic of an 
unsupported, and unsupportable, speciest understanding of morality,” Regan insists.46  Regan 
then develops a theory of equal inherent value in which all “subjects-of-a-life” possess value that 
is independent of their usefulness to others or their aggregation of pleasurable and painful 
experiences.47  He initially limits subjects-of-a-life to “mentally normal mammals of a year or 
more,”48 but he later extends this to include birds and possibly fish.49  Thus, because both moral 
                                                                                                                                           
entirely unforeseen by their human progenitors.”  Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 129. 
43 Barth also notes the difficulty later philosophers have when attempting to appropriate Kant’s 
thinking into their own.  Kant stands as a stumbling block, he claims – “someone determinedly pursuing 
his own course, more feared than loved, a prophet whom almost everyone even among those who wanted 
to go forward with him had first to re-interpret before they could do anything with him.” Barth, Protestant 
Theology, 266. 
44 Immanuel Kant, “Duties to Animals and Spirits,” in Lectures on Ethics, Cambridge Ed., ed. Peter 
Heath and J.B. Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 213. 
45 Regan, The Case, 193. 
46 Ibid., 184. 
47 In sum, “individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and 
a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and 
pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to take action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares 
well or ill for them.” Ibid., 243. 
48 Ibid., 78. 
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agents and moral patients possess equal inherent value, they possess the same moral right to 
respectful treatment.50   
 
Theologian Andrew Linzey argues for animal rights from a theological perspective in his 
influential book Christianity and the Rights of Animals.  This represents a substantial shift from 
his earlier book on animal rights which was published several years before Regan’s classic The 
Case for Animal Rights, but whose arguments would find happy company in Regan’s text.  In 
this first book, Linzey names sentiency as the most appropriate qualification for a rights holder.  
His primary claim here also rests on a similar equality principle that we find in Regan – that it is 
inconsistent to grant rights to human children or mental patients who are not fully rational while 
denying rights to animals of similar mental capacity.51  Yet, in his later, more mature writing 
Linzey largely abandons this line of argument in favor of a more theologically robust account.  
In his proposal of “Theos-rights” Linzey states that God, as Creator, has primary rights over 
creatures.  “All creation, large and small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient 
has worth because God values it.”52  This basic worth, however, does not mean that all creatures 
should possess rights.  Linzey admits here that sentiency, or the ability to suffer, is an 
insufficient theological criterion for rights possession.  He finds more appropriate biblical 
grounds in the possession of “spirit, flesh, and blood.”53  Creatures possessing these qualities, he 
claims, possess an additional “inherent value.”54  Although I do not articulate this in the same 
way, I agree with Linzey that while the bible clearly finds value in all creatures as created by 
God, it also expresses a unique concern for humans and other animals.  The unique way that the 
bible describes other animals gives us reason, I argue, for viewing them as potential neighbors.  
We find examples of this in the creation of humans and land animals on the same day in Gen. 1, 
the covenant with humans and all animals in Gen. 9, and the explicit inclusion of domestic 
                                                                                                                                           
49 Tom Regan, Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights (Landham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2004), 59, 61. 
50 Joel Feinberg makes a similar argument for animal rights based on a comparison with human 
“marginal cases.”  For Feinberg, the possession of interests does not automatically confer rights on an 
individual, but it does prove that the individual in question is “the kind of being to whom moral or legal 
rights can be ascribed without conceptual absurdity.” Joel Feinberg, “Human Duties and Animal Rights,” 
in On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics, ed. Richard Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox 
(Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1978), 55. 
51 Andrew Linzey, Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment of Man’s Treatment of Animals (London: 
SCM Press, 1976), 27, 24. 
52 Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (London: SPCK, 1987), 9. 
53 Ibid., 79. 
54 Ibid., 80. 
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animals in the Mosaic covenant of Ex. 20.  I develop this idea in greater detail in chapter five.  
Linzey and Regan’s accounts of animal rights also possess similarity with my own proposal in 
their emphasis on the moral significance of the individual rather than on his/her experiences of 
suffering or pleasure as in utilitarianism.  As I demonstrate in chapters two-four, however, the 
major shortcomings of rights language lies in its inability to account for the moral significance of 
emotions or relationships of dependency and nearness.   
 
 These concerns are addressed in part by Alasdair MacIntyre in his Dependent Rational 
Animals.  Here MacIntyre critiques his own previous work in After Virtue along with most of 
Western philosophy influenced by Aristotle for paying inadequate attention to the reality and 
moral relevance of dependency.  He argues, “The virtues of independent rational agency need for 
their adequate exercise to be accompanied by what I shall call the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence.”55  In contrast to the “continuously rational, healthy, and untroubled” moral agents 
populating the pages of many past philosophy books,56 MacIntyre draws attention to the reality 
of human life as characterized by vulnerability and dependency throughout, from infancy, 
sickness, injury, to old age.  He also notes that in this regard humans are no different from other 
intelligent animals and he spends a sizeable portion of his book looking at the similarities 
between humans and dolphins.  In this way, MacIntyre offers a compelling revisionary critique 
of virtue ethics.   Although my thesis will not follow his close Aristotelian and Thomistic line of 
thinking, I do acknowledge the significance of this observation for human moral relationships 
with animals.  In chapter two particularly, I bring his arguments into conversation with feminist 
ethics in order to address the moral significance of dependency in human care for other animals. 
  
Beginning in the late twentieth century feminist ethicists have also mounted critiques of 
both modern systematic abuses of animals and earlier utilitarian and deontological attempts at 
addressing these abuses.  Partly because of the decentralized nature of feminist methodology, we 
cannot specify the feminist position or critique of animal ethics.  Broadly speaking, however, 
feminist writers criticize these previous positions for their dismissal of human emotion as 
significant for moral thinking, their preference for universal categories and norms over specific 
individuals and situations, and the general, patriarchal neglect of women’s cultural experiences 
and points of view in the development of moral theories.  Carol Gilligan’s book, In A Different 
                                                
55 MacIntrye, Dependent Rational Animals, 8. 
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Voice, published in 1982, has been widely influential in articulating the different moral priorities 
prevalent in men and women.  In distinction from Kant and his later interpreters, Gilligan writes, 
“The morality of rights differs from the morality of responsibility in its emphasis on separation 
rather than connection, in its consideration of the individual rather than the relationship as 
primary.”57  Gilligan argues that traditionally masculine ethical theories, like Kant’s, tend to 
overlook the significance that relationships between individuals play in human, especially 
feminine, moral thinking.  Two years later, Nel Noddings developed Gilligan’s basic 
observations and ideas into a distinct ethical perspective in Caring.  In this book, Noddings 
addresses both human relationships with other humans and other animals.  With respect to 
animals, she claims, “I must resist [Singer’s] charge that we are guilty of ‘speciesism’ in our 
failure to accord rights to animals, because I shall locate the very wellspring of ethical behavior 
in human affective response.”58  Noddings makes a clear moral distinction between humans and 
other animals, but this does not prevent her from including animals in her circle of care.  
Although they have been subject to criticism and revision since their first inception, these 
foundational works by Gilligan and Noddings “nevertheless, remain central to understanding the 
origins of, and many directions within, feminist ethics today.”59  I develop and critique these 
theories in relation to their extension to animals and the Christian neighborly love ethic in 
chapters two and three. 
 
 Although we could mention several additional feminist writers here, two thinkers 
particularly noteworthy in the field of animal ethics are Mary Midgley and Carol J. Adams.  
Midgely claims that the major problem with utilitarianism is its “hedonistic framework.  Pain 
and pleasure are indeed very important for certain purposes, but they cannot possibly be the only 
things that matter in life.”60  She shares with Gilligan and Noddings an insistence that emotional 
and social bonds are morally relevant.  In her book, Animals and Why They Matter, Midgely 
argues that “all human societies have involved animals” and that this closeness places unique 
responsibilities on humans for those animals with whom we have shared a historic relationship.  
Midgely’s thesis is significant in that, contrary to Singer and Regan, she envisages a moral 
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University of California Press, 1984), 3. 
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community between humans and other animals that permits compassionate animal keeping 
rather than a total abolition of human-animal working relationships.  As theologian, Michael 
Northcott observes, philosophical positions that simply believe these animals “should not be in 
such places” offer little relevance or guidance to scientists and farmers who might also be 
concerned about animal welfare.61  I explore this idea more fully in chapter four.  In her earliest, 
and perhaps most influential and provocative, book, The Sexual Politics of Meat, Adams links 
feminist theory and vegetarianism.  “Feminist theory logically contains a vegetarian critique that 
has gone unperceived, just as vegetarianism covertly challenges a patriarchal society.”62  She 
examines several diverse sources, from cookbooks to literature, to make the case for a historic 
link between the slaughtering and eating of animals and the patriarchal control and abuse of 
women in many societies.  I will consider Adams’s arguments, particularly those of her later 
book, Neither Man Nor Beast, in my final chapter where I articulate a theologically informed 
vegetarianism. 
  
The Parable of the Good Samaritan and Animal Neighbors 
 
My own contribution to the growing field of animal ethics in the twenty-first century 
involves a theological critique of these earlier positions by placing animals in the ethical 
category of neighbor, as informed by Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37).  
Before I explicate my position, however, a stronger articulation of the methodological uses of 
scripture and insights from non-theological disciplines as well their interaction with Christian 
ethics in this treatment warrants attention.  A defense of the mere use of the bible as a primary 
source for Christian ethics hardly seems necessary.  As Thomas W. Ogletree observes, “Given 
the role of the Bible in Western Civilization, almost any of our moral notions will reflect its 
impact in some fashion.”63  The concepts and language found in scripture have contributed to the 
shape and development of moral discourse in the West in ways that simply cannot be 
overlooked.  Zenon Bańkowski, for example, articulates the legal interaction between love and 
                                                
61 Michael Northcott, “‘They Shall Not Hurt or Destroy in All My Holy Mountain’ (Isaiah 65:25): 
Killing for Philosophy and a Creaturely Theology of Non-Violence,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, 
Humans and Other Animals, ed. Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 
238. 
62 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, 10th 
Anniversary Ed. (New York: Continuum International Pub, 2006), 27. 
63 Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 5.   
 20 
law through an explication of biblical parables such as the Good Samaritan.64   Furthermore, we 
may affirm along with J.I.H. McDonald that although Christian ethics itself as a discipline has 
emerged from a number of sources such as philosophy, theology, exegesis, and social science, “it 
is unlikely to lose sight of its compound nature, one element of which is its biblical base.”65  
Thus, “the area of difficulty lies not in the general principle [of a relationship between the bible 
and Christian ethics], but in the practicalities of this interaction.”66  The question is not whether 
the bible has something to say to Christian ethics, but in what way Christian ethics uses the bible 
in its own moral discourse.   
  
 One potential way forward would be to take an historical perspective and trace the place 
of animals in ancient Israelite and early Christian communities.  Laura Hobgood-Oster does this 
to a certain extent with the Christian tradition in her recent book.67  In as much as the bible is 
comprised of human documents written in a specific time and place, historical study and 
reconstruction are invaluable to the exegete.  Yet, the Christian ethicist must also move beyond 
historical criticism to ask new questions of the text.  Ogletree writes that interpretation “does not 
consist simply in the exposition of original meanings.  It finally involves an enlargement of the 
understanding of the interpreter concerning that about which the texts speak as a result of an 
encounter with the text.”68  An awareness of the original writers’ concerns and unique cultural 
situations are important for ensuring that our modern readings do not violate the ethical thrust of 
the text, yet we must also remain open to what the text may say to us in our own unique setting.  
This complex exchange is necessary because of the historical distance between the two groups of 
readers.  Because of the differences in worldviews, McDonald claims, “at best, one could hope 
to join in the process of Christian moral decision-making which clearly exercised the minds of 
the apostles . . . and perhaps share, however remotely, in the moral integrity of Jesus.”69  In my 
own reading of Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan and other relevant biblical texts I utilize the 
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insights of textual critics like Crossan, Von Rad, and Westermann.  Yet I do so in a way that still 
allows for a fresh encounter with these texts.  I ask what the ethical thrust of these passages 
might mean for the new situations humans find themselves in with relation to other animals.70   
  
 Ogletree writes, “Interpretation requires us to formulate the questions lying behind the 
texts in ways that are real to us.  A real question is one capable of shaking the hold of our taken-
for-granted opinions.  It is a question which places our own opinions in question.”71  As I alluded 
to earlier in this Introduction, narratives possess a unique ability to draw in a reader and open up 
new questions and ways of relating.  This is precisely what Jesus does for the lawyer in Luke 10.  
The lawyer asks Jesus to expound the meaning of neighbor in the law and Jesus responds by 
telling a parable about neighborly love.  The lawyer can discover the answer to his question only 
by entering into the story and encountering another as neighbor.  Rowan Williams asserts that 
Christian language takes it for granted that meanings are learned and produced rather than given 
in iconic or ahistorical form.  “Christian interpretation,” he claims, “is unavoidably engaged in 
‘dramatic’ modes of reading: we are invited to identify ourselves in the story being 
contemplated, to re-appropriate who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of the 
story.”72  Biblical narratives offer to transform the life of the reader rather than simply proposing 
a set of rules or iconic moral exemplars.  Williams notes that this is especially significant of the 
“parabolic mode of Jesus’ teaching.”73  Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell also remark on the 
significance of narrative for ethical reflection.  To reject narrative, they claim, is to reject an 
accurate account of moral experience.  
 
Stories, then, help us, as we hold them, to relate to our world and our destiny: the origins 
and goals of our lives, as they embody in narrative form specific ways of acting out that 
relatedness.  So in allowing ourselves to adopt and be adopted by a particular story, we 
are in fact assuming a set of practices which will shape the ways we relate to our world 
and destiny.74 
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72 Rowan Williams, On Christian Doctrine (Oxford, Blackwell Pub., 2000), 50. 
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 In this thesis I take up a narrative approach to animal ethics through the particular 
narrative of Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan.  I demonstrate that a narrative ethics arising 
from this text involves an approach to human relationships with animals which is not simply 
arbitrary.  This parable is unique in the way it upturns the lawyer’s conventional opinions and 
offers an answer that can only be fully known when experienced.  As Crossan points out, the 
original cultural situation of the parable prevents an interpretation that amounts to a simple, blind 
following of the Samaritan’s example.  If this were all that was expected, Jesus would have done 
much better to name the man as a fellow Jew than a despised Samaritan.75  The lawyer can only 
“Go and do likewise” (Luke 10:37)76 by transforming his preconceptions and being truly open to 
an encounter with the other.  By adopting this particular story I hope to open up new questions 
with regard to our relationships with animal others and allow it to shape this often neglected 
dimension of human moral relatedness.  
 
 This approach proves significant for my use of knowledge gained from scientific and 
other philosophical studies.  The narrativist approach I am adopting by using the parable 
paradigm “seeks to fit the world into the story of God rather than God into the story of the 
world.”77  Scientific knowledge and study are important for Christian ethics, but they are not 
foundational to Christian ethics.  The foundation is the divine story; it is in this story that 
Christians discover who they are and what it means to exist as creatures in relationship.  Truth 
for the Christian is ultimately based in the life-story of Jesus Christ.78  It is only because the 
divine Word has first become neighbor to creatures that we are then able to both be and know 
what it means to be neighbor to others.  Once we have entered into this story and open ourselves 
up to the other as neighbor we are then freed to use our knowledge of the other and her specific 
needs in order to inform and discern the most appropriate response.  This is why, for example, 
my first chapter takes a close look at the insights gained from the scientific field of animal 
ethology but finds its real ethical force in its discussion of humans created in the imago Dei.   
 
Speaking from a more Thomistic theological perspective, Servais Pinckaers also offers 
insightful observations into this complex interaction.  He asks,  
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Should ethics, understood in a theological context, claim autonomy as a science based 
exclusively on rational norms?  In this case, revelation’s role would be simply one of 
confirmation and external inspiration.  Or rather, should Christian ethics consider 
revelation as its principle and direct source?79  
 
“Without a moment’s hesitation,” he asserts, “I choose the second alternative.”  For Pinckaers 
the priority of scripture and faith for Christian ethics in no way fetters the use of reason.  Reason, 
rather, is viewed as “the power of human intelligence simultaneously open to spiritual 
enlightenment and faithful to the rigorous discipline of thought.”80  Reason may direct the shape 
our moral action takes, but it cannot serve as an adequate origin for that moral action.  For that 
we require revelation.  We require an alternative story.  Pinckaers goes on to outline three 
dangers in the relation of moral theology to the behavioral sciences.  It is possible to view these 
points in the frame of two competing narratives.  First is the danger of abdicating ethics to 
scientific explanation.  “Carried away by the success of the behavioral sciences, [we] will be 
limited to a ‘shifting morality’ adapted to the prevailing opinions of a given time or milieu.”81   
Yet if kept to their proper descriptive methods the sciences have no directly normative function 
for human behavior.  Second, he refers to the “high-handedness” of science.  Science may be 
tempted but it cannot explain everything.  This is rather a philosophical leap resulting from a 
kind of faith in science and scientific reasoning.  Third is the danger of creating a one-
dimensional world.  Science “concentrates on phenomena, whatever can be perceived by the 
senses or scientific instruments.”82  In such a world morality has no role to play.  Because of the 
descriptive power of scientific observation the Christian ethicist cannot overlook this source of 
knowledge, but neither should she abdicate her judgment to serve as a mere theological 
affirmation of scientific explanation.  She must rather seek to incorporate this knowledge into the 
wider story of God in which we and all other creatures participate. 
 
We turn now to the central thesis of this dissertation – the consideration of nonhuman 
animals in the ethical category of neighbor as explicated through the parable of the Good 
Samaritan.  I have stated above that I agree with Linzey’s intuition that all aspects of creation 
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possess a basic value deriving from their creation by God as “good” and even “very good” (Gen. 
1).  Humans, in this way, cannot simply disregard any aspect of the created world as possessing 
no value for our ethical thinking.  Yet, this does not mean that all creatures possess the same 
value.  I disagree with Schweitzer that the correct Christian response to the world is a flat respect 
for life.  When we encounter another creature, we must respect the kind of creature that it is in 
order to generate an appropriate moral response.  We value some creatures, like plants, 
inanimate natural phenomena, and possibly even ecosystems as a whole, aesthetically and 
instrumentally as habitat.  Yet their basic, derivative value as created and valued by God also 
dictates the character with which we value and interact with these creatures.  They demand the 
kind of respect typified in stewardship ethics.83  As I will demonstrate in later chapters, because 
of the many commonalities between human and animal natures, animals demand an additional, 
uniquely relational kind of moral response.  They, like humans, are the kinds of creatures that 
deserve to be treated as neighbors.84  For now I want to demonstrate that the biblical concept of 
neighbor as expressed in our parable can in fact extend itself to include other animals as apposite 
subjects of neighborly concern. 
 
                                                
83 A full exposition of stewardship ethics is beyond the scope of this thesis, although I do address it in 
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not easily translate.  Furthermore, we might ask why Attfield does not go the way of Aldo Leopold and 
consider the good of a mountain? 
84 While this thesis confines itself to viewing animals rather than insects as neighbors, the moral 
placement of insects does pose an interesting question.  For example, from a legal point of view, Stephen 
M. Wise entertains the idea that honeybees, because of their complex communicative dances, might 
possess a low level of practical autonomy.  Biologist Edward O. Wilson, on the other hand, describes a 
colony of leafcutter ants as “an organic machine” or “superorganism.”  “The superorganism's brain is the 
entire society; the workers are the crude analogy of its nerve cells.  Seen from a distance, the leafcutter 
colony resembles a gigantic amoeba.” Edward O. Wilson, Biophilia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 34. 
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The parable of the Good Samaritan readily embraces nonhuman animals as neighbors 
because it focuses on the action rather than recipient of neighborly love.  American theologian 
Paul Ramsey elucidates, “The parable actually shows the nature and meaning of Christian love 
which alone of all ethical standpoints discovers the neighbor because it alone begins with 
neighborly love and not with discriminating between worthy and unworthy people according to 
the qualities they possess.”85  Although Ramsey speaks only of humans in his exposition of the 
parable, his line of thinking needs not stop there.  The lawyer in the story “asked for a definition 
of ‘my neighbor’; Jesus told a story defining instead the meaning of ‘neighborly love.’”86  The 
impetus of Christian neighborly love, in this way, lays not in defining those individuals that are 
deserving of our care, but rather in providing care.  “Animals are generally speaking, less 
intelligent, less valuable, less highly esteemed, and less important than human beings,” C.W. 
Hume claims; but in choosing a Samaritan as the hero, Jesus indicates that “the duty of good-
neighbourliness is not conditioned by the esteem in which its object is held.”87  Neighborly love 
does not care for the high or low regard with which we hold an individual or whether that regard 
is based on social or species discriminations.  From the perspective of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, it is the act of loving, rather than the status of the one loved, that counts.         
 
Zenon Bańkowski, in his legal exposition of Luke 10, correctly perceives the ethical 
thrust of the parable’s message: “One must go further than applying the legal definition, one 
must connect with those who in terms of the law are not your neighbours.”88  Neighborhood, he 
observers, is based on action rather than legal description.  “The Good Samaritan applies the rule 
‘love thy neighbour’ to someone who only becomes a neighbour in that application.”89  In other 
words, the act of loving creates neighborhood between two individuals.  As Karl Barth observes, 
“my neighbour is an event.”90  We cannot always expect to know ahead of time who our 
neighbor will be nor to whom we ourselves may be called to be neighbors.  This idea will be 
explored in more depth in chapter four.  For now we can simply note the significance of Jesus’ 
counter question to the lawyer at the conclusion of the parable: “Which of these three seems to 
                                                
85 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 93. 
86 Ibid., 92. 
87 C. W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion (London: UFAW, 1956), 52. 
88 Bańkowski, Living Lawfully, 100. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I.2, ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas Forsyth Torrance 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956–1975) in The Digital Karl Barth Library, 419.  All future references to 
the Church Dogmatics will be noted with CD. 
 26 
you to have become [γεγονέναι] a neighbor?”91  Jesus’ question concerns itself with the subject 
of neighborliness rather than the object of neighborly concern like the lawyer’s.92  It is in the act 
of loving, of pausing and taking notice of the needs of others, regardless of their station or 
taxonomy, that the parable focuses our attention.  
 
Thus, for Jesus the question of neighborly love “is not a cry for limitation but for an 
opportunity.”93  Caring for animals presents an opportunity to demonstrate the unlimited bounds 
of neighborly love.  Love in this sense is not a limited resource that must be cautiously reserved 
for a narrowly defined group.  Whether one chooses to stop at the boundary of one’s own 
community or the human species, neighborly love need not restrict itself to such limitations.  
Moreover, granting neighborly love to animals does not lead to a diminishment of the Christian’s 
capacity to love human neighbors.  Historian Keith Thomas reports, for example, that in 17th and 
18th century England “the concern for animal welfare was part of a much wider movement which 
involved the spread of humane feelings towards previously despised human beings, like the 
criminal, the insane or the enslaved.”94  Theologian Robert Wennberg calls this the “logic of the 
line” fallacy – “the charge that moral concern for animals will unacceptably divert moral energy 
from human beings.”95  We would be hard pressed to find such logic in the bible.  For a counter 
example, Midgley cites the Old Testament prophet Nathan’s story of a man who had a lamb that 
“grew up with him and with his children, it used to eat of his meager fare, and drink from his 
cup, and lie in his bosom, and it was like a daughter to him” (2 Sam. 12:3).  This story strikes 
                                                
91 My translation. The NRSV reads: “Which of these three do you think was a neighbor…?”  I feel the 
phrase ‘to have become’ conveys a truer sense of γεγονέναι in the context of this parable; γεγονέναι, a 
perfect active infinitive, as Mounce observes, denotes “a completed action with ongoing implications.” 
William D. Mounce, Basics of Biblical Greek Grammar, 2nd Ed. (Grand Rapids, MI, Zondervan: 2003), 
302.  Similarly, Nolland argues that “It is probably justified to press the perfect tense form of γεγονέναι, 
‘to have become,’ and to say that the Samaritan became neighbor in his compassionate actions.” John 
Nolland, “Luke 9:21-18:34,” in Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 35b, ed. David A. Hubbard and Glenn 
W. Baker et al (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1993), 59. 
92 Charles A. Kimball, Jesus' Exposition of the Old Testament in Luke's Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1994), 132. 
93 Taylor C. Smith, “Parable of the Samaritan,” Review and Expositor, 47, no. 4 (1950), 441. 
94 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1983), 184. 
Kathryn Shevelow, among others, has also noted that the early animal welfare movement “was 
inextricably tied to other humanitarian causes: it was part of a larger wave of reform that swept England in 
the later eighteenth century.” Kathryn Shevelow, For the Love of Animals: The Rise of the Animal 
Protection Movement (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2008), 5. 
95 Robert N. Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2003), 27. 
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against the opinion that “no creature ought seriously to concern us which is not of our own 
species,” Midgley claims.96  The man’s care for his lamb took nothing away from his love for his 
human children.  “It is time,” Midgley asserts, “that some reason was offered for this 
extraordinary assumption” that love for animals detracts from our love for humans.97  The so-
called “species-barrier” fails to provide adequate grounds for limiting human care.98  In the New 
Testament we find quite the opposite to be true.  Luke 13:10-17 provides an example of love for 
animals actually encouraging love for humans. Here Jesus heals a woman from a sickness on the 
Sabbath day.  When the leader of the synagogue objects, Jesus justifies his action by referring to 
the care that animals are granted on the Sabbath: “Does not each of you on the sabbath untie his 
ox or his donkey from the manger, and lead it away to give it water?” (13:15).  Rather than 
negating our care for humans, caring for animals reveals the unrestrictive love that should 
characterize all our interactions.  This example is, thus, in line with the trust of Luke’s parable in 
chapter 10.  Christian teaching on neighborly love is concerned primarily with the act of loving 
or with proving neighbor to the one in need.  All other concerns, like the status of the one in need 
or even the demands of Sabbath, are secondary to the fundamental act of love.  Therefore, we 
can see that whether it be a sickly woman on the Sabbath, an animal in need of water, or a pet 
lamb and one’s children, neighborly love does not falter at the species line.  
 
Outline of Main Chapters 
 
 The body of my thesis proceeds in two stages.  The first and largest section identifies 
and explores three themes key to interpreting the parable with a view toward animal ethics: 
responsibility, care, and nearness.  After expounding these three themes, I then employ them in 
the second section to examine two specific theological issues: dominion and vegetarianism.  The 
theme of responsibility occupies my first chapter.  I address this issue from two sides.  From the 
animal side, I first ask to what degree, if any, can nonhuman animals be held responsible for 
their actions toward humans.  In other words, if the traveler on the road from Jerusalem to 
Jericho had been attacked by wild animals rather than human robbers, would we hold the 
                                                
96 Mary Midgley, “Brutality and Sentimentality,” Philosophy 54, no. 209 (1979), 389. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Although he is not speaking from a philosophical or theological perspective, ethologist Marc 
Bekoff makes a similar point: “Respecting, protecting, and loving animals wouldn’t compromise science, 
nor would it mean we’d respect, protect, and love humans less.” Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of 
Animals (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2007), 23.   
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animals morally accountable for this action?  Would they be subject to punishment due to guilt?  
From the human side, I then ask what responsibilities we may have for animals as neighbors. To 
answer these questions I draw on contemporary studies in animal ethnology as well as the 
primary theological distinction between humans and other animals, that of the imago Dei.  The 
thought of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth proves crucial for my definition of responsibility as a 
property that only human creatures, as freely responsive to God and others, truly possess.  In 
drawing on these two theologians, I acknowledge a certain dependence on the Kantian 
conception of responsibility as a property resulting from freedom of choice.  Nonetheless, I 
argue that it is humanity as created in unique relationship with God and other creatures that truly 
grounds their freedom of response, and thus their responsibility.   
 
 The second theme of caring, or sympathy, occupies chapters two and three.  Although 
the priest or the Levite, as fellow Jews, may have had a greater duty to aid the fallen traveler, it 
is the Samaritan who finally cares for him.  The Samaritan did this, the text says, because he 
“was moved with pity” (ἐσπλαγχνίσθη) (Luke10:33), not because he felt obligated.  In these 
chapters I question whether the Kantian sense of duty alone, as adopted in justice-based rights 
theories, is sufficient motivating force for benevolent moral action toward animals.  Instead I 
suggest along the critical lines of feminist care theory, that sympathy represents a valid basis for 
moral action.  The caring perspective, as its theoretical founder Carol Gilligan observes, de-
emphasizes the abstract, universality of ethical rules in favor of particular relationships between 
actual individuals.  This idea coincides with the first chapter’s analysis of the imago Dei as 
human responsible relationship with God and other creatures.  In chapter two I am primarily 
preoccupied with the question of sympathetic extension – are other animals fitting subjects of 
human care?  In chapter three I investigate different levels of care and answer a potential 
weakness of the feminist ethics of care that can be overcome with an appeal to the Christian 
concept of neighborly love. 
 
We arrive at the final theme of nearness in chapter four.  Closely aligned with the 
previous chapters, this theme asks how far we can extend our care.  Must we care equally for all 
neighbors wherever they may be, or do we show greater care for those neighbors closer to us?  
The Samaritan, the parable says, is the one who “came near” (ηλθεν κατ') (Luke10:33).  This 
proximity is the whole point of the parable, theologian Robert Spaemann claims.  “The 
Samaritan is a foreigner who comes by chance across a man who needs his help.  He is the one 
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who happens to be close by.”99  This chapter proceeds in two stages.  I first investigate the 
significance of nearness for Christian neighborly love.  Second, I apply this insight to human 
relationships with animal neighbors.  I argue that human responsibility for animals is not 
monolithic, but varies in degree according to the nearness of the animal to human society.  In 
doing so I modify a phrase by Clare Palmer to outline a taxonomy of nearness in which 
responsibilities to wild, domestic working, and pet animals can be established and 
differentiated.100 
 
In the final two chapters I explore the implications of a Good Samaritan animal ethic on 
specific moral issues related to human relationships with animals.  In chapter five I ask what the 
Christian notion of human dominion over animals might look like when animals are viewed as 
neighbors.  I argue that the command in Gen. 1:28 for humans to have dominion (rādâ) over 
animals can be distinguished from the subsequent command to subdue (kābaš) the earth.  Human 
dominion, I contend, describes a relationship between two relational subjects, like that of the 
ancient shepherd king, or Martin Buber’s more contemporary I and Thou.  In light of this 
distinction I then critique a common tendency in both Christian stewardship ethics and 
environmental land ethics of lumping together animals, plants, and inanimate natural phenomena 
into a singular other to which humans have a singular responsibility. Such a compilation is 
inappropriate because it ignores important differences between these different kinds of creatures 
and, therefore, the differing levels of respect apposite to them.  In chapter six I ask whether 
dominion, viewed in light of neighborly love for animals, is consistent with a normative practice 
of human consumption of other animals.  In other words, can we consistently view other animals 
as both neighbors and food?  This chapter primarily takes the form of a dialogue with Karl Barth 
and his discussion of killing animals in Church Dogmatics III/4.  In the first half of the chapter I 
critique the comparisons between human hunting and animal predation often made by 
environmental philosophers in light of Barth’s concept of human sin and violent struggle for life 
existing only in the present, historical “caveat” (Vorbehalt).  In the second half of the chapter I 
compare the human killing of animal neighbors to Barth’s exposition of the Grenzfall, extreme 
case, of killing human neighbors.  I argue that the Grenzfall is a conceptual category that offers 
                                                
99 Spaemann, Happiness and Benevolence, 112. 
100 Palmer’s original phrase is “taxonomy of relationship.” Clare Palmer, Animal Liberation, 
Environmental Ethics and Domestication, OCEES Research Paper No. 1 (Oxford: Oxford Center for the 
Environment, Ethics, and Society, 1995), 9.  I discuss the reasons for my adoption and modification of this 
idea further in chapter four. 
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richer and more appropriate resources for discussing the human killing of animals for food than 
the substitutionary, sacrificial language Barth actually employs for this subject. 
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CHAPTER 1: RESPONSIBILITY, IMAGO DEI, AND ANIMAL NEIGHBORS 
 
“A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers, who 
stripped him, beat him, and went away, leaving him half dead” (Luke 10:30). 
 
Roughly thirty years after its establishment as a US national park in 1872, Yellowstone 
documented its first human fatality due to grizzly bear attack.   A male tourist chased a grizzly 
cub up a tree.  The cub’s mother “attacked the man and, in doing so, ripped out his breastbone 
and one lung.”101  On another occasion in 1961, a three-year-old male grizzly gradually lost his 
shyness of humans after spending time near a park crew’s encampment.  He unearthed the 
remains of buried lunch trash and even accepted food scraps thrown to him by humans.  Two 
years later “this thoroughly man-conditioned grizzly was shot in June 1963 by Park rangers after 
molesting visitors camped in wilderness country near Lewis Lake.”102  Although grizzly bear 
attacks are extremely rare in national parks, and fatalities even rarer,103 these cases do pose an 
interesting question: To what degree, if any, may we hold nonhuman animals morally 
accountable for the injuries they inflict on humans?  If in our parable, for example, bears rather 
than men had left the traveler for dead along the side of the road, would we proceed to label 
these animals “robbers” (λησταῖς) – a title possessing a clearly negative moral connotation?     
 
As we saw in the Introduction, we can readily extend the Good Samaritan love ethic to 
animals as neighbors; yet, because of important differences between humans and other animals, 
this human neighborly relationship with animals will possess a certain unequal or one-sided 
quality.  I argue in this chapter that the answer to the above question is a qualified “No.”  Using 
modern ethological and philosophical evidence and the theological insight of Emil Brunner and 
Karl Barth, I demonstrate that humans represent the only creature, as far as we can know,104 to 
                                                
101 Stephen Herrero, “Human Injury Inflicted by Grizzly Bears,” Science, New Series, 170, no. 3958 
(Nov. 6, 1970), 594. 
102 John J. Craighead and Frank C. Craighead, Jr., “Grizzly Bear - Man Relationships in Yellowstone 
National Park,” BioScience, 21, no. 16 (Aug. 15, 1971), 849. 
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possess true responsibility before God, other humans, and other animals.  My argument proceeds 
in two stages.  In the first section I investigate the degree to which, if any, we may assign moral 
responsibility to nonhuman animals.  I begin this inquiry by noting the medieval practice of 
putting animals on trial for criminal offenses.  The justifications for these trials prove skeptical 
or at best ambiguous with regard to animal moral responsibility.  I then review modern 
ethological studies to show that, while animals are not biological automata as Descartes 
famously argued,105 they do not ultimately possess the level of intentionality and understanding 
of right and wrong necessary for truly responsible action.  As environmental philosopher Holmes 
Rolston claims, “Animals are not morally deficient, much less immoral; they are amoral.”106  In 
making the argument that animals lack moral responsibility, I do not deny the goodness of 
animal creation (Gen. 1:21, 25), or that animals do pursue their own goods or even the divine in 
their own species-specific ways (Ps. 104; Eph. 1:10).  I only deny that moral responsibility, as 
far as humans can know, is one of those goods.  In the second section I argue that, while we may 
find “incipient” morality in some animal species,107 it is only in humans, as created in the imago 
Dei, that true moral responsibility exists.  Here I follow the thinking of Brunner and Barth in 
contending that human responsibility derives from our existence as those creatures that exist in a 
relationship of free “call” and “response” to God and other creatures.  The argument, in this way, 
is teleologically rather than biologically driven.  The human capacity for moral responsibility 
derives from our unique destiny as the divine “counterpart”108 capable of giving a truly free 
response to the call of the other. 
 
1.1 ANIMAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
 
1.1a Medieval Animal Trials 
 
                                                
105 “It seems reasonable, since art copies nature, and men can make various automata which move 
without thought, that nature should produce its own automata, much more splendid than artificial ones.  
These natural automata are the animals.” Descartes, Letter to Moore, 61. 
106 “It is pointless to blame a blue jay for ‘selfishly’ stealing seeds at the feeder while praising a child 
who shares her cookies.  Animals have all the capacities they need for the niches they fill; to disvalue them 
because they are not moral or civil is out of place.”  Holmes Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to 
and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 67. 
107 Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 214. 
108 Barth, CD III/1, 184. 
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Before we discuss modern arguments into the question of animal morality, it is 
worthwhile to note the peculiar medieval practice of putting animals on trial for their supposed 
crimes against human communities and individuals.  On the surface the existence of these trials 
seems to indicate that medievals believed animals could be held morally culpable for their 
offences against humans.  As Kathryn Shevelow writes, “The prosecution, conviction (or 
exoneration), and execution of beasts implicitly endowed animals with humanlike 
characteristics, assigning them legal and moral responsibility for their actions.”109  I argue in this 
subsection, however, that a belief in animals as morally responsible agents need not necessarily 
follow from the their presence in criminal trials.  There are indications from the trials themselves 
and among medieval writers, particularly Thomas Aquinas, that medievals were aware of the 
logical ambiguity and inconsistencies inherent in these trials. 
 
A survey of the relevant literature on medieval animal trials uncovers at least five 
reasons for their existence.  First, there is the possibility that the people truly believed animals 
were morally responsible, and thus culpable, for their “crimes” against humans.  Shevelow lists 
two examples that point in this direction.   In one instance a male dog was tried and executed for 
bestiality; in another a female donkey was acquitted for the same crime.  She claims that these 
contrasting examples clearly demonstrate an anthropomorphic blurring of the line between 
humans and other animals.  These animals were attributed the same gender stereotypes as their 
human counterparts: “criminal male lust and honest female virtue.  The male dog was 
presumably a willing, active partner, the she-ass presumably an unwilling, passive victim.”110  In 
a similar manner, those animals that killed humans were thought to have homicidal intent similar 
to that of human murderers.  Yet, philosopher J.J. Finkelstein argues, “however crude the 
popular perception of the condemned animal as having killed with homicidal intent may have 
been, the learned sector of society, largely ecclesiastical, was under no such delusion.”111  A look 
at the defense tactics of some medieval animal lawyers and the writings of prominent medieval 
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theologian Thomas Aquinas prove Finkelstein’s assessment correct.  If criminal intent was 
anthropomorphized to animals at a folk level, it was also challenged by more learned members 
of medieval society.  In Berne in 1666 an insane human man was tried for murder.  The 
prosecutor attempted to prove the man’s liability by appealing to the biblical law of the goring 
ox (Ex. 21:28-32).  The absence of moral responsibility, the prosecutor argued, failed to defend 
the offending animal against the charge of capital punishment.  “In short,” Finkelstein observes, 
“the court clearly perceived that the execution of the ox is not grounded on any idea that the 
animal was ‘morally’ guilty or that it committed a crime in the normal legal sense, since as an 
unreasoning being it was incapable of doing so.”112  The ox was to be executed because the act 
of killing a human had rendered it “an object of public horror.”  Furthermore Thomas Aquinas 
writes that “to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; 
while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful.”113  
The first instance, cursing an animal as a creature of God, is blasphemy because it is possible 
that the animal is simply an instrument of God for delivering punishment upon human sin.  Thus 
to condemn the animal is to condemn God.  The second instance, cursing an animal in itself, is 
vain and unlawful because “benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to 
which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures.”114  Aquinas believes that because 
animals lack reason, they also lack moral responsibility.   
 
This logic leads us to the second rationale for animal prosecution in the middle ages.  In 
killing or injuring a human, the animal did not act of its own volition, but as the instrument of a 
divine or demonic agent.  Of the latter, “the commonest were pigs, which freely ran the streets of 
medieval towns, and which, following the example of their ancestors from Gadara [Matt. 8:28-
32], seemed most attractive to the devil and most easily possessed.”115  In this case, the 
condemnation of the animal was really a condemnation of the devil.  E.P. Evans proposes a third 
possible reason for animal trials.  He claims criminal proceedings were used by the Church to 
strengthen its influence in people’s lives by extending its authority even to animals and 
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insects.116  As a collector of records of medieval animal trials, Evans’s work is invaluable; yet, as 
an interpreter of the reasoning behind these trials, his explanations leave much to be desired.  
Finkelstein, for example, makes a more convincing case for the ecclesiastical proceedings 
against “infesting pests” like snakes, mice, and locusts as “ritual appeals for non-human 
intervention to rescue a helpless society from an enemy beyond human reach.”117  Furthermore, 
Evans’s explanation accounts for only the ecclesiastical trials that had the authority merely to 
curse or banish offending animals.  Yet, it was in the secular, civil courts where the more serious 
capital punishments were issued against animals.   
 
Our forth and fifth explanations come from Finkelstein.  He argues that the killing of an 
animal that had fatally wounded a human was done not on the suspicion that the animal was 
guilty of any wrong but rather because “it had violated the hierarchical order of the universe.”118  
This explanation accords with the hierarchical thinking of Aquinas who teaches that the lower 
creatures exist for the service of the higher.  Aquinas writes, “The plants make use of the earth 
for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and 
animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over 
animals.”119  Human were permitted to kill and use the “lower” animals, but animals were not 
permitted to use humans.  The animal that killed a human, therefore, was not executed because it 
was morally culpable; rather, it was executed in order to preserve the “the divinely-ordained 
hierarchy of God’s creation.”120  Lastly, the existence of animal trials can be explained as a vivid 
form of instruction and warning to the human public.  For example, in 1386 a tribunal in Falaise 
sentenced a sow to be hanged for the killing of a human child.  The sow was dressed in human 
clothing and executed in the public square by the civil executioner.121  Finkelstein claims that 
such pageantry served “as a kind of drama, in certain respects not so far removed from the 
simple morality plays enacted in medieval Europe for the unlettered folk on other occasions.”122  
The animal was executed as a vivid representation and reminder of the gravity of murder rather 
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than as a truly guilty criminal.  Another scholar adds that such trials might have served to 
“intimidate those who were responsible for an offending animal’s dangerous actions.”123  In 
either case, the trials served more of a cautionary than punishing role.   
 
As we have seen, many explanations have been offered for the existence of medieval 
animal trials.  In reality, no single theory is likely to fully explain this phenomenon.  Different 
classes of society may have had different rationales for these trials at different times.  It is also 
possible for them to have entertained more than one of these explanations at once.  For example, 
it is not inconceivable for a homicidal animal to be executed both as an instrument of the devil 
and a deterrent to potential anthropogenic homicides.  The significant point to draw out for my 
purposes in this chapter is that the existence of animal criminal trials does not unequivocally 
indicate that humans believed animals to be morally responsible for their actions against humans.  
Although criminal animal trials have largely become an historical relic, humans often still speak 
of animals, especially carnivores, with morally charged language.124  Everyday, vernacular 
language about animals, then as now, is not above ambiguities or inconsistencies.  Animals are 
still described as evil, vicious, or even virtuous.  Philosopher Mary Midgley argues that this 
tendency is more than simply a case of confusing the use of animals as symbols for vice and 
actually attributing vice to them.  For example, she lists a documentary that describes sharks as 
“the world’s most vicious killers” and a crocodile hunter who speaks of a baby crocodile as 
having “the morality of a laser beam” and snapping at anything that moves, from a leach to a 
human leg.125  This morally charged language is common despite the absurdity of expecting 
crocodiles to distinguish between the legs of humans or other creatures because for crocodiles, 
“as for all carnivores, prey is simply food, not an enemy or a victim.”126  In the following two 
subsections we consider modern philosophical and ethological evaluations of animals in our 
attempt to speak clearly about animals as neither moral nor immoral, but rather as amoral agents.  
                                                
123 Beirnes, “The Law,” 38. 
124 We find a notable exception in the recent Swiss referendum to decide whether animals should be 
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In section two we then consider a rich theological resource for distinguishing human moral 
responsibility.  
1.1b Animal Intentionality 
 
As we saw above, part of our problem is linguistic – what do we mean when we say 
animals are or are not “moral”?   In a recent book, ethologist Marc Bekoff and philosopher 
Jessica Pierce argue for the appropriateness of the term “moral” in describing certain nonhuman 
animal behaviors.  In making their case they acknowledge that their definition of morality is 
somewhat novel.  They are “quite explicit that the meaning of morality is itself under 
consideration, and we’re suggesting a shift in meaning.  How we define morality will, or course, 
determine whether and to what extent animals have it.”127  Yet in order to include animals within 
this concept, they are forced to form a rather general, “species-relative” definition of morality. 
“We believe that the most appropriate definition of morality is an expansive one that includes 
under its umbrella a suite of behaviors common among a number of species.”128  In my own 
discussion below I am sympathetic to their desire to accept and take seriously the emotional, 
social, and cognitive lives of animals.  I am not, however, convinced by their use of the term 
“moral” to describe nonhuman animals.  The general way in which morality must be defined in 
order to accommodate other animals leaves its significance as a philosophical concept 
ambiguous.  Yet by using qualifiers such as “animal morality” or “wild justice,” they seem to 
show an awareness of this difficulty.   On one occasion, they even admit: “human morality is 
unique.”129  “For humans, it may not be enough simply to claim that morality is the set of social 
arrangements that maintain social harmony.”130  For morality to maintain significance for human 
relationships and behavior it must possess a level of intentional responsibility and accountability 
not found among other animals.  Thus, while we may concede that other animals possess 
abilities that approximate human moral capacities, we may nevertheless maintain that they are 
not responsible in the same way that we consider normal human adults to be as moral agents.   
 
                                                
127 Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 11. 
128 Ibid., 32.  “This suite of behaviors includes cooperation, empathy, and justice, as well as the social, 
cognitive, and emotional intelligences that make such behaviors possible.” Ibid., 54. 
129 Ibid., 132. 
130 Ibid., 148. 
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Philosopher Dale Jamieson defines moral agents as those “individuals who can act from 
a sense of right and wrong, who can deliberate about what they ought to do, who can act and not 
merely react, and who can thus be held accountable or responsible for what they do or fail to 
do.”131  Under this definition, he concludes, animals cannot be considered morally responsible.  
We can articulate this linguistic confusion by drawing a distinction between a weak definition of 
morality, describing general social behaviors found in many animal species, and a strong 
definition of morality, requiring deliberative, abstract reflection about one’s social relationships 
and actions.  I emphasize in chapters two and three that those emotional, caring sympathies we 
share with other animals still hold moral value even if they do not suffice for the strong sense of 
moral responsibility that we understand normal human adults to possess.  I argue there that both 
emotions and reason are essential for a fully embodied human morality.  In the rest of this 
chapter, however, I am concerned primarily with the strong definition of morality represented by 
Jamieson’s definition rather than that of Bekoff and Pierce.  In the following two subsections I 
break Jamieson’s definition into two component parts in order to judge the philosophical 
arguments and ethological evidence concerning animal morality.  I first ask whether animals 
possess the level of intentionality adequate to classify their behavior as morally responsible.  I do 
this by considering three specific behaviors: communication/warning cries, play, and deception.  
Second, I contrast knowledge of good and evil with obedience to species-specific social rules.  I 
conclude ultimately that nonhuman animals are not fully responsible in the sense that we 
consider humans to be.  Accordingly, they are not culpable in the strong sense of possessing 
guilt, although we may want to say they are culpable in a weaker sense of overstepping socially 
acceptable rules or boundaries.  
 
Yet, this conclusion does not mean that we must abandon the Darwinian conception of 
differences in degree rather than kind between humans and other animals.  Darwin writes:   
 
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable – namely, that any 
animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial 
affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or consciousness, 
as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in 
man.132 
 
                                                
131 Dale Jamieson, Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of Nature 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 120. 
132 Darwin, Descent of Man, 98. 
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It is not inconsistent to follow Darwin in claiming that some animals can acquire a “moral sense” 
of a lesser degree than humans and maintain, nevertheless, that animals are not strictly speaking 
moral agents.  Primatologist Frans de Waal prefers to describe the complex social and 
intellectual abilities of higher mammals as “incipient morality”133 rather than actual morality.  
The question of whether animals have morality, he explains, is similar to asking whether they 
possess culture or language.  “If we take the full-blown human phenomenon as a yardstick, they 
most definitely do not.  On the other hand, if we break the relevant human abilities into their 
component parts, some are recognizable in other animals.”134  Thus, it is possible for us to limit 
full moral responsibility to humans without necessarily making a category break between 
humans and other animals.   
 
Intentionality is significant in this regard because it defines the degree to which an 
individual’s actions are based on free deliberation vs. instinct.  If all animal actions derive 
wholly from instinct, then no deliberation occurs and they merely react rather than act.  Some 
species, such as sharks or crocodiles, rely heavily on instinct while others, such as primates, 
approach more closely the lower boundary of human free will.  Midgley’s notion of “closed and 
open instincts” articulates this point well.  “Closed instincts are behavior patterns fixed 
genetically in every detail. . . . Open instincts on the other hand are programs with a gap.  Parts 
of the behavior pattern are innately determined, but others are left to be filled in by 
experience.”135  Examples of closed instincts include bees’ honey dance, some birdsong, and the 
nest-building pattern of weaver birds.  Open instincts, in contrast, are general tendencies toward 
certain behaviors, such as hunting, tree-climbing, singing, and caring for young.  Animals 
possessing a disposition toward these skills refine them with time, practice, and often some 
instructive example.  Hunting, for example, “like most activities of higher mammals, is both 
innate and learned,” Midgley claims.136  Along these lines, we can see different animal species 
existing along a continuum of intentionality as we move from those species that are more 
dependent on closed instinct like weaver birds and those that enjoy greater degrees of openness 
like humans. 
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134 Ibid., 210. 
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136 Ibid., 52. 
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Without a high level of intentionality, however, moral responsibility is impossible.  In 
his book, The Intentional Stance, philosopher Daniel Dennett proposes a system for categorizing 
different degrees, or orders, of intentionality.  He uses the cries of vervet monkeys as an 
example.  Vervet monkeys give different alarm calls for different predators.  They give one call 
when they sense a leopard, another for snakes, and still another for eagles.137  Depending on 
what the monkeys actually intend in their calls, Dennett proposes, will determine what order of 
intentionality they are capable of.138  An extremely negative position would hold that the 
monkeys possess zero intentionality, i.e., they are mechanically driven by instinct to give one 
call when they see a leopard and another for an eagle.  On the other hand, an extremely positive 
position would grant vervet monkeys a “third order” intentionality. This would mean that in 
giving a leopard alarm call, scout monkey x wants monkey y to believe that x thinks x saw a 
leopard.  Normal, adult humans easily pass this “third-order” and are capable of much higher 
orders of intentionality.  For example, x wants y to think that x understood y to be requesting x to 
leave (forth-order).  In principle, Dennett claims, humans could continue on infinitely, “but in 
fact I suspect that . . . most of us can keep track of only about five or six orders, under the best 
circumstance.”139  Scientists who study vervet monkeys place them within a first-order of 
intentionality – x wants that y.140  The scout monkey clearly intends to change the other 
monkeys’ behavior, but it is less clear that he intends that the other monkeys believe this is his 
intent.  In other words, the scout monkey does not need the others to believe that he sees a 
leopard (second-order).  The leopard call is effective if the other monkeys stop foraging and run 
up a tree, regardless of what, if any, beliefs they have about the scout.141   
 
If animals possess only first-order intentionality, they cannot be considered responsible 
agents.  In his Gifford Lectures, Holmes Rolston makes a similar point: “To become a reflective 
agent interacting with a society of similar reflective agents, knowing that other actors (if 
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normal), like oneself, are able to choose between options and are responsible for their behavior - 
this is not within the animal capacity.”142  Vervet monkeys and other animals clearly intend to 
change the behaviors of others, but not necessarily the beliefs of others.143  In other words,  many 
animals have desires, but they do not likely possess a concept of other minds.  Without such 
understanding, moral responsibility cannot occur.  One cannot hold oneself responsible to others, 
much less others to oneself, if one does not understand that others have similar or competing 
interests.  As such, Rolston describes animal intentionality and social behavior as “more pre-
ethical than ethical.”144  Their actions, therefore, are neither morally culpable nor praiseworthy.  
If we take the warning calls of vervet monkey as our model for animal communication then it is 
not likely that they surpass first-order intentionality. 
 
Animal play behavior, on the other hand, presents a stronger model than warning calls 
from which to assert a high level of animal intentionality.  Yet, like the vervet monkeys’ calls, 
animal play behavior ultimately fails to provide sufficient evidence for responsible moral 
agency.  Marc Bekoff, who has written extensively on animal play, especially among canids, 
believes that study of animal play allows us to “make a stronger claim that some animals might 
be moral beings.”145  Yet as we have already noted, in order to incorporate animal behavior 
Bekoff’s definition of “moral” must remain quite general and superficial.  “In the context of 
animals,” he writes, “morality refers to a wide-ranging suite of social behaviors; it is an 
internalized set of rules for how to act within a community.”146  Morality in this broad sense 
requires only a minimal level of intentionality.  For example, canids indicate a desire to play 
with a play “bow.”147  If the other animal responds accordingly, play commences.  When one 
animal becomes too aggressive or attempts to mate, the playmate shows signs of confusion and 
further communicative gestures, such as the bow, are required before play can continue.148  
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Animal play indicates clear behavioral or “social expectations,”149 but this can hardly be 
described as true moral accountability.  Play halts because similar behavioral expectations are 
not met, not because an individual recognizes an obligation to act according to custom or for the 
good of the other.  Neither do animal playmates understand each other’s missteps as wrong or 
wicked.  Questions of good and evil never come into play, so to speak.  For these reasons, 
Bekoff is on surer ground when he describes animal play as “a rudimentary form of social 
morality” – “a forerunner of more complex and more sophisticated human moral systems.”150  
Animal play maintains social codes of behavior, but it lacks a strong moral sense.151   
 
 While play does not indicate full responsible agency, it does pose a seeming anomaly for 
categorizing animal intentionality.  Dennett observes that animals sometimes exhibit “mixed and 
confusing symptoms of higher-order intentionality.”152  On the one hand, play could indicate 
only first-order intentionality.  By bowing one animal intends to change the behavior of another 
so that play ensues.  On the other hand, play could reflect second-order or potentially even third-
order intentionality.  By bowing animal x believes that animal y believes that x desires to play.  
Bekoff and Allen answer this problem by suggesting that such higher order intentionality in 
animals is context specific.153  Along these lines, x believes that y believes that x desires to play 
only when x actually desires to play.  Higher-order intentionality, in this way, only becomes 
active under certain context specific triggers.  “It may be reasonable to attribute a very specific 
second-order inference of the form ‘when I bow I want to play so when you bow you want also 
to play’ without being committed to a general capacity for the possession of second-order mental 
states in these animals,” they argue.154	    X does not always have to believe that y always has 
beliefs.  Animal play, therefore, does not unambiguously indicate responsible intention on the 
part of animals.155  With regard to animals, Bekoff and Pierce argue, “Moral agency is species-
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specific and context-specific.  Furthermore, animals are moral agents within the limited context 
of their own communities.”156  In other words, the behavior that is appropriate in one pack of 
wolves may not be appropriate in another.  Moreover, they assert that the predatory behavior of a 
wolf towards an elk is clearly “amoral – it is not subject to condemnation or accolades.”157  We 
can note here a unique contrast with human morality in our ready ability to enter into moral 
relationships outside our immediate group and even species.  Human moral agency is, thus, 
continuous in a way that wild justice is not.  This is a significant point to keep in mind for my 
later articulation of humans as imago Dei – those creatures that exist in responsible relationships 
with God, other humans, and other animals. 
 
Evidence of deceptive behavior in animals provides a third and potentially the strongest 
evidence for responsible intentionality in animals.  Because planned deception in animals would 
seem to require higher-order intentionality, it has received growing attention in recent decades.  
De Waal defines deception as “the deliberative projection, to one’s own advantage, of a false 
image of past behavior, knowledge, or intention.”158  This requires, at the very least, an 
understanding that others have beliefs.  It likely also involves some awareness that the other 
believes I have beliefs.  Although deceptive-like behavior has been observed in other species, 
most studies of deception in animals focus on primates.159  Within primate species, studies show 
that the great apes are more likely than monkeys to possess a conception of another’s state of 
mind.160  The following three examples, all involving chimpanzees, indicate in varying degrees 
that higher-order intentionality is possible among some highly complex animals.  The first two 
demonstrate, at the very least, a belief in other minds and the third provides possible evidence for 
third-order intentionality.    
                                                                                                                                           
his assertion that some animals are sometimes capable of intending to act with respect to moral principles, 
but he fails to work out a satisfactory solution.  Richard A. Watson, “Self-Consciousness and the Rights of 
Nonhumans Animals and Nature,” in The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate, ed. Eugene C. 
Hargrove (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 33. 
156 Bekoff and Pierce, Wild Justice, 144. 
157 Ibid., 145. 
158 De Waal, Good Natured, 75. 
159 For example, two different species of African fly-catching birds, which act as sentinels for larger 
multispecies flocks, will give false predator warning calls in order to distract the other birds and increase 
their own chances of capturing choice insects.  Charles A. Munn, "Birds that ‘Cry Wolf’,” Nature 319, no. 
9 (Jan 1986): 143.   
160 Richard W. Byrne, “Social and Technical Forms of Primate Intelligence,” in Tree of Origin: What 
Primate Behavior Can Tell Us about Human Social Evolution, ed. Frans B. M. de Waal (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 159. 
 44 
 
In the 1970s scientists performed an experiment to test the level of intentional 
communication in chimpanzees.161  In the trials, chimpanzee-human pairs communicated about 
the location of hidden food.  Each member of the pair served alternately as ‘sender’ and 
‘recipient’ of information.  When the human cooperated with the chimpanzee the chimpanzees 
were able to produce and comprehend behavioral cues to accurately convey the food’s location.  
When the human competed with the chimpanzee by keeping the found food for him or herself, 
some chimpanzees learned (after dozens of trials) to withhold information or mislead the human.  
When the human was the sender of deceptive information, some chimpanzees even learned to 
discount or controvert the misleading cues.  The results of this experiment indicated that some 
chimpanzees have a stronger grasp of the communication system than others.  One chimpanzee 
both engaged in deception and adjusted to the deception of the competitive human.  Two others 
adjusted to the misleading cues from the human, but failed to give deceptive cues themselves.  
Another failed to adjust to received false cues, but succeeded in providing deceptive cues.  This 
experiment, along with others, the experimenters conclude, “suggests that a chimpanzee . . . can 
make some kinds of inferences, for example, about the purposes of another individual.”162  More 
recently scientists developed an experiment to test “whether chimpanzees are not only capable of 
assessing when a competitor can and cannot see things, but also whether they use this same 
ability to intentionally manipulate another individual’s visual information.”163  In the course of 
the experiment the chimpanzees chose to approach a contested food item via a route hidden from 
a competitor human’s view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so).  The results of the 
experiment demonstrate that chimpanzees are able to understand when others have a restricted 
view and manipulate this ignorance for personal gain.  Their hiding behavior “also provides 
some of the strongest evidence that chimpanzees are capable of intentional deception.”164 
 
Our final example comes from De Waal’s observation of two male chimpanzees in the 
Arnhem zoo chimpanzee colony.  In this episode, one male, Luit, attempted to hide his grinning 
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behavior, a sign of nervousness in chimpanzees, before responding to the threatening displays of 
a rival male:     
 
When he heard the renewed sounds of provocation he bared his teeth but immediately 
put his hand over his mouth and pressed his lips together. . . . I saw the nervous grin 
appear on his face again and once more he used his fingers to press his lips together.  
The third time Luit finally succeeded in wiping the grin off his face; only then did he 
turn around [to face his rival].165  
 
The most complete sense of deception, De Waal asserts, “requires awareness of how one’s 
actions come across and what the outside world is likely to read into them.”166  Such awareness 
would present a clear example of third-order intentionality – x believes that y believes that x 
believes.  While this last example is more anecdotal observation than planned, quantifiable 
experimentation, it does appear to provide convincing evidence for at least rudimentary higher-
order intentionality in chimpanzees.  Whether such intentionality is consistent or context-
specific, as Bekoff and Allen suggest, has yet to be studied.  Still, to be considered truly 
responsible, intentionality must be met with a concept of right and wrong.  Evidence for the 
presence of the latter in nonhuman animals is much less convincing.   
1.1c The Knowledge of Good and Evil 
“The crucial question for moral decision-making is how far and to what extent animals 
might be aware or conscious that an action is wrong or right,” writes theologian Celia Deane-
Drummond.167  Deane-Drummond is surely correct on this point.  Yet, in order to include animal 
behavior in the sphere of moral action she must define “moral” in a general, ambiguous manner.  
Her assessment is similar to that of Bekoff’s in this regard.  She writes that “as long as we define 
morality in terms of judgments about right and wrong, and as long as this is perceived in the 
context of the specific social life of non-human animals, then it is entirely possible to attribute 
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‘morality’ of a sort to some animals.”168  Deane-Drummond wants to insist, along with Darwin, 
that the differences between humans and other animals are differences of degree rather than 
kind.  She is, therefore, wary of attempts to relegate morality to the realm of abstraction in such a 
way that isolates it from bodily, physical realities.  In my present account, I do not want to imply 
that only those actions done purely out of duty, totally devoid of emotion, can count as moral.  In 
this way, I agree with Deane-Drummond in as much as she includes emotions in her concept of 
morality.  In the following chapter I argue against a strong Kantian rejection of emotions as 
significant for moral decision making.  Yet, I believe her diluted model of morality also comes 
up short.  Some conscious awareness that one’s actions are done because they are good or evil is 
necessary for them to be considered moral – whether this awareness and the actions that follow 
from it derive from a sense of duty or an emotional response is not in question here.  As we will 
see in chapter three it is possible to argue from a feminist care perspective that animal caring is 
continuous with human caring in its emotional content, but that it is only with the combination of 
conscious reflection that this natural caring becomes truly ethical.  Reflection, however, is not 
necessary for the kind of animal morality, or more properly moralities,169 that Deane-Drummond 
or Bekoff discuss. 
 
It is true that social animals modify their actions in accordance with their own species-
specific social customs and hierarchical group dynamics, but this does not necessarily amount to 
true moral behavior.  “The degree to which even higher animals have opinions among which 
they can reflectively choose is minimal,” Holmes Rolston claims.  “Animals are capable of 
performative self-actualizing, but absent such considered options, they cannot choose either right 
or wrong.”170  Animals enact their intentions within a very limited sphere.  In the present 
subsection I consider the mechanisms present in some animal groups for rebuking offending 
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members as a possible indication of moral reflection.  I conclude, however, that these procedures 
fail to indicate true moral reflection on the good or evil of a given action.  For example, Jane 
Goodall’s report of the Gombe chimpanzees’ “four-year war” shows that their brutality and 
violence should not be understood as evils, but rather as a way of maintaining social hierarchies 
on a group scale.  I conclude this subsection by drawing a comparison between animal 
punishment and appeasement behaviors and the distinction in Catholic moral theology between 
attrition and contrition for sin.  This proves significant theologically for, as we will see later in 
the Protestant thinking of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, a creature that lacks the freedom to 
choose between good and evil also lacks the freedom to choose the Good.  It is this spiritual 
freedom, the choice for or against God that distinguishes animal intentional social behavior from 
human responsibility.   
 
Social animals possess ways of “punishing” behavior that breaks the group’s social 
rules.  Clutton-Brock and Parker list five social contexts in which punishment commonly occurs: 
the establishment and maintenance of dominance relationships, discouragement of cheats, 
establishment of mating bonds, disciplining of offspring, and enforcement of cooperative 
behavior.171  These punishments do not, however, “imply either a conscious decision or a moral 
sense on the part of the punisher.”172  For example, “from time to time, subordinates will test 
dominants, probably because this allows them to check for changes in the dominant’s fighting 
ability, which would permit them to reverse the relationship.”173  Unsuccessful challenges will 
elicit attacks from the dominant animal and for a period thereafter the dominant will often be 
highly sensitive to subordinates’ failures to respond appropriately to even mild threats.  Again, as 
a way of enforcing cooperative behavior among chimpanzees, group members often treat 
individuals that fail to share food with less generosity and greater hostility.174  As a kind of 
sanction against lying behavior, coyotes that follow a play bow with an attack have difficulty 
getting others to play and are unlikely to be chosen by others as play partners.  This makes them 
more likely to leave the group and, consequently, lowers their reproductive fitness.175  Animals 
have also been known to punish others for violating human imposed rules.  To reduce fighting at 
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the Arnhem Zoo, chimpanzees are not fed until all of them have moved from their island to their 
sleeping quarters at the end of the day.  Violators of this rule are met with hostility from the 
other apes.  On one occasion two adolescent chimpanzees retired to their sleeping quarters two 
hours late and thereby prevented the other apes from receiving their food on time.  Handlers 
separated the two adolescents for fear the other chimpanzees would greet them with hostility.  
The next morning, however, the entire colony chased and beat the two latecomers.  That night, 
the two adolescents were the first to come inside.176   
 
Although such punishments uphold social rules and expectations, they do not necessarily 
punish the behavior because the behavior itself is wrong.  Jane Goodall’s observations of 
cannibalism and “war” among the wild chimpanzees of Gombe powerfully illustrate this point.  
In the case of cannibalism, for four years the mother and daughter pair, Passion and Pom, preyed 
on the infants of females within their same community.177  When they attempted to steal away an 
infant in the presence of a dominant male, the male would attack and chase them away.  Yet, 
they were never systematically punished for their actions.  Dominants, for example, never 
ostracized them from the group.  Goodall also observed a four-year “war” among the 
chimpanzees that she studied.  A small number of males and females split and relocated to the 
south of the former larger group's territory.  Slowly each of the southern chimpanzees, when 
found alone, was attacked by groups of patrolling northern males.  Each of the victims either 
died from their wounds or was never seen again and presumed dead.  The northern males 
violently attacked their former group members, twisting their limbs, tearing their skin, and even 
drinking their blood.  Such behaviors more closely resembled the way chimpanzees kill prey 
animals of another species than anything observed during in-group fighting.  Goodall reflects on 
this phenonenon: 
 
For although the basic aggressive patterns of the chimpanzees are remarkably similar to 
some of our own, their comprehension of the suffering they inflict on their victims is 
very different from ours.  Chimpanzees, it is true, are able to empathize, to understand at 
least to some extent the wants and needs of their companions.  But only humans, I 
believe, are capable of deliberate cruelty - acting with the intention of causing pain and 
suffering.178 
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While human readers may cringe at the seeming brutality of these behaviors, we would be 
mistaken to assign moral culpability to the chimpanzees.  Animal punishments and even group-
group conflicts are enacted for the maintenance of social rules and hierarchies but not for the 
sake of moral uprightness or justice.  “Only we, surely, are capable of evil.”179 
 
In addition to the punishment of offences, some animals, like the domestic dog, seem to 
show signs of shame and appeasement when they have done something wrong.  Yet, this 
behavior in dogs after a transgression is best regarded as “the typical attitude of a hierarchical 
species in the presence of a potentially angry dominant: a mixture of submission and 
appeasement that serves to reduce the probability of attack.”180  Thus, by bowing its head or 
rolling over on its back the dog is enacting species-specific behaviors aimed at appeasing a 
dominant group member rather than expressing guilt or moral responsibility for his actions.  The 
dog may be punished for breaking a social rule, but not because he acted immorally.  Moral 
responsibility only comes into the picture when an agent understands why a wrong action is 
wrong.  For example, in an experiment scientists taught two human-language-using bonobos and 
one chimpanzee to use the terms “good” and “bad.”  The apes could label an action “bad,” like 
breaking a pen, but they could not express why such an action was bad.181  On one occasion, 
after being asked by her caregiver to climb down from a forbidden part of the enclosure, one 
bonobo “answered that she had been BAD, as though she knew what she had done was wrong, 
but not why.  She seemed puzzled and sad.”182  The apes sometimes even announced when they 
were about to misbehave.  Augustine’s account of stealing from a neighbor’s pear tree in his 
Confessions, provides a striking contrast to the misbehavior of the apes.  Here, he recalls, “I had 
a desire to commit robbery, and did so, compelled to it by neither hunger nor poverty, but 
through a contempt for well-doing and a strong impulse for iniquity. . . . I loved my error – not 
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that for which I erred but the error itself.”183  Humans, unlike animals, are able to not only 
understand why a particular action is wrong but to even go beyond this knowledge and perform 
an action precisely because it is wrong.   
 
An analogy may here be drawn between animal appeasement and the distinction in 
Catholic moral theology between attrition and contrition.  According to Thomas Aquinas, 
“attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins, whereas contrition denotes 
perfect displeasure.”184  The Council of Trent defines contrition as sorrow that includes 
“detestation for the sin committed” and a resolve to not sin again.185  Attrition, on the other hand, 
arises not from the hatred of sin as sin, but from the fear of punishment.186  Similarly in animals, 
submissive and appeasement behaviors often serve to reduce the probability of an attack by a 
dominant.  Animals do not possess the capacities for hating the transgression itself rather then 
simply the punishment it might provoke.  An animal may understand that a certain action is bad 
in the sense that it will result in a painful retaliation from a dominant, but not that it is bad 
because it disrupts the good of the community or opposes the divine will.  In humans, attrition, 
or “imperfect contrition,” prompted by grace, may initiate an interior process that disposes one to 
contrition and to seek Penance.187  Yet, the ability for nonhuman animals to feel remorse 
comparable to human contrition is unlikely.  Feinberg writes, animals “have a concept perhaps of 
the mala prohibitia - the act that is wrong because it is prohibited, but they have no notion of the 
mala in se - the act that is prohibited because it is wrong.”188  Aquinas affords a degree of 
voluntariness to animal behavior.  They are not like rocks or plants that must rely on outside 
forces to move them.189  Both humans and animals possess an internal origin for their actions, 
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but he does not believe they can possess, like humans, a perfect knowledge of the ends of their 
actions.  Consequently, Aquinas claims, “perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect 
voluntary; . . . but imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; . . . 
[wherefore] the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.”190  As 
we have observed, animals possess varying degrees of intentionality, with some bordering on the 
abilities of humans.  Yet, their imperfect knowledge of ends – in this case the ends of good and 
evil – means they can aspire to only an imperfect voluntary.  This precludes us from assigning 
evil intent to an animal.  In another place, Aquinas maintains that animals are naturally inclined 
to their own respective goods and that evil consequences sometimes derive from their pursuit of 
those goods.  Yet, we must not attribute evil to the animal itself.  The evil is only “accidentally 
connected.”191  Thus, “it is not evil for the fox to be sly.”192 
 
1.2 THE IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
In this second section I add a theological assessment of the moral distinction between 
humans and animals. The distinction is not where the Enlightenment would place it – in the 
sovereignty of reason – , but in the Christian concept of humans being created in the image of 
God.  Humans, like other animals, are intentional creatures that form complex social 
relationships with others.  The question of morality comes when we consider the particularity of 
those relationships.  In doing so we find that humans do not simply exist in relationship, but in 
responsible relationship to God and others.  We can phrase this in another way by saying that 
humans exist actively in relationship while other animals exist in relationship passively.  I am 
naming this uniquely active way of being in relationship the imago Dei.  This relational 
interpretation possesses a marked contrast to a more ancient, yet still very influential, view that 
locates the imago Dei in some substantial attribute of human beings.193  Against this view Emil 
Brunner claims that the boundary between humans and animals does not lay in any superior 
physical or intellectual capacity of humans.  “The boundary is placed rather where the Bible sees 
it: in being created in the image of God, in the spiritual-responsible personal being of 
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humans.”194  In describing the imago Dei as relational rather than substantial, we do not deny 
animal nature its social character, but neither can we ascribe to animal nature a responsible social 
quality.  The human person alone is responsible for her answer to the call for relationship from 
the ‘other,’ whether that other be divine or creaturely.195   Thus, whatever social relationship 
animals have with God, humans, or even other animals, it is not a relationship that possesses the 
freedom of response, and thus responsibility, that defines human relationships.  
 
1.2a Relational imago Dei and Animals 
 
Although they did not always agree on specific theological matters, Brunner and Barth 
both consistently describe the imago Dei as consisting in human relationality and responsibility, 
rather than substance.196  The chief source of Brunner’s teaching on this subject is Man in 
Revolt.197  Here Brunner writes that it is the human responsibility before God rather than superior 
intellectual abilities that distinguishes human beings.198  Barth’s thoughts on the image of God 
develop through several stages and find their most mature expression in Church Dogmatics 
III.199  For Barth, “man is the being that is for God.  It is as such that he surpasses all other 
creatures. At any rate, we do not know any other creature of which this can be said.”200  The 
biblical creation saga, he notes, makes no mention “of his [the human’s] rationality as a feature 
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which distinguishes him from them [the animals].”201  Commenting on Barth’s teaching, 
Torrance writes, “The continuity between the [human] creature and God and his likeness to God 
do not belong to the creature in virtue of some property that he possesses in himself but . . . in his 
continuing contingent relation to the grace of the Creator.”202  Old Testament scholar Claus 
Westermann, also references Barth’s relational interpretation approvingly.203  This conception of 
humanity is significant in that it provides a specifically theological distinction between humans 
and other animals.  As we will see, it defines human capacities from a teleological perspective 
rather than the other way around.  Characterizing human nature as responsible relationship also 
grants theological weight to the idea that animals are intentional and social, but not fully 
responsible.   
 
Yet, despite his rejection of the image consisting in human capacities, Brunner’s thought 
at times displays a tendency to “elaborate the formal imago in terms of material capacities of 
knowing God’s nature and will,” as Joan O’Donovan notes.204  His teachings on the inclusion of 
infants and severely mentally disabled humans as imago Dei, for instance, are ambiguous at 
best.205  Regarding the difference between humans and animals Brunner writes, “But culture, the 
creation of significant works, which are intended to manifest, and do manifest the spirit, is alien 
to the animals, and is unconditionally characteristic of man as man. . . . The same might be said 
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of speech.”206  If Brunner is equating human uniqueness with our abilities to create complex 
culture, religion, or speech, then we must disagree with his statement here.  An earlier passage, 
however, clarifies Brunner’s thought: in humans “the God-relation is not understood from 
reason, but reason from the God-relation.”207  In other words, “reason is, so to speak, only the 
organ of God-relation.”208  Barth makes a similar assessment.  He insists that the human “does 
not first have some kind of nature in which he is then addressed by God.  He does not have 
something different and earlier and more intrinsic.”209  Rather, it is because God addresses 
humans in a particular way that we possess the particular capacities we do.  “He is a man as he is 
summoned, and his endowment merely follows as part of the summons, his constitution being 
his equipment.”210  Human capacities represent the equipment (Ausstattung) that enables us to 
relate to God.  In this way, we may view them as means, but not ends.211 
 
The difference, therefore, between a substantial and a relational view of the image of 
God lies in where one begins one’s anthropology – with biology or teleology.  Biographer and 
former student of Barth, Eberhard Busch, notes that for Barth, “the problem with Darwinism is 
not that it sees the relation between humans and animals, but that it defines humanity in terms of 
the animal.”212  If anthropology begins with biology, human responsibility is seen as resulting 
out of the human’s highly complex mental abilities.  Yet Barth asserts that for theologians to do 
this, they must defer too much to the current state of scientific research, which is always subject 
to change.  “No definition of human nature can meet our present need if it is merely an assertion 
and description of immediately accessible and knowable characteristics of the nature which man 
thinks he can regard as that of his fellows and therefore of man in general.”213  A mere 
comparing and contrasting of humans to other animals can never give a complete picture of real 
humanity.  Barth insists that real humanity can only be defined by our relationship and end in 
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God.  “The real human exists, whether as animal or as rational being, in a definite history 
established in God’s attitude to him.”214  Humans are not defined primarily by their capacity for 
reason because the possession of reason alone does not lead us necessarily to the conclusion that 
humanity’s being derives from our particular relationship with God.  Barth sees human being 
represented most fully in Christ and he lists six points, based on Jesus’ humanity, for how we 
might form a theological definition of humanity in general.  In part these include humanity 
coming from and belonging to God, participating in the deliverance enacted by Christ, and being 
“in active participation in what God does and means for him, . . . an event in which he renders 
God service.”215  Our understanding of humanity as elected for a particular relationship with 
God, however, does not “require any unbecoming deprecation of our fellow-creatures,” Barth 
insists. 
 
We do not know what particular attitude God may have to them, and therefore what may 
be their decisive particularity within the cosmos.  We are not in a position either to 
ascribe or to deny any such particularity to them.  We can and must accept them as our 
fellow-creatures [Mitkreaturen] with all the due regard for the mystery in which God has 
veiled them.216 
 
This is a significant point that I alluded to in the second paragraph of this chapter.  As creatures, 
we possess a natural limitation in our understanding of God and other creatures.  We cannot talk 
definitively about the ways other creatures relate to God because we simply do not know what it 
is like to be another creature in relation to God.  We only know what it is like to be a human 
creature in relation to God and we know that for human creatures, this relationship involves a 
particular history and address.  The human “is the being among all others of whom we know that 
God has directly made Himself known to him, revealing Himself and His will . . . Man is the 
being which is addressed in this way by God.”217  Whether and in what way God addresses other 
animals is shrouded in mystery.  Only by divine revelation can we, as human creatures, glimpse 
the divine address and relationship to other creatures.  I return to this idea in relation to 
phenomenology in chapter 4.1c and again in 6.2a.   
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In a recent article, David Clough argues against what he calls “human-separatist” 
interpretations of Genesis.218  These are interpretations that place humans and other creatures in 
different theological categories.  Similar to the reticence Christian theologians once displayed in 
acknowledging Copernicus’s displacement of Earth from the center of the universe, Clough 
argues that Christians today tend to retain a pre-Darwinian reading of the Genesis creation 
narrative with regard to human distinction from other animals.  Space does not permit me to 
discuss the merits of Clough’s article, so I focus on one specific argument he makes that poses a 
potential problem for my own case for the imago Dei as a distinguishing mark between humans 
and other animals.  As an example of the human-separatist interpretation, Clough cites Walter 
Bruggemann’s statement that in Genesis 1 the human creature “has a different, intimate 
relationship with the creator. . . . This is the one to whom God has made a peculiarly intense 
commitment (by speaking) and to whom marvelous freedom has been granted (in 
responding).”219  Clough rightly notes Barth’s obvious influence on Brueggemann’s statement.220  
Yet, he dismisses Barth’s concept of God electing humans to a particular relationship because of 
Barth’s limited view of Christ’s incarnation.  Barth’s concept of election is dependent on his 
concept of the incarnation and Clough believes “the doctrine of the incarnation need not and 
should not be interpreted in such a way as to establish a discontinuity between human beings and 
other creatures.”221  In other words, Christ’s incarnation has broader implications than Barth 
readily admits.  In this I agree with Clough; yet, I question whether a rejection of the language of 
election is possible from a theological perspective and whether it is even necessary in order to 
articulate a theological anthropology that takes Darwin seriously.  It is not obvious why we must 
use election in the strong sense of marking a qualitative difference between humans and other 
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animals.  Election can also constitute a particularity among a common class of creatures.222  As I 
elaborate in chapter five, the bible’s primary distinction between creatures is not between 
humans and animals, but between humans and animals and their creaturely habitat of plants and 
inanimate natural phenomena.  Humans and other animals are spoken of together as one kind of 
being –  “living creatures (nephesh chayah)” (Gen. 1:20, 24; 2:7; 9:10).  The imago Dei, then 
marks the specific relationship that God establishes amongst a particular group of these living 
creatures.  Of course this weaker understanding of election requires a more inclusive 
understanding of the significance of the incarnation than Barth obviously allows. 
 
I will not belabor this criticism here as I elaborate it more fully in chapter 4.1c.  I will, 
however, briefly demonstrate that, for Barth, the significance of the incarnation is at least open to 
the inclusion of nonhuman creatures, however underdeveloped this topic is in his writings.  Barth 
maintains that humans have a definite relationship with God.  “This does not mean, of course, 
that we must rush to the perverse conclusion that the particular thing which is so basically true of 
man is not also true of other creatures in their way, namely, that they are originally and 
decisively with Jesus, and in this way with God their Creator, and thus participate in being.”223  
Barth cites John 1, Col. 1, and Heb. 1 in support of this view.  Simply because we know the 
particularity in which God summons humans to be in relation does not mean that other animals 
have no relationship with God or other creatures.  Barth does not deny that the incarnation has 
implications for other creatures; he simply refuses to speculate about what exactly these 
implications are.  Because God in Christ became a human rather than another creature, we 
cannot know exactly what it means for other creatures to also be in Christ.224  We can locate, 
therefore, the incarnation’s primary distinguishing factor in the fact that because God became 
human, as humans, we do know what the incarnation means for us.  Barth writes,  
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And it is the fact that human being is revealed as being with God which constitutes its 
particularity. If we affirm and stress this fact, it is not in arrogance towards other 
creatures, but as an act of humility in face of the secret of God in other spheres and its 
revelation in our human sphere. . . . The glory of other creatures lies in the concealment 
of their being with God, no less than ours in its disclosure.225 
 
Thus, if the language of election is based on the incarnation, when we acknowledge the 
(unknown) significance of the incarnation for all creatures, the argument that God’s election of 
humans to a particular relationship necessitates a qualitative break between humans and other 
animals looses much of its force.  Clough is concerned that in light of Darwin, “it is necessary 
for us to recognize that God’s purposes are not exhausted in the creation and redemption of 
human beings . . . there are other creatures over which God’s providential care also extends”226  
As we have seen, however, our knowledge of God’s particular address and purposes for human 
creatures does not “require any unbecoming deprecation of our fellow creatures.”227  
Furthermore, as has just been demonstrated, Barth leaves the significance of the incarnation open 
to other creatures.  We do not need to look far beyond the Barthian concept of election and the 
imago Dei as denoting a particular relationship to find language for articulating the responsibility 
of humanity without also implying a qualitative break between humans and our fellow animal 
creatures. 
  
This relational interpretation of the imago Dei allows us to overcome a problem that 
some theologians have with the way this concept is used to distinguish humans from other 
animals.  David Cunningham has recently argued that differences between creatures “will always 
be a matter of degree rather than a simple opposition of inclusion and exclusion from the 
attribution ‘created in the image of God.’”228  Cunningham correctly states that the abilities of 
humans and animals are differentiated more by degree than kind.  His concern that the imago 
Dei places an arbitrary distinction on the human species, however, leads him to suggest that “the 
imago Dei can also describe other elements of the created order – and that, in fact, the entire 
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creation bears the ‘mark of the Maker’ to at least some degree.”229  Yet, by ascribing elements of 
the image of God to all aspects of creation, the idea becomes too diffuse and consequently 
meaningless.  Cunningham’s proposal also severs the imago Dei from its biblical setting in Gen. 
1:26-27.  It can no longer provide a meaningful distinction between humans and other creatures, 
nor, as we will see in chapter five, can it anymore serve as the grounds for human dominion.  
Cunningham’s drastic suggestion supplies a solution to a problem that is only caused by insisting 
on a substantialist interpretation of the imago Dei.  If we equate the imago Dei with superior 
human capacities, then we might agree with Cunningham’s solution.  Yet by interpreting the 
image relationally, we effectively avoid this whole dilemma.  If we see the imago Dei as 
denoting a particular relationship rather than a special capacity, we should have no trouble 
accepting the differences in capacities between creatures as differences of degree rather than 
kind.  Furthermore, as we noted above, we do not belittle other animals by excluding them from 
the designation, imago Dei.  With regard to their capacities, Barth admits that some animals 
possess abilities “which put those of man in the shade.”230  The image of God distinguishes 
humans not as those creatures that have uniquely superior capacities, but as those creatures that 
exist in a particular relationship of responsibility with regard to God and others.231 
 
1.2b Human Responsibility and Animals 
 
“One of Brunner’s favourite words is responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit).”232  In creating 
humanity, he claims, God created a uniquely responsible, creature.  “Thus we are not concerned 
with an ‘image’ and a ‘reflection’ but with a ‘word’ and an ‘answer;’ this is the exposition which 
the New Testament gives to the Old Testament story of Creation, the idea of imago Dei.”233  In 
this way, Brunner explains, “the being of humanity, at its core, is to be understood: responsible 
being.”234  Humans’ responsibility derives from the particularity of our relationships – humans 
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are those creatures that knowingly and freely respond to God’s word.235  In defining humanity 
“as an act of response to God” Brunner explicitly rejects all other anthropologies that that do not 
take into account this relationship to God as the very essence of humanity’s being.236  Human 
uniqueness, according to Brunner, lies in our creation as creatures that are responsible for 
accepting or rejecting our relationships with the others, both divine and creaturely.  Brunner 
describes this human responsiveness in terms of the “formal” and “material” image of God.  This 
language marks one of the primary disagreements Barth had with Brunner over the imago Dei.  
The particulars of this disagreement are beyond the scope of this chapter.237  Yet despite their 
differences, both Barth and Brunner agree on how this responsible nature of humanity 
distinguishes humans from other animals.   
 
“Figuratively speaking,” Brunner claims, “God produces the other creatures in a finished 
state; they are what they ought to be, and this they remain.”238  Humanity, on the other hand, 
remains, in a sense, unfinished or free.239  As relational, responsible creatures humans provide a 
free answer to God’s word.  This responsibility is a gift, Brunner insists.  God “does not fling it 
at him [the human] – for that would mean that he was a ‘finished article’ – but He offers it to 
him through His call.”240  In this, humans are unique. Cairns explains: “The beasts and God have 
no responsibility, the beasts because they have no freedom, God because He has unconditioned 
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freedom.”241  Thus, the question is not whether animals have a relationship with God, but 
whether animals have a choice in that relationship.  Brunner would clearly answer this question 
in the negative.  Only in humans, who have a limited freedom, can real responsibility arise.242   
 
Barth makes a similar assessment.  God’s Word “does not first summon the animal to a 
decision, but accomplishes this by its utterance.  It takes place in such a way that there can be no 
question of disobedience on the part of the animal.”243  Barth finds examples of this absolute 
divine address to animals in various biblical passages, such as the giant fish that carries Jonah, 
the ravens that feed Elijah, and the various psalms that depict animals praising God.  There are 
certain advantages in both the absoluteness of the divine call to animals and the openness of the 
divine call to humans, Barth admits.  On the one hand, “the goal and final triumph of the divine 
Word are much clearer in the address to beast than to man.”244  On the other hand, humans have 
the privilege of actively participating in that Word, whereas animals can only do so 
“passively.”245  The significant difference is not that humans and animals respond to God, but 
how humans and animals respond to God – passively or actively.  Barth writes,  
 
The meaning and basis for this distinction [between humans and other animals] consists 
in the fact that he [the human] is the animal creature to whom God reveals, entrusts and 
binds Himself within the rest of creation, with whom He makes common cause in the 
course of a particular history which is neither that of an animal nor of a plant, and in 
whose life-activity He expects a conscious and deliberate recognition of His honour, 
mercy and power.246 
 
It is the human’s election as active respondent that makes her responsible.247 
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Part of humanity’s active response to the Word of God consists in our gratitude to God.  
Yet, gratitude, like any response to God, applies in some way to both humans and other animals.  
“As we must say that he [the human] is what he is only in gratitude towards God, we shall have 
to say the same of all other creatures,” Barth claims.248  Animals too owe their creation and 
sustained existence to the grace of God and, therefore, “they belong with us as they too are in 
their own way thankful to God.”249  Yet when he asks what exactly grace and thankfulness mean 
for animals, Barth must admit ignorance.250  Whatever the life of gratitude may mean for other 
animals, the form in which it is demanded of humanity is peculiar to humanity alone.251  Other 
animals “can only exist in thankfulness.  They share this characteristic with us,” Barth explains, 
“[But the human’s] thanks and his thanks alone consist in the fact that he is not bound and 
engaged to the divine Benefactor, but that he freely engages himself to this Benefactor, and has 
in this fact his being.”252  In other words, animals are not held responsible for their being grateful 
to God.  This is consistent with Barth’s previous statement about animals’ passive obedience vs. 
the active response of humans. “It is this being in responsibility for gratitude towards God which 
isolates the being of man from that of all other creatures.”253  We know that both humans and 
animals exist in gratitude to God; yet, we do not know how the other animals thank God, nor do 
we know of any other animals besides humans that are responsible for praising God.254   
 
In this way, humanity’s primary responsibility is one of answering God’s call (Brunner) 
or freely giving gratitude to God (Barth).  This distinction may appear too subtle to merit further 
exposition, but it does mark a basic impasse in their concept of humanity as a responsible being.  
Brunner and Barth disagree as to what it might mean for a human to reject the divine call.  In his 
article, “The New Barth,” Brunner writes that “likeness to God is the nature of man as God’s 
creature in relation to which sin stands in a contradiction which is incomprehensible but on no 
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account inherent in that nature.”255  Sin is a contradiction because humanity is created for 
relationship with God.  Brunner sees this as a point of agreement between himself and Barth, but 
later in the same article he expresses a concern that Barth may mean more by the contradiction 
of sin than Brunner, himself, intends.256  Brunner’s suspicion is correct.  For Barth, sin is not 
only a contradiction of humanity’s nature, it is “an ontological impossibility” because Christ, as 
real man, has already answered “Yes” to God.257  “For Brunner,” Barth believes, “man is neutral: 
man can sin because man is free.  For me man is not neutral: he can only obey.  One cannot 
explain sin: it is an actuality without possibility.”258  For Barth, humans are already obedient to 
God in Jesus Christ.259  Willis aptly summarizes Barth’s position: “As Christ is both electing 
God and elected man, he exhibits conclusively both the freedom of God for man, and man’s 
corresponding freedom for God and his fellows.”260  Barth, in this way, does not see how 
Brunner can say both that humanity’s being is in Christ and that we can choose not to be so – “If 
man has his being in the Word of God, he can do only that which corresponds to the Word of 
God.”261  Hart explains this disagreement as a difference in the way Brunner and Barth conceive 
of the temporality of God’s judgment and human responsibility.  Brunner understands God’s 
judgment as taking place in the future and based on each human’s present responsible answer to 
the divine call.  For Barth, God’s judgment lies in the past and is based on Christ’s pretemporal 
response to God.262  It is also worth pointing out that Barth does not, theoretically, exclude 
nonhuman animals from his considerations here.  He does not believe it is probable, but “if there 
were godlessness in nonhuman creatures, it would have to be understood as an ontological 
impossibility” as well.263  This is because all creatures are somehow with Jesus and therefore 
with God.  He admits, however, that talk of sin truly makes sense only for creatures to which 
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God is revealed and which know themselves in confrontation with God, i.e. those made in the 




Both Brunner and Barth agree that humanity’s responsibility to God also includes a 
responsibility to other creatures.  This is most obvious in our relationships with other humans.  
For Brunner this responsibility is manifest in neighborly love.  Thus, “man cannot be man ‘by 
himself’; he can only be man in community.  For love can only operate in community, and only 
in this operation of love is man human,” Brunner writes.264  Humans are responsible for 
answering the divine call in love and are similarly responsible for answering the call of the 
human community.  Barth, for his part, emphasizes this human-human responsibility in his 
exposition of the biblical statement, “He created them male and female.”265  Yet “in his 
anthropological teaching Barth very definitely declares that even in dealing with nonhuman 
creatures, we as creatures are always in relation, for in ourselves first of all we are destined for 
coexistence and are, therefore, relational beings.”266  As I argue in the following chapters, the 
relational community in which neighborly love operates necessarily includes other animals.  My 
main point in this chapter, however, has been to show that human responsibility for animals 
possesses an unequal or one-sided quality.  We may hold humans responsible for their 
relationships and actions toward other creatures, but we would be mistaken to do the same with 
regard to animals.  We first observed that while the existence of medieval animal trials appears 
to give support to the view that humans once believed animals to be morally culpable, a deeper 
look at these trials proves otherwise.  We then surveyed philosophical and ethological arguments 
regarding animal moral responsibility and found that animals do not ultimately exhibit the levels 
of intentionality or understanding of good and evil necessary for truly responsible action.  As 
Stephen R.L. Clark concludes, “They are not moral: for they do not, as far as we can see, have 
any occasion to moralize about themselves or to construct intellectual systems to accommodate 
their immediate responses.”267  Finally, we looked at the issue theologically by articulating the 
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distinction between animal and human responsibility with the use of the concept, imago Dei.  
Humans were seen here to be summoned to a particular relationship with God resulting in their 
responsibility for answering the call of the divine and creaturely others.   
 
I would like to conclude by reiterating Barth’s emphasis that denying the imago Dei, and 
thus responsibility, to other animals does necessarily constitute a deprecation of our fellow 
creatures.  Other animals have the advantage of being unable to fail in answering the divine call.  
Responsibility comes with the ability to be other than what God has created us to be.  A bear 
cannot of its own accord become less of a bear.  Humans can manipulate bears and force them to 
act in ways contrary to their natures or restrict their environments to such a degree that the bear 
can no longer act out its bearness. Yet, moral fault in such circumstances falls on humans, not 
bears.  Bears do not actively pursue bearness; they simply are bears.  Humans, on the other hand, 
have an active role in being human.  We choose to answer or reject the divine call or the call of 
creaturely neighbors.  This “call” and “answer,” to use Brunner’s terminology, is what makes 
humans responsible.  Animals are not similarly responsible for fulfilling their own being. Thus, 
it is a tragedy for humans to fail to be responsible; it is not for other animals.268  Far from 
separating humans from other animals, this unique responsibility actually depends upon our 
relationship with other animals and draws us into closer community with them.  As we will see 
in the following two chapters, to respond responsibly with neighborly love for animals involves 
the whole human person – our reason and emotions. 
                                                                                                                                           
might be considered “ethical” in the sense that “they respond to aspects of a situation and to features of 
their kindred, that a good man also would respect.”  
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CHAPTER 2: ʻCARINGʼ FOR ANIMAL NEIGHBORS, PART 1 
 
“…and when he saw him, he was moved with pity.” (Luke 10:33b) 
 
One fall Princeton philosophy professor, George Pitcher, noticed a dark colored creature 
creeping through the tall grass of his backyard.  The animal was a feral dog, clearly pregnant and 
reticent of humans, who eventually nested in a hole under Pitcher’s backyard shed.  “I couldn’t 
help being touched by this dark creature, alone in the world, with a gang of puppies to look 
after,” Pitcher recalls.  “And winter coming on.  Somewhere inside me the subversive, irrational 
hope was already forming that she would have her puppies on our property.”269  Pitcher’s 
moving memoir, The Dogs Who Came to Stay, tells the story of the deep connection that 
eventually develops between this professor, this abused and abandoned animal, who he names 
Lupa, and one of her pups.  As the story progresses, Pitcher’s relationship with Lupa opens up a 
world of emotions that he had formerly been unable to fully express.  Eventually in her death, 
she helped him overcome his lifelong inability to confront the reality of the death – “she taught 
me, at last, how to grieve.”270  All of this began with the sympathetic feeling the sight of this 
needy animal evoked in Pitcher and his decision to offer it care in the form of a bowl of dog 
food.  Like the Samaritan in our parable, Pitcher was moved to care for this needy animal after 
being first moved emotionally by her.  The Samaritan is not depicted as rationalizing his decision 
to care for the wounded traveler by appealing to an abstract, universal, ethical imperative.  Jesus 
simply states that “when he saw him, he was moved with pity (or compassion, ἐσπλαγχνίσθη).  
He went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on them.  Then he put 
him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of him” (Luke 10:33b-34).  
Accordingly, this chapter will argue that human moral responsibility, especially with regard to 
other animals, involves a necessarily emotional component. 
 
In the previous chapter we focused on the reality of human moral responsibility and its 
derivative relationship to our summons as imago Dei.  We found that other animals, while 
existing in hierarchical societies often with complex social rules, nevertheless lack the 
intentional and cognitive capacities to be considered truly responsible in a morally relevant 
sense.  Cognitive autonomy, in the strong Kantian sense, however, forms only one piece in the 
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larger tapestry of human moral action.  It is important, therefore, that the present chapter 
immediately follow the previous in order to provide the missing thread.  The relational 
interpretation of imago Dei taken in the previous chapter defined humans as those creatures that 
exist in free response to the call of God and other creatures.  In the present chapter morality is 
shown to consist not simply in human existence as responsible creatures, but in human 
responsibility for specific others.  The human reply to the call of the other demands a 
relationship between two relational subjects, between an I and a Thou.271  In this chapter I use 
insights gained from feminist ethics of care to draw attention to both the essential emotional 
content of the human reply to animal neighbors and the concrete relationships that provide 
context for this reply.  My argument proceeds in three stages.  I first lay out an introduction to 
the ethics of care and its promise for a Christian animal ethic.  Second, I ask questions regarding 
the proper objects of care and find that, while we may have concern for the health of plants and 
ecosystems, only other sentient creatures capable of a reply may be truly cared for.  This claim 
leads me in the third section to investigate the importance that sympathetic emotions hold in 
providing a connection between human care and animals as proper recipient subjects of that care.   
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CARE PERSPECTVE 
 
2.1a Key Figures and Characteristics 
 
 As I noted in the Introduction, feminist ethicists began thinking seriously about animals 
in the late twentieth century.  The specific branch of feminist theory that I turn to now, the ethics 
of care, “is an account of ethics that first began to be articulated in the early 1980s by thinkers 
such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings.”272  In 1982 Carol Gilligan published In a Different 
Voice, a book that provided the foundational vision for the development of an ethics of care.  In 
this book Gilligan argues that traditional psychological models like those of Freud, Piaget, and 
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Kohlberg prioritize male tendencies like separation and universalizing and therefore see 
women’s moral development, which emphasizes relationship and the particular, as deficient.  
Gilligan, contends, however, that the female caring perspective actually represents a separate and 
valid ethical perspective rather than a defective conception of justice.  Although she associates 
male thinking with the rights or justice approach, which is characterized by abstract, rule-based, 
universalized principles, Gilligan does not believe the two perspectives are biologically 
determined.  Gilligan writes in her introduction: 
 
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but by theme.  Its 
association with women is an empirical observation. . . . But this association is not 
absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to 
highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem of 
interpretation rather than to represent a generalization about either sex.273   
 
The Swiss Christian physician Paul Tournier, who believed that emotions are bound up in the 
very constitution of human and animal being, also saw a discrepancy in male and female abilities 
to expresses emotion.  He attributed this, like Gilligan, largely to cultural models of masculinity 
and femininity imposed in Western societies.  “It is men, therefore, who are handicapped in this 
respect, deprived of one of the most human qualities of their nature, and that is why they are 
generally so impersonal,” Tournier writes.274  Other cultures, he insists, have “preserved greater 
emotional warmth and a keener sense of community” than his own.275  Yet, despite Gilligan’s 
cautionary remark in her introduction, some opponents have still criticized her methodology and 
justice/male, care/female association.  Lawrence Walker, for example, writes that “the moral 
reasoning of men and women is remarkably similar.”276  In a response to her critics Gilligan 
states, “No claims . . . are made about the origins of these voices or their distribution in a wider 
population, across cultures or time.  Thus, the care perspective in my rendition is neither 
biologically determined nor unique to women.”277  This is an important point to keep in mind if 
the insights gained from the ethics of care are to be used in the development of a Christian 
animal ethic.  Both men and women have regular interactions with animals, whether that be 
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directly through keeping pets, working with animals, sharing wild places with animals, or more 
indirectly through consuming products made from animals.  Therefore to provide adequate 
content to the human relationship to animals, such an ethic must prove viable for both sexes. 
 
 Two years later in 1984, Nel Noddings developed Gilligan’s observations and vision 
into a more systematic ethical argument and position.  As we will see in the following chapter, 
she outlines two levels of caring, natural and ethical.  Both Gilligan and Noddings are highly 
critical of theories such as Kant’s that focus on individuals, impartiality, and abstract, universal 
imperatives.  Because its two foundational texts were published shortly over two decades ago, 
the ethics of care enjoys a certain novelty as an explicit ethical theory relative to the more 
traditional justice approaches espoused by thinkers like Rawls, Kant, Bentham, and even ancient 
Stoic philosophers as described by Martha Nussbaum.  Therefore, before delving into a detailed 
analysis of the ethics of care and its insights for a Christian animal ethic, it is necessary to offer a 
brief sketch of the theory’s main points.   
 
 Virginia Held concisely outlines five key characteristics of the ethics of care.  First, it 
concerns itself with attending to the specific needs of those for whom we take responsibility.  In 
other words, dependency rather than, or in addition to, autonomy is viewed as a fundamental 
reality of human existence.  Childhood and old age are not viewed as aberrations to a normal 
human moral life.  “Moralities built on the image of the independent, autonomous, rational 
individual largely overlook the reality of human dependence and the morality for which it calls,” 
Held claims.278  I look more closely at the moral significance of dependence below in subsection 
2.1c in conversation with Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of “virtues of acknowledged 
dependence.”  I later return to the issue of dependence in relation to domestic animals in chapter 
4.2b.  Second, the ethics of care values rather than rejects emotion.  This is not to say that raw 
emotions need not be thoughtfully evaluated – reflection is a crucial move in Noddings’s 
transition from natural to ethical caring.  It simply means, “from the care perspective, moral 
inquiries that rely entirely on reason and rationalistic deductions or calculations are seen as 
deficient.”279  Third, the ethics of care “rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the 
more abstract the reasoning about a moral problem the better because the more likely to avoid 
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bias and arbitrariness, the more nearly to achieve impartiality.”280   Closely related to the first 
characteristic, this attention to the particular needs and relationships that one has with others 
makes care ethicists wary of theories that attempt to consider humanity or animals in general or 
simplify human responsibility to a succinct set of abstract rules.  Forth, “like much feminist 
thought in many areas, it reconceptualizes traditional notions about the public and the private.”281  
The ethics of care sees private, familiar, and community relationships that are often un-chosen 
and non-contractual as possessing moral significance.  Fifth, again closely related to the first, 
“the ethics of care usually works with a conception of persons as relational, rather than as the 
self-sufficient independent individuals of the dominant moral theories.”282  The autonomy sought 
in the ethics of care, Held claims, consists of a freedom to reshape and cultivate relationships 
rather than to create a separate, abstract self.  Because of its commitment to particularity, the 
ethics of care cannot overlook individuals; yet, its interest in relationship draws attention to the 
fact that human nature and morality are constituted as such by the connections humans have with 
other humans and, from a Christian perspective, God and other creatures.  This final 
characteristic possesses a particular resonance with the relational interpretation of the imago Dei 
in the previous chapter.  We are concerned here with a call and a reply, or in Brunner’s words 
with “a ‘word’ and an ‘answer.’”283  Humanity is created in the image of God by existing as that 
creature that is uniquely responsible for its relationships with God and others.  I turn now to this 
response and relationship as articulated in the ethics of care.    
  
2.1b Relationship in Caring and Theological Ethics 
 
Carol Gilligan first articulated the caring perspective’s sensitivity to relationship by 
studying female responses to tests designed to measure psychological and moral development.  
She employs Lawrence Kohlberg’s articulation of the Heinz dilemma as an example.284  In this 
hypothetical case, Heinz’s wife has a rare form of cancer.  He is, however, unable to afford the 
cost the druggist charges for the only drug that can save her.  When asked whether it would be 
right for Heinz to steal the drug, a young boy answered with a clear “Yes.”  He saw the problem 
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as a conflict between the values of life and property with life superseding that of property.  A 
young girl, in contrast, viewed the problem arising less as a conflict between competing rights 
and more as a failure of response.  In “seeing the world comprised of relationships rather than of 
people standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through 
systems of rules, she found the puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to 
respond to the wife,” Gilligan concludes.285  A female college student answered the question in a 
similar manner.  “They both equate responsibility with the need for response that arises from the 
recognition that others are counting on you and that you are in a position to help.”286  From this 
point of view moral action is dictated by the needs of those with whom one is in relationship.  In 
contrast Kohlberg sees the highpoint of moral development in the application of “universal 
ethical principles that all humanity should follow.”287  The care perspective thus articulated 
possesses striking similarities to our previous interpretation of the imago Dei as responsible 
relationship.  Like theological ethicists, care ethicists see relationship as basic to a conception of 
real humanity.  Humans in both cases are seen as existing in a series of relationships, many of 
which are simply given, like the relations between parent and child, human and God, and, in 
many cases, human and animal.  Morality, therefore, is concerned with how humans reply to the 
call of the other in these relationships. 
 
“Taking relation as ontologically basic,” Noddings’s explains, “simply means that we 
recognize human encounter and affective response as a basic fact of human existence.”288  
Humans are not isolated individuals; they are individuals in relationship.  “My very 
individuality,” Noddings asserts, “is defined in a set of relations.  This is my basic reality.”289  
Without knowing the speaker, we could not be criticized for assuming statements such as these 
derive from the mouth of a theologian expressing a theological anthropology of relationship like 
we discussed in the previous chapter.  The relational interpretation of humans as imago Dei 
would sit nicely alongside the relational understanding of humanity in the ethics of care except 
for one significant feature.  Both agree on the moral and ontological significance of relationship, 
yet unlike theological ethicists, Noddings’s articulation of the ethics of care does not conceive 
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the human relationship with God as significant or necessary to her understanding of humanity.  It 
is not surprising that Noddings’s language has a theological ring to it.  In order to develop 
Gilligan’s observations and theory into a complete ethical account she appropriates many ideas 
from the Jewish theologian Martin Buber.  Yet, her refusal to allow a place for the human 
relationship with the divine in her explication of care leaves her use of Buber’s thought wanting.  
Buber’s conception of the I-Thou relation is inseparable from his belief in the all-encompassing 
presence of God.  Buber writes, “In every sphere, through everything that becomes present to us, 
we gaze toward the train [hem or edge] of the eternal You; . . . in every You we address the 
eternal You, in every sphere according to its manner.”290  Our own ability to be in relationship is 
contingent upon the divine decision to be in relationship with and create a world capable of 
being in relation.  From a Christian perspective that sees God as Trinity, relationship is at the 
very heart of the divine being.291  Human relationships can then be seen as a reflection of and 
participation in the eternal perichoresis of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  Space does not 
permit a full exposition of this key doctrine of Christian faith, but it suffices to note that ignoring 
the relationship between creature and Creator divests Noddings’s account of a rich foundation 
for understanding the ontological significance of relationship.  Human existence as a being in 
relation is simply one expression of an entire universe that exists in relationship with its divine 
creator.  This idea proves particularly pertinent for an ethic of care that attempts to extend past 
the human sphere because it sees relationship as ontologically basic to all of Creation, not just 
humans.292 
 
For many care ethicists, the parent/child relationship, particularly the care of a mother 
for her child, represents a central symbol in our understanding of the nature of the caring 
relationship.293  This is also an important, though sometimes overlooked, metaphor of the divine 
relationship with Creation in Jewish and Christian scriptures.  Old Testament scholar John 
Goldingay picks up this imagery when he paraphrases Gen. 1:1: “In the beginning, God birthed 
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the heavens and the earth.”294  The metaphor of birth, he claims, is one of a number of key 
themes in the first chapters of Genesis.  In Gen. 2:4, the “generations of the heavens and the 
earth” recall the familiar relationship of later generational lists in the book.  Psalm 90:2, he 
observes, makes this association with divine creation and birth explicit.  Here the mountains are 
quite literally “birthed” (yalad) from God.  If scripture describes God’s relationship with the 
world as a relationship of motherly care, we should not be surprised that humanity’s own 
relationship to other responsive creatures, as imago Dei, also finds resonance with an ethic of 
care that extols the mother icon.  This is surely a metaphor, Goldingay insists, but nevertheless, 
“birthing is an image that tells us something true about God’s relationship with the world.”295  It 
hints, for one, of the deep care and joys of motherhood.  He compares the separating of the 
waters from the dry land in Genesis 1 to Job 38:8-11 where the confining of the sea “was no 
more problematic for Yhwh than keeping a newborn baby under control is problematic for its 
mother.”296  The divine pronouncements of “good” and “very good” in Genesis 1 may even be 
compared to the delight that a parent takes in her child.297  This analogy is even repeated in the 
New Testament when Jesus likens his care for Jerusalem to that of a mother hen for her chicks 
(Luke 13:34).  This last analogy is particularly interesting for a care based animal ethic in that 
the care described is that of a mother animal rather than a human.  As we will see in the 
following chapter, the ethics of care has no problem attributing a certain kind of caring capacity 
to nonhuman animals.  It is in fact this natural caring impulse that humans share with other 
animals that forms the base upon which human ethical caring is built. 
 
2.1c Care and Dependency 
 
The dependency of a child on its mother provides a good example of the reality and 
significance of dependency in both human and animal relationships.  As I noted in the 
introduction, Alasdair MacIntyre takes up this theme in his book Dependent Rational Animals.  
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Here he insists on “the moral importance of acknowledging not only our vulnerabilities and 
afflictions, but also our consequent dependence.”298  From infancy to old age, sickness to 
permanent disability, humans exist in varying degrees of dependency on others.  MacIntyre 
argues that in this regard “we comport ourselves towards the world in much the same way as 
other intelligent animals.”299 Rather than widening the gap, this common fact of dependency 
connects the lives of humans with those of other animals.  MacIntyre’s observation is significant 
because it prevents us from assuming that we exist essentially as autonomous, rational agents 
and that those relationships that are of most importance ethically are those that we voluntarily 
initiate with other autonomous, rational agents.  In reality humans, like other animals, enter the 
world in dependent relationships that are not of our own making.  For any ethical theory to 
represent a complete picture of human existence, therefore, it must acknowledge our essential 
vulnerability and dependence.  In this way MacIntre notes that the significant difference between 
humans and animals is that humans 
 
have the possibility of understanding their animal identity through time from conception 
to death and with it their need at different past and future stages of life for the care of 
others, that is, as those who, having received care, will be from time to time called upon 
to give care, and who, having given, will from time to time themselves once more be in 
need of care by and from others.300 
 
Humans are uniquely able to respond to the vulnerability of other creatures in a way that 
recognizes the common dependency that unites us all. 
 
In criticizing past ethical theories for failing to adequately acknowledge dependency, 
MacIntyre hits upon an important, though not always strongly articulated, theme in Christian 
theology.  Both the Old and New Testaments of Christian scripture attest to the reality and moral 
significance of vulnerability.  We find a surprising Old Testament example of this in the 
Leviticus dietary and sacrificial laws.  Anthropologist Mary Douglas argues that one way of 
looking at the “unclean” animals in these laws is to see them as representative of “the 
endangered categories for whom Isaiah spoke, the oppressed, the fatherless, the widow (Isa. 
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1.17).”301  She draws a parallel between these forbidden animals – the laboring ants, the 
blindness of bats, the vulnerability of fish without scales – and the vulnerability of human 
laborers, orphans, and widows.  The text is not saying that these animals are to be shunned 
because of their unusual bodies any more than other passages teach that poor humans are to be 
shunned because of their vulnerability.  The issue is not shunning but predation.  Expounding the 
blood prohibition of Gen. 9:4, the writers of Leviticus understand holiness as incompatible with 
predatory behavior (Lev. 19:14).  “Predation is wrong, eating is a form of predation and the poor 
are not to be prey.”302  Respect for these animals that represent vulnerability becomes a way for 
the Israelites to symbolically remember their responsibility for the poor and the vulnerable in 
their own society.   
 
While the forbidden animals in Leviticus are seen by Douglas to represent vulnerability, 
we saw from MacIntyre that vulnerability is a trait shared by both humans and animals.  Species 
lines, therefore, need not bind the biblical concern for the poor.  We see just such an extension of 
care for dependent animals in laws against boiling a calf in its mother’s milk or prematurely 
separating a newborn calf from its mother (Ex 23:19; Lev 22:27-28).  Furthermore, as we noted 
in the Introduction, from the New Testament perspective of the parable of the Good Samaritan, 
neighborly love is concerned primarily with the act of caring for the one in need rather than their 
status.  The man in the ditch is wholly dependent; he is in no position to reject the Samaritan’s 
aid.303  In this way, the fallen man is little different from the sheep that has fallen into a pit on the 
Sabbath (Matt. 12:11).  Both are in positions of dependency and constitute objects of neighborly 
responsibility.  In shifting focus away from the Samaritan to the man in the ditch,304 the work of 
New Testament scholar Robert Funk proves enlightening.  “If the auditor, as Jew, understands 
what it means to be the victim in the ditch, in this story, he/she also understands what the 
kingdom is all about.”305  By placing ourselves in the ditch, a place of dependency where our 
differences from other animals loose significance, we open ourselves up to the true power of the 
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parable.  Funk summarizes the parable’s message: “In the Kingdom of God mercy comes only to 
those who have no right to expect it and who cannot resist it when it comes.”306  One would be 
hard pressed to find a better description of the dependent natures of both human and animal 
neighbors.307 
 
2.2 CARE FOR ANIMALS, CONCERN FOR PLANTS 
  
This section distinguishes care for animals from a concern for the natural environment in 
general.  I return to this distinction again in chapter five in relation to the biblical contrast 
between having dominion over living creatures and subduing the earth.  It is worth introducing 
now, however, for it holds particular significance to our notion of caring for animals as 
neighbors.  Human ‘care’ for plants “is not, strictly speaking, the true ethical ought.  I cannot 
receive a plant as I can a human being, or even as I can certain animals,” Noddings contends.308  
While my analysis of caring for animals in this chapter differs from Noddings’s at significant 
points,309 I concur with her basic instinct in regard to the distinction between animals and plants.  
Thus, both a Christian neighborly love ethic and the feminist ethics of care value other animals 
as uniquely suitable recipients of care.  Unlike humans or animals, however, plants and other 
inanimate natural phenomena do not place a true call on humans that care is capable of receiving 
or replying to.  In the following section I first discuss Noddings’s conception of the “receptive 
mode” in human caring.  The receptive mode is significant for animal ethics in that it puts 
humans in a position to receive the call of the animal as the call of a true subject.  In the 
following subsections I explore questions concerning reciprocity in caring for animals, what 
criteria are necessary to establish a true reply, and finally whether caring is appropriate for the 
land or the natural environment in general.  
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2.2a The “Receptive Mode” 
 
Before we can respond ethically to the call of the other we must put ourselves in a 
position to receive that call.  Caring, in this way, is not simply an acknowledgement that human 
life, biological, historical, and moral, is shaped by a series of relationships.  Caring is about the 
reply that we give to the call of the other in these relationships.  Noddings describes this 
“receptive mode” by explicitly borrowing language and concepts from Martin Buber’s I and 
Thou.  “When I receive the other, I am totally with the other,” she claims.310  The receptive mode 
consists of feeling rather than reason.  This feeling will eventually lead to an assessment of the 
relationship and a course of action, but it does not begin there.  “In the receptive mode itself, I 
am not thinking the other as object.  I am not making claims to knowledge.”311  Buber speaks of 
this as an encounter rather than an experience of the other.  “The You encounters me by grace,” 
he claims.  “The relation is election and electing, passive and active at once: An action of the 
whole being must approach passivity, for it does away with all partial actions and thus with any 
sense of action, which always depends on limited exertions.”312  In other words, the encounter 
between the I and the Thou is primarily receptive.  It begins without a prior intention, whether 
benevolent or otherwise.  The Thou is not assessed as worthy or unworthy of care, he/she is 
simply encountered.  The relation is direct or unmediated (unmittelbar) by rationale or motive.  
“Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no imagination. . . . 
No purpose intervenes between I and You.”313  We must shift, Noddings claims, from  
 
an assimilatory mode to a receptive-intuitive mode. . . . In such a mode, we receive 
what-is-there as nearly as possible without evaluation or assessment.  We are in the 
world of relation, having stepped out of the instrumental world, we have either not yet 
established goals or we have suspended striving for those already established.314   
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As we will find in the following chapter, this non-rational receptivity causes problems for more 
rational, justice inclined thinkers like Martha Nussbaum.  It is a vital concept for caring, 
however, in that the first response the one-caring315 gives to the call of the other consists of a 
passive reception of that call. It does not project the one-caring’s desires or beliefs on the one 
cared-for.  Only after this initial disposition of open, receptivity does caring incorporate a 
cognitive element and become active.  The receptive mode allows the one-caring to encounter 
the other first as a subject before seeing him/her as a problem that requires solving.  We may 
desire for plants to actively respond to human care when they are in fact capable only of 
reacting.  I use the term react to identify the specific kind of response that plants give to human 
manipulation.  Reaction is characterized by passivity and a lack of cognition or emotion.  
Animals and humans, on the other hand, offer a true reply to the care of others.  Reply is 
characterized actively and with some level of cognition or emotion.  The human reply, as 
discussed in the previous chapter and developed further below, is then distinguished from the 
animal reply as a responsible reply.  Thus, because plants only possess the capacity to react, they 




Noddings approaches the question of reciprocity by asking whether her houseplants 
respond to her care or simply to her “caretaking.”  “Would they not do just as well if I did the 
right things at the right time with no engrossment and no displacement of motivation?” she 
asks.316  In answering this question, she admits that her talking to her plants as if she ‘cares’ for 
them does more for her own well-being than that of her plants.  Looking after her plants as if she 
were truly caring for them supports her own “best self,”317 or conception that she has of herself 
as a caring individual, which she sees as important for ethical caring.  But for the plant itself, 
caretaking is enough.  When we consider the plant world, she asserts, something like caring can 
occur, but “there is no true relation between humans and plants because the relation is logically 
one-sided and there is no other consciousness to receive the caring.”318   In a true caring 
relationship both parties must somehow contribute – “my caring must be somehow completed in 
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the other if the relation is to be described as caring.”319  This ability to reply is something that 
both humans and other animals share and a trait that unites them in the biblical creation story.  
“In blessing the creatures, God addresses them,” Goldingay claims.  “God’s previous commands 
have been in the third person.  For the first time God speaks in the imperative, overtly speaking 
to someone.”320  God pronounces the previous acts of creation, the water, the land, the 
vegetation, and the lights of the sky, “good,” but God does not address them with a further 
command or blessing.  “Apparently the animal world is able to hear God speak and respond to it, 
as the cosmos and the plant world cannot.  The animal world is created, blessed and 
addressed.”321  That animals do not reply to God in the same responsible manner as humans was 
discussed in the previous chapter.  What is important to note here is that animals, as opposed to 
plants, do reply.  Animals similarly respond to human care with a reply, rather than a passive 
reaction, and are, therefore, appropriate subjects of human care.   
 
Yet, this is not always clear in Noddings’s writing.  Our obligation to care, she claims, is 
limited by the possibility of reciprocity.  “We are not obliged to act as one-caring if there is no 
possibility of completion in the other.”322  In humans caring can be completed through an 
acknowledgement via words or some other communicative action.  While animals do not 
necessarily lack the capacity for some form of species-specific language or communicative 
behavior, their inability to express themselves with the complexity that comes with human 
language means their ability to reply to human caring is also much less complex.  Caring, 
however, can be completed in animals at the level of response to pain.  “Insofar as we can 
receive the pain of a creature and detect its relief as we remove the pain, we are both addressed 
and received,” Noddings claims.323  She concludes that at the very least, therefore, the human 
obligation of care toward animals means, “we may not inflict pain without justification.”324  
When a human encounters pain in an animal, her responsive mode is first engaged.  She 
encounters the animal as a distinct subject; when she then moves to address the animal’s pain, 
her care is completed in the animal’s relief.  In humans we may enjoy a more complex, 
communicative reply from the one cared-for, but with animals we must be content with a pre-
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linguistic reply.  This poses no problem for the animal’s suitability as a proper subject of care, 
however, because as Noddings emphasizes, “this reciprocity is not contractual; that is, it is not 
characterized by mutuality.”325  “What we seek in caring is not payment or reciprocity in kind 
but the special reciprocity that connotes completion.”326  We do not expect animals, or even 
humans, to reciprocate our caring by caring for us in turn.  We do expect our caring to find 
completion in the one cared-for.  We expect that the one cared-for is capable of a reply rather 
than mere reaction.  A Christian animal ethic informed by the parable of the Good Samaritan 
seems particularly ready to take advantage of this point.  Clare Palmer points out that, although 
human relationships with pets or working animals may approach reciprocity, there is also “a 
long-standing Christian tradition that loving is not necessarily to be regarded as reciprocal.”327  
We find just such an example in our guiding parable.  In caring for the fallen traveler, the 
Samaritan in the parable gives no indication that he expects to be repaid.  The state of the 
traveler shows a great deal of resemblance to that of animals in this regard.  Left for dead on the 
side of the road, the traveler’s relief from pain is likely the only completion the Samaritan’s care 
can find. 
 
2.2c Two Criteria for a Reply? 
 
So far we have been looking at a chapter in Caring where Noddings directly addresses 
the possibility of care for animals and other creatures; yet, before this section, she puzzlingly 
paints a much less agreeable picture of animals’ ability to offer a sufficiently reciprocal reply.  
With regard to fellow humans, she claims, we cannot refuse the fact of relation.  “In connection 
with animals, however, we may find it possible to refuse relation itself on the grounds of a 
species-specific impossibility of any form of reciprocity in caring.”328  She bases this assessment 
on two criteria that constitute an obligation of caring: that there exist first, the reality “or 
potential for present relation,” and second, the “dynamic potential for growth in relation, 
including the potential for increased reciprocity and, perhaps, mutuality.”329  The first criterion 
poses no significant problem since we have already established that both humans and animals are 
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capable of a reply rather than mere reaction.  Thus, in the receptive mode a human may receive 
the animal as a true subject, a Thou.  If we must also accept the second criterion of “potential for 
growth in relation,” however, we may be forced to exclude animals from our sphere of care.  
“The potential for response in animals, for example, is nearly static,” Noddings claims.  “They 
cannot respond mutually, nor can the nature of their response change substantially.  But a child’s 
potential for increased response is enormous.”330  “Growth in relation” as a criterion for care not 
only excludes animals from human care, it also contradicts Noddings’s later statement about 
animals’ responsiveness to pain as a fundamental kind of reply.  If human caring can find 
completion in an animal by relieving its pain, adding a second criterion of potential growth 
seems unnecessarily restrictive.  It is possible that Noddings does so because of her conscious 
efforts to distance her theory from that of justice-based animal ethicists like Peter Singer.  She 
wants to establish an ethic that clearly distinguishes “between our obligation to human infants 
and, say, pigs.”331  
 
Yet, positing this as a criterion for the obligation to care causes problems not only for 
human care for animals but also human care for other humans.  Held observes:  
 
In normal cases, recipients of care sustain caring relations through their 
responsiveness—the look of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient. Where 
such responsiveness is not possible—with a severely mentally ill person, for instance—
sustaining the relation may depend entirely on the caregiver, but it is still appropriate to 
think in terms of caring relations: The caregiver may be trying to form a relation or must 
imagine a relation.332 
 
If we take the reality of dependency seriously, we find that Noddings’s mention of “growth in 
relation,” much less a growth in relation that possesses the potential for mutuality, constitutes an 
unnecessary stipulation for the establishment of the caring relation.  We can potentially get 
around this problem with humans by imagining a relation, as Held suggests.  Yet, if taken too far 
this solution runs up against the danger of abstraction.  By imagining that the one cared-for 
possesses capacities for growth in response that he does not, we fail to pay sufficient attention to 
the particular individual and situation (another key principle for the ethics of care).  We end up 
caring for an abstract, idealized individual that does not really exist.  There is nothing inherently 
                                                
330 Ibid., 87. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Held, Ethics of Care, 36. 
 82 
wrong with recognizing that the one cared-for’s potential for growth in response regulates the 
character and comprehensiveness of our caring.  This is in fact vital for seeing the one cared-for 
as a specific individual.  If this observation operates as a limiting criterion that excludes animals 
from the possibility of human care, however, it must be rejected.  It is not only unnecessary; it 
overlooks the reality of human care being completed in animals as well as the real potential for 
growth, however limited, in human-animal relationships.  Animals have a limited range of 
responsive behaviors, but like human children, animals develop these capacities over time.  
Veterinarian and animal behavioralist Michael W. Fox observes, for example, “that the 
developing brain of the dog, its unfolding pattern of socialization and other critical sensitive 
periods during development are very similar, and sometimes identical, to the same phenomena 
recognized in the human infant, although they develop on a different time base.”333  Both 
puppies and human children experience growth in their relational capacities, although to 
differing degrees.  Furthermore, the longer and more intimate the human and animal relationship 
becomes, the greater each participant is able to understand the other’s communicative behaviors, 
however different they may at first appear.  Such understanding on the part of animals is what 
makes training possible.  Noddings herself even admits that though her relationship with her pet 
cat “does not possess the dynamic potential that characterizes [her] relation with infants,”334 a 
certain level of mutual understanding between human and cat cannot be denied.  Accordingly, 
she does comment that “the first criterion establishes an absolute obligation and the second 
serves to put our obligations into an order of priority.”335  Yet, her further statement that humans 
may then refuse relation itself with regard to animals confuses her position.  Therefore we would 
do better to see “growth in relation” as a guideline rather than an absolute criterion for 
establishing obligations of care. 
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2.2d Care and the Land? 
 
In our investigation so far, we have seen how vegetation’s inability to engage the human 
receptive mode disqualifies if from a relationship with humans that can properly be described as 
care.  We then found animals’ responsiveness to pain as adequate grounds for their ability to 
receive human care and that a further criterion of growth in relation is unnecessary.  We will 
now consider how the caring act’s need to find completion in the one cared-for provides still 
further grounds for limiting the caring relation to humans and animals.  Environmental 
philosopher J. Baird Callicott contends that a theory of moral sentiment is more adequate for an 
environmental ethic than a rational, justice based ethics along the lines of Kant, Rawls, Singer, 
and Regan.  He traces the ideological heritage of Aldo Leopold’s famous “land ethic” back to 
Charles Darwin and David Hume who both saw a positive connection between human emotions 
and moral sensibilities.  Callicott says that the similarity of animals to humans appropriately 
stimulates our moral sympathy and therefore they “ought to be extended moral 
considerability.”336  He even cites Carol Gilligan approvingly as emphasizing the moral 
importance of relationships and feelings of care.  Leopold simply extended and directed these 
natural human sensibilities to the natural environment as a whole.  “Aldo Leopold tried to 
persuade us that we ought to feel a sense of kinship with our fellow voyagers in the odyssey of 
evolution and love and respect for the land because ecology has reorganized our understanding 
of nature,” Callicott claims.337  In other words, because ecology teaches that humans exist within 
a larger “biotic community,” we should extend our sympathies and caring relationships to 
include ecosystems as well as individual humans and animals.  A true caring relationship, 
however, cannot make this final step because care is limited by reciprocity.  Care must be 
completed in the one cared-for.   
 
 Writing a decade before the emergence of care as an ethical tradition in its own right, 
philosopher Philip Mercer, made several observations about the relationship between what he 
called “sympathy” (a near equivalent to “care” in later feminist writings) and ethics that are 
relevant for our current discussion.  Sympathy, he says, is “interpersonal.”  The “sympathetic 
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agent cannot just sympathize: he must sympathize ‘with another’ ” and “this other must be, or be 
believed by the agent to be, a sentient being - a being which can feel and suffer, be helped and be 
harmed.”338  Like Noddings several years later, Mercer insists that sympathy need not be 
contractual or mutual; “ ‘sympathy’ has regard for ‘the other’ solely in respect of his capacity to 
feel and suffer.”339  For this reason, he believes it perfectly appropriate to extend sympathetic 
feelings toward other animals.  Callicott, so far, would appear to agree: “If plants are not 
conscious then we have no grounds for sympathizing with them, but if they are conative we may 
appropriately feel benevolent toward them.”340  What exactly feelings of benevolence toward 
vegetation entail, he does not say.  It cannot, however, mean a relationship of care.  This is 
because the caring act can find no completion in plant life.  Humans do not find a sentient other 
with whom we can sympathize in plant life, much less the inanimate rivers, stones, and climate 
that make up an ecosystem.  We can have moral obligations to those who do not, and cannot, 
know that they have claims upon us, Mercer states.  Examples include children, the mentally 
handicapped, and animals.  For Mercer, “our moral obligations extend as far as our capacity for 
sympathy extends.  If we could sympathize with insects, trees, and stones then we could have 
moral obligations to them.”341  While both Callicott and care ethicists may emphasize emotions 
and relationship, the moral sentiment described by caring ultimately cannot support a general 
environmental ethic.  This is not to say that humans have no reasons to respect and protect the 
land.  It simply means that basing such protection on sympathy or care for the land itself is 
inappropriate.  One suggestion would be to care for the land for the sake of those sentient 
humans and animals that inhabit it.  John Fisher writes along these lines: “Indeed, it is the 
existence of sympathetic animals that creates ecosystems that we care about. . . . The 
environments that we seek to protect, that we find beautiful, I suggest, are just those in which 
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sympathetic creatures live.”342  Feelings of respect or loyalty to our biotic community because of 
our historic, evolutionary connection to it and our present aesthetic enjoyment of the land are 
surely appropriate sentiments and important motivators in our efforts to protect the natural 
environment.  They are not, however, appropriate foundations for a relationship of care toward 
the land.  Care or sympathy, in this sense, are not identical to concern.  We may, for example, be 
concerned that a historic house is being torn down, but we do not feel sympathy for the building.  
In contrast, if a family is being evicted and their house torn down, we may feel sympathy for the 
family.343 
 
2.3 HUMAN AND ANIMAL EMOTIONS 
 
 As noted in the introduction, emotions play an essential role in human moral decision-
making and caring.  So far we have shown that human care for animals is founded in concrete 
relationships rather than abstract principles and that animals’ ability to offer a true reply to 
human caring distinguishes our relationships with them from our relationships with plants and 
the natural environment as a whole.  The reply that animals give, however, is often nonverbal 
and, for the most part, nonlinguistic.344  For this reason attention to animal emotions is of 
particular importance to ethical interactions and care for animals.345  In this following section I 
explore how the continuity of emotions that humans and animals share permits a strong critique 
of Immanuel Kant’s indirect duties approach to animal ethics.  Here I find an unexpected ally in 
Thomas Aquinas and his embodied concept of human moral action.  I then consider the practical 
limits of our understanding of animal experience and emotion.  I find that animal emotions are 
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unique but still analogous to human emotions in such a way that a true fellow-feeling between 
humans and animals is possible.   
 
2.3a Emotional Continuity 
 
In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin famously asserts a similarity between the 
emotional natures of humans and other animals.  “The lower animals, like man, manifestly feel 
pleasure and pain, happiness and misery,” he claims.346  In the higher animals this continuity is 
even more manifest.   
 
All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations - similar passions, affections, and 
emotions, even the more complex ones, such as jealousy, suspicion, emulation, 
gratitude, and magnanimity; they practice deceit and are revengeful; they are sometimes 
susceptible to ridicule, and even have a sense of humour; they feel wonder and curiosity; 
they possess the same faculties of imitation, attention, deliberation, choice, memory, 
imagination, the association of ideas, and reason, though in very different degrees.347 
 
Modern ethological studies of animals have confirmed Darwin’s initial insight.  Primatologist 
Frans de Waal recounts the time one of the chimpanzees in the colony he studied gave birth.  
Several other chimpanzees gathered around the pregnant female, Mai, and once she had given 
birth, “the crowd stirred, and Atlanta, Mai’s best friend, emerged with a scream, looking around 
and embracing a couple of other chimpanzees next to her, one of whom uttered a shrill bark.”348  
It is entirely possible, he insists, that the emotional reaction of Atlanta, who had born children of 
her own, reflected empathy, or identification with the circumstance and feelings of her friend.  
Such observations lead De Waal, like Darwin before him, to assert a kind of emotional 
continuum within which different animal capacities fall.  “It is hard to imagine empathy as an 
all-or-nothing phenomenon.  Many forms of empathy exist intermediate between the extremes of 
mere agitation at the distress of others and a full understanding of their predicament.”349  
Ethologist Marc Bekoff, who’s own work is littered with stories of animal emotions, also states 
that “behavioral and neurobiological studies have consistently shown, and it is now largely 
accepted as fact, that animals share the primary emotions, those instinctual reactions to the world 
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we call fear, anger, surprise, sadness, disgust, and joy.”350  Consequently, he insists, attention to 
animal emotions must inform human moral relations with animals.  “There’s no doubt 
whatsoever that, when it comes to what we can and cannot do to other animals, it’s their 
emotions that should inform our discussions and our action on their behalf.”351  Such scientific 
conclusions only serve to support care ethicists’ intuition that our similar emotional capacities 
serve as a kind of bridge or connection between human moral relations with other humans and 
human moral relations with other animals.  In observing animal emotions we find both 
appropriate and familiar territory within which our caring impulses may be initiated and 
extended.  
 
2.3b Against a Kantian Rejection of Emotions 
 
It is at this point, at the necessity of emotion for human moral action, that an animal 
ethic informed by insights from the parable of the Good Samaritan and feminist ethics of care 
makes a strong critique of traditional justice oriented Kantian ethics.  Kant’s moral perspective 
relies on reason and engages only other rational agents.  Emotions and nonhuman animals are 
relegated to the periphery of his moral concern as practice for real moral action.  Humans, Kant 
claims, have “indirect duties” to animals that serve to “cultivate our duties to humanity.”352  
Thus, we treat animals kindly in order to encourage kind actions toward humans.  Such an 
assumption and valuation, however, is not original to Kant.  Thomas Aquinas, from a theological 
natural law perspective, similarly writes, “Now it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful 
affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men.”353  Animals in 
both instances are treated with kindness as a means to promoting kindness to humans.354  Against 
Kant, Tom Regan concludes, “This is certainly a reason to discourage cruelty to animals, but this 
cannot be the only reason, nor can it be the main one.”355  Against Aquinas, Judith Barad protests 
that if this does constitute our primary reason, “we are back to the point that animals are of only 
instrumental value for humans. . . . In short, cruelty and sadism towards animals is not in itself 
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wrong.”356  Thus, if we do not see animals as directly morally relevant, human kindness toward 
animals can only possess an instrumental value.     
 
As we will see, however, Aquinas, permits a way out of this dilemma by acknowledging 
a moral resource that Kant denies – the emotions.  Kant contrasts the person who helps others 
because he feels sympathy for them and the person who feels no sympathy but still helps others 
out of a sense of duty.  Only the second of these two people, according to Kant, acts in a clearly 
moral way.  True moral worth arises when a rational agent “is beneficent, not from inclination, 
but from duty.”357  Sympathy is, thus, rejected as a legitimate source for moral action.358  Even if 
humans and animals share similar sympathetic natures, this connection is insignificant for moral 
reasoning.  Theologian Michael Northcott criticizes Kant along these lines: “Embodiment and 
sociability seem to play no part in Kant's categorical imperative. . . . [He] insufficiently 
considered the extent to which human reasoners are embodied reasoners.”359  Humans, in other 
words, do not practice reason as disembodied intellects.  Human bodies, and all the powers that 
come with such bodies, add a crucial dynamic to human reasoning and action.  Philosopher H. B. 
Acton suspects that if a creature did exist as a purely disembodied intellect, that creature could 
never truly comprehend the needs or sufferings of embodied creatures.  Its attitude toward their 
“hunger and thirst, for example, would be more like the attitude of a mechanic towards an engine 
that was running out of fuel than of a man towards another man in trouble.”360  Only creatures 
with bodies and feelings can be cared for or know what it is to care.  Any attempt to render aid 
on purely rational grounds without feelings of sympathy or pity would be “like an art critic who 
was born blind and carried out his profession on the basis of reports supplied to him by men who 
had actually seen the pictures under review.”361  Acton insists that if humans could exist as 
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rational being in mere possession of bodies, but without emotions, as Kant would seem to prefer, 
they could never have “full insight into the moral significance” of their deeds.362  This is a 
particularly important point for human caring with regard to animals that possess bodies and 
emotions but do not fully possess reason.  Care that is directed toward creatures that lack reason 
can still be counted as moral.  Even if reason plays a significant role in moral action, the 
possession of bodies and emotions alone suffices to make a creature the proper recipient of 
moral action. 
 
Only by neglecting sympathy and the emotions can Kant claim that benevolent action 
toward animals presents merely an “analogy” of moral action toward other humans rather than 
actual moral action.  This analogy is directed toward the goal of promoting benevolent human-
human sympathies.  Yet, if duty rather than sympathy provides the sole ground for moral action, 
then the analogy’s service towards this goal is of questionable value.  Therefore, Kant’s appeal 
to human sympathies in this regard may be seen as a rare acknowledgement of the practical 
power of sympathy for moral action.  In a lengthy, but insightful quotation, Paul Guyer 
observers: 
 
It makes clear that although he thinks that the only morally estimable motivation is the 
pure respect for the moral law characteristic of a good will, he also recognizes that in 
real life we are moved to act by various sorts of feelings and predispositions, and thus 
that our overarching respect for the moral law requires us to mold the feelings that 
actually affect our actions, strengthening those that can move us in the direction of 
actions required by the moral law and constraining those that would lead us astray.  In 
spite of his theoretical commitment to the utter freedom of choice of the noumenal will, 
here again Kant clearly recognizes that human beings are embodied wills, rational 
animals and not pure rational beings, who must exercise their freedom and reason 
through their nature and not independently of it.363 
 
Guyer, at least in the last sentence, attributes to Kant an insight that he may not have actually 
sufficiently held.  Even so, an important point of critique is still clear.  It is possible to theorize a 
sharp mind and body dualism, but in reality such a theory breaks down.  Actual human persons 
cannot be divided between their minds and bodies.  Each represents an essential component of 
the human person as well as human moral action.  
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If, as Philip Mercer contends, “the Kantian notion of emotion is a restricted one…[and] 
presents us with only half the picture,”364 Aquinas’s integration of emotions into human moral 
reasoning presents a significant move toward supplying the other half.  “Affection in man is 
twofold: it may be the affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion.  If a man’s 
affection be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals . . . But if a man’s 
affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals,” Aquinas writes.365   
If we put this idea in Kantian terms, the human relationship with animals, based on reason, 
results in no direct duties to them.  Yet based on our common sympathetic natures, direct duties 
may be afforded them.  “Since the passion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others; and since 
it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of pity 
to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals.”366  Aquinas goes on to claim, like 
Kant, that human benevolent sympathy for animals serves to promote similar sympathy for other 
humans.  Yet, unlike Kant, Aquinas’s “twofold” presentation of reason and sympathy preserves a 
meaningful connection between humans and animals.  There is no reason, in this view, to deny 
that benevolent sentiment toward animals has value on its own even if it does serve a higher 
purpose.  Aquinas retains a clearly hierarchical worldview.367  Yet, his insistence on the 
legitimacy of emotions for moral action provides reason to support benevolent action toward 
animals on grounds other than its influence on human-human actions.  
 
2.3c The Limits of Emotional Consideration 
 
 If we allow that emotions can provide a potential bridge between human moral actions 
and our relationships to animals, the next problem we face is one of interpretation.  In other 
words, we must consider whether it is possible for humans to correctly understand what an 
animal of another species is thinking or feeling.  This is an important problem because an 
inability to correctly interpret another’s emotional state would result in inappropriate caring 
actions.  Feminist ethicist Josephine Donovan answers this question by asserting that we read 
animal mental and emotional states in much the same way as we do similar states in other 
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humans.368  She does, however, admit to the greater possibility of humans misreading animal 
emotions and communicative behaviors.  Philosopher Mary Midgley makes a similar argument.  
“Your fear is not my fear; all the same, you can have perfectly good grounds for drawing the 
conclusion that I am frightened. . . . Exactly the same thing is true of a horse, dog or elephant 
with which you are reasonably familiar.”369  Relationship is key.  Our ability to understand the 
emotional states of animals increases with our familiarity with specific animal species.  It 
increases even further when we develop a close relationship with an individual representative of 
that species.    
 
Yet, American philosopher Thomas Nagel, in his influencial article, “What is it Like to 
Be a Bat?”, is skeptical of answering a firm “Yes” to this question.  Bats’ extreme behaviors and 
sensory apparatus, at least from the perspective of humans, provide vivid examples for his 
trepidation.  If a human desires to know what it is like to be a bat, it will not suffice for her to 
simply imagine that she has webbing attached to her arms, has poor vision, catches insects in her 
mouth, or perceives the world through echolocation.  “In so far as I can imagine this (which is 
not very far), [these] tell me only what it would be like for me to behave like a bat,” Nagel 
claims.370  We can ascribe general types of experience to bats based on our observations of their 
physiology and behavior, but bat pain, fear, desire, and hunger always possess a subjective 
character that is beyond our grasp, he insists.  Nagel cautions that he is not “adverting here to the 
alleged privacy of experience to its possessor.  The point of view in question is not one 
accessible only to a single individual.  Rather it is a type.”371  There is a type of bat perception 
and a type of human perception.  We have the ability to take up the point of view of another so it 
is possible for us to comprehend the facts of fear, hunger, and other emotions or physical needs.  
Yet, carrying a comparable comprehension across the species line presets an insurmountable 
difficulty.  There exist enough similarities for us to draw analogies about what the bat point of 
view is, but we, as human, can never truly have experiences from the view of a bat. 
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Our common embodied, relational natures allow humans to meet animals at an 
emotional level, but the real differences that exist between different species means that our 
consideration of animal emotions must remain at the level of analogy.  Along these lines, 
professor of animal behavior Mary Stamp Dawkins cautions against two alternative extremes.  
On the one hand, we must not think that “the subjective feelings of other animals are identical to 
our own and that all we need to do to understand animals is to project our own feelings onto 
them.”372  On the other hand, there exists “the danger of thinking of other species as so different 
from human beings that there is no analogy to be drawn at all.”373  We may look to Fisher’s 
emperor penguin example as a helpful illustration of Dawkins’s point.  The male emperor 
penguin sits on an egg for many months through the cold, black Antarctic winter.  We may feel 
empathy for this penguin if we compare its devotion to our own care for human children.  But, 
Fisher asks, “would I be justified in feeling sympathy for the emperor penguin? . . . I must think 
of what is good for a penguin, and whether the penguin really suffers, and whether its suffering 
is avoidable.”374  In order to successfully judge what caring response a human may have if she 
encounters such an animal, she must consider the real differences that exist between a human’s 
and an emperor penguin’s experiences of the world.  Standing in a single position outside in the 
Antarctic for many months is not an evil for male emperor penguins in the same way it would be 
for a human parent.  Yet, the differences in the two experiences are not so extreme as to dissolve 
any emotional connection or understanding.  We can draw analogies with basic parental feeling 
of care and other emotions like fear, joy, and the desire for companionship.  Openness to animal 
pain and emotions at this analogical level makes us receptive to the animal in ways that real and 
appropriate care can take place. 
 
 We can describe this analogical emotional connection between humans and animals as a 
kind of fellow-feeling.  Fellow-feeling does not require two rational agents, but it does require 
two responsive, sensitive agents.  Along these lines, German philosopher Max Scheler states that 
“fellow-feeling (which can also be bestowed on animals) differs from love of humanity” or 
humanitarianism.375  Humanitarianism values all humans simply because they are human.  
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Fellow feeling, however, extends to all creatures with whom we are capable of sympathizing.  If, 
for example, “you suppose a man to be a corpse or a tree-stump it is just not possible for you to 
be brutal towards him,” Scheler states.376  We come again to the distinction between humans and 
animals as apposite subjects of care or sympathy against plants and other aspects of the natural 
world as objects of concern or respect, but not sympathy.  Philip Mercer, building on Scheler’s 
thought, also insists that fellow-feeling is an essential component of true sympathy.  Fellow-
feeling, he says, “is an exercise in the imagination in that it involves imaginative representation 
of another’s feelings.”377  Like Nagel, Mercer is concerned with the distinction between 
experiencing another’s feelings and sympathizing with another.  Mercer’s conception of fellow-
feeling forms the first step of sympathy in which we are able to form an analogy of the other’s 
feeling in our mind.378  It does not mean, he emphatically states, that one feels the same feelings 
as another, or that one suffers in the same way as another.  Furthermore, “it is not enough that I 
should imagine how I should feel were I in the other person's place; I have to imagine how he 
feels, having the temperament and personality that he has.”379  This is of particular significance 
when we extend fellow-feeling to nonhuman animals.  To continue Nagel’s example, a bat’s pain 
is not my pain, nor can I ever feel pain from the perspective of a bat; yet, I do know what it is to 




If relationship, rather than individual autonomy, is taken as the starting place for 
morality, then responsibility implies an examination of the actual reply that humans give to those 
they are in relationship with.  Feminist scholar Karen Warren writes, “Humans and human moral 
conduct are properly understood essentially (and not merely accidentally) in terms of networks 
or webs of historical and concrete relationships.”381  In this chapter we have seen that human 
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relationships with and emotional connection to other animals prove significant in both 
motivating and evaluating human ethical relationships with animals.  In the first section we were 
introduced to the feminist ethic of care and its significance for animal ethics.  From a theological 
perspective, we also addressed the shortcoming of an ethical approach based on relationship that 
fails to account for the basic relational nature of the cosmos as creatures in communion with 
their divine Creator.  After noting the resources within Christian theology for addressing the 
reality of creaturely dependency, we moved on in the second section to articulate a distinction 
between caring for other animals and having a concern for the land as a whole.  We found that 
animals, unlike plants and other inanimate natural phenomena, are capable of offering a true call 
and reply to human caring.  Finally, in the third section we addressed the importance of emotions 
for human care for other animals.  We found that, while we cannot put ourselves completely in 
the position of another animal, we still possess sufficient emotional continuity with animals to 
allow us to relate and care for them in a meaningful way.  This is not to say that principles or 
justice-based approaches like animal rights are not important in the overall human relationship 
with animals.  The feminist approach insists, however, “that what makes them relevant or 
important is that those to whom they apply are entities in relationship with others.”382  As we 
will see in the following chapter, rights language can still play a positive, though limited, role 
within a larger ethic of neighborly care for animals.   
 
                                                
382 Ibid., 142.  
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CHAPTER 3: ʻCARINGʼ FOR ANIMAL NEIGHBORS, PART 2 
 
“Which of these three, do you think, was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of the 
robbers?” (Luke 10:36) 
 
Old Man, the chimpanzee, was rescued from a lab at around the age of twelve and 
relocated to a zoo in Florida with three female chimpanzees.  The human caretaker for the 
chimpanzees, Marc, built up Old Man’s trust by slowly approaching closer and closer when he 
brought them food.  Eventually he was able to play with and even groom Old Man.383  One day 
while in the enclosure, Marc slipped and fell.  This startled an infant, “who screamed, and his 
mother, her protective instinct aroused, at once leaped to attack Mark.”  Soon the two other 
females joined in the attack.  “And then Old Man charged to the rescue of this, his first human 
friend in years.  He dragged each of the highly roused females off Mark and hurled them away.  
Then he stayed, close by, keeping them at bay, while Marc slowly dragged himself to . . . 
safety.”384 
 
At a chimpanzee exhibit in the Detroit Zoo, Jojo attempted to escape the attacks of the 
top-ranking male by fleeing into the moat that surrounded the enclosure.  As chimpanzees cannot 
swim, Jojo quickly began to sink in the deep water.  A truck driver, Rick, who was visiting the 
zoo with his family, happened to be among the crowd of human onlookers that day and took 
notice of the chimpanzee’s plight.   
 
As Jojo sank for the third time, Rick jumped in.  The zoo staff yelled at him to get out, 
but he ignored them. . . . But when [Rick] pushed him onto the bank the slope was such 
that Jojo began to slip back into the water.  At this point other chimpanzees, hair 
bristling, screaming, charged toward the scene.  The people on the bank yelled even 
louder at Rick, telling him to ‘let the monkey drown!’  But Rick, despite the fierce 
approach of other chimpanzees, pushed Jojo back up and held him there until he raised 
his head, took a few groggy steps, and collapsed onto the level ground.385   
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When asked why he did what he did when he knew it was dangerous, Rick replied, “Well I 
looked into his eyes, and it was like looking into the eyes of a man, and the message was: Won’t 
anybody help me?”386 
 
 In the previous chapter we introduced the feminist ethics of care and explored its 
significance for animal ethics.  We found care to play a vital role in human moral relationships 
with other animals especially in light of our emotional continuity and common states of 
dependency.  In the present chapter I continue this investigation with a view towards connecting 
care more explicitly with the Christian concept of neighborly love in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan.  Along the way I offer responses to criticisms of extending both care and the concept 
of neighbor to animals.  The chapter proceeds in two stages.  First, I examine Noddings’s 
differentiation between “natural” and “ethical” caring.  This distinction proves important for 
connecting human responsibility and sympathy into a unified caring response.  Second, by 
appealing to the parable of the Good Samaritan, I answer a criticism of caring put forward by the 
animal rights position and then consider a limited role for rights language within a larger ethic of 
neighborly care for animals.   
 
3.1 TWO LEVELS OF CARE: NATURAL AND ETHICAL 
 
 So far we have looked at the role that emotions play in establishing caring relationships 
between humans and animals.  We have implicitly assumed along the way that human reason 
also has a role to play in these relationships.  It is now time to explicate more fully exactly how 
these two processes, emotion and reason, interact in order to construct a full picture of human 
ethical interactions with animals.  The following three subsections look at the “twin sentiments” 
of natural and ethical caring that Nel Noddings proposes.  First, natural caring is shown to 
comprise the emotional aspect of human relationships.  This is a form of caring that humans 
share with other animals.  Second, we find that ethical caring builds upon natural caring and 
involves a reflective, discriminatory element.  Humans alone, Noddings claims, engage in ethical 
caring.  The combination of these two levels of care brings together the previous chapter’s 
analysis of the moral relevance of emotions with chapter one’s emphasis on human 
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responsibility.  In the third subsection, I show how this combination is able to defend against 
criticisms from philosophers like Martha Nussbaum.  
 
3.1a Natural Caring 
 
 Noddings calls the first of the twin sentiments natural caring.  The care of a mother for 
her child provides the paradigmatic example of this foundational level of care.  “A mother’s 
caretaking efforts on behalf of her child are not usually considered ethical but natural,” Noddings 
claims.387  Along these lines, neglecting to care for one’s child is more properly considered a 
sickness rather than a failure of ethical deliberation on the part of the parent.  “We feel that either 
she or the situation into which she has been thrust must be pathological.”388  The desire to care 
for one’s child is natural and does not require rational deliberation.  Parents care for their 
children out of an innate impulse.  “We share this impulse with other creatures in the animal 
kingdom,” Noddings claims.389  Examples of animal parents caring for their offspring abound in 
nature.  We may even extend this natural caring to include similar events of care for other 
closely related family or group members.  Jane Goodall’s observation of the adolescent 
chimpanzee Flint’s severe depression during and after his mother’s death provides an example of 
the first; her observation of the “four-year war” in which the members of the larger group 
defended themselves against and attacked the members of a smaller group that had broken away 
provides a gruesome example of the latter.390  A kind of natural affection and care can even 
occur between an animal and a closely associated human.  For example, Darwin writes, 
“Everyone has seen how jealous a dog is of his master’s affection, if lavished on any other 
creature.”  For Darwin, “this shews that animals not only love, but have desire to be loved.”391  
The above story of Old Man and Marc would also seem to fit this paradigm.  Natural caring, 
therefore, is not bound by species lines.  It is not a unidirectional encounter flowing from the 
human to the animal.  Rather, natural care can occur between any two individual animals that are 
in close relationship with each other.392   
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 98 
 
3.1b Ethical Caring 
 
 “The second sentiment occurs in response to a remembrance of the first,” Noddings 
asserts.393  Ethical caring is the responsible creature’s evaluation of her relationship with and 
emotional reaction to the one in need and deliberation about an appropriate response.  This 
reflective element is added to the initial, emotional reaction in order to create a fully embodied 
ethical encounter with another human or animal.  Ruth Groenhout, who explores the continuities 
between ethics of care and Christian theology, succinctly observers: “Without emotional impetus 
we cannot act, without reflection and experience we cannot act well.”394  This represents a clear 
modification of the rationalistic Kantian account of morality and Noddings acknowledges this.  
“Kant has identified the ethical with that which is done out of duty and not out of love, and that 
distinction in itself seems right,” she admits.  “But an ethic built on caring strives to maintain the 
caring attitude and thus is dependent upon, and not superior to, natural caring.”395 This 
progression from natural to ethical is essential for the development of a fully embodied account 
of humanity and morality.  Human moral action begins with natural caring and finds its 
completion in ethical caring.  Thus, Kant’s example of the man who helps others out of duty 
rather than sympathy betrays a striking omission.  Along these lines, H. B. Acton concludes that 
this man  
 
could not have performed such an act of heroic beneficence if his heart had never 
warmed towards anybody. We may therefore say that although he does not at present 
sympathize with the man whom he is helping, he once sympathized with men in similar 
situations so that his present rational act is, as it were, an extension or revival of his past 
sympathetic ones.396 
 
Human ethical caring with regard to animals is no different.  Having once sympathized with an 
animal in pain, we need only recall that encounter to ethically care for an animal in a similar 
situation for whom we may not presently feel naturally inclined to care. Similarly, the universal 
reality of creaturely dependency means that when we encounter a dependent other we may 
                                                                                                                                           
“adopted” an injured rabbit. Bekoff, Emotional Lives, 17-18.  Darwin even includes a story of a captive 
baboon that adopts and cares for a kitten.  Darwin, Descent of Man, 70. 
393 Noddings, Caring, 79. 
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immediately recognize our own past and present states of dependency.  We fail to respond 
ethically, therefore, not by failing to initially feel sympathy for a specific animal that we 
encounter.  We fail by not recalling or preventing the recollection of past sympathetic encounters 
with animals to inform a present encounter with an animal that meets us with a specific need.  
Our introductory story from chapter two demonstrates the power of such memory and reflection.  
George Pitcher’s first sighting of Lupa, pregnant and desperately searching for shelter, brought 
back memories of past times when he had cared for stray, needy animals.  “I found myself 
thinking about her and about the dogs I had owned in my youth,” he writes.397  When later given 
the opportunity to respond to Lupa, after discovering her makeshift den under his shed, he 
responded with a combination of natural and ethical caring by presenting her with daily bowls of 
dog food. 
 
Connections with the previous two chapters become apparent at this point.  Humans 
share an emotional nature with other animals and this allows us to reply to the call that they 
make to us.  But this reply is distinguished from natural, animal caring in that, as imago Dei, 
humans are responsible for their reply.  This was noticeably brought out in the chapter one’s 
discussion of the difference between attrition and contrition and the implications of animal 
amorality for animal punishment.  We saw there a greater similarity between animal “moral” 
behavior and human attrition, the avoidance of sin because of fear of punishment, than human 
contrition, the avoidance of sin out of detestation for the sin itself.  For Noddings “the genuine 
moral sentiment (our second sentiment) arises from an evaluation of the caring relation as good, 
as better than, superior to, other forms of relating.”398  Humans, because they are created in 
responsible relationship with others, can reject abusive, neglective, or exploitative relationships 
because we judge relationships characterized by care as better for their own sakes as well as for 
all involved in the relationships.  We can see the significance of this distinction in a quotation by 
Jane Goodall on the differences between human and chimpanzee caring.  “While chimpanzees 
will, indeed, respond to the immediate need of a companion in distress, even when this involves 
risk to themselves, only humans are capable of performing acts of self-sacrifice with full 
knowledge of the costs that may have to be borne.”399  The question of punishment brings out the 
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implications of this difference.  We train both domestic animals and human children to adhere to 
certain social rules that make life together possible.  We also expect children to eventually reflect 
on and understand these rules.  We expect them to understand the relationship of the rules to the 
good of society or the maintenance of relationships, rather than simply that disobedience results 
in punishment.  In other words, we normally expect children to develop from feelings of attrition 
to a position of contrition.  We do not, however, normally have such expectations of animals.  As 
we have observed previously, in human children there exists a “dynamic potential for growth in 
relation.”400  This potential allows us to distinguish between our punishing of children and 
animals.  In both cases punishment possesses the aim of reinforcing socially constructive 
behaviors, but with children it has the additional aim of helping them understand why such 
behavior is constructive or destructive.  For example, we may train a dog not to bite in the same 
way that we can train a child not to hit, but we do not expect the dog to eventually contemplate 
the merits of nonviolence or civil disobedience.  In the same way, human caring has this further 
level of reflection that makes it truly ethical and responsible and distinguishes it from natural, 
animal caring. 
 
A final point to make about ethical caring is that it necessarily leads to benevolent action on 
the part of the one-caring toward the one cared-for.  The Samaritan in our parable became the 
wounded man’s neighbor by being “the one who showed him mercy” (Ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔλεος µετ' 
αὐτοῦ) (Luke 10:37a).  If an emotional response was elicited in the priest or Levite, it could not 
be called true ethical caring because it did not result in merciful action.  “When we sympathize 
with another who is suffering,” Philip Mercer writes, “not only do we imaginatively participate 
in this suffering but we are also disposed to do something about it: we cannot sympathize with 
someone and yet remain indifferent to him.”401  The sight of an injured or needy animal may 
strike an emotional cord in our hearts, yet until that initial emotional reaction is completed in 
some kind of benevolent action for the sake of the animal it is not true ethical caring.  To have 
sympathy and yet remain inactive is a contradiction.  Accordingly, Mercer proposes four 
conditions for the existence of true sympathy, or ethical caring, between the one-caring (A) and 
the one cared-for (B): “A is aware of the existence of B as a sentient subject; A knows or believes 
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that he knows B's state of mind; there is fellow-feeling between A and B so that through his 
imagination A is able to realize B’s state of mind; and A is altruistically concerned for B's 
welfare.”402  Ethical caring builds upon the similar emotional natures that connect humans 
morally to animals and allows for fellow-feeling between them.  It then reflects upon the best 
course of action required to meet the animal’s specific need.  Writing nearly two decades before 
Mercer, and three before Noddings, H. B. Action makes a similar, though less developed, 
observation. “Sympathy,” he says, “is not a primitive animal feeling but is an exercise of the 
imagination involving self-consciousness and comparison. Hence it should not be contrasted 
with rationality but should be regarded as a form of it.”403  Ethical caring, therefore, can be 
defined as the deliberative evaluation of A’s natural emotional impulses toward another sentient, 
emotional creature (B) that considers the unique needs of B, the nature of the relationship 
between A and B, and finally the most appropriate action A may make towards relieving B’s 
suffering or meeting B’s need.  Ethical caring on the one hand takes a deontological approach to 
moral relationships and problems.  The caring attitude, Mercer claims, “is always good.  But the 
action it inspires is only conditionally good.”404  Thus, while memory and reflection allow the 
one caring to see the independent goodness of the caring relationship, the goodness of the actions 
that this relationship inspires is dependent upon the specific needs and situation of the one cared 
for.  
 
3.1c Noddings and Nussbaum 
 
 Advocates of the ethics of care clearly place it within the feminist tradition, but not all 
philosophers who write with feminist concerns evaluate it favorably.  In this final subsection I 
will examine the criticisms one such critic, Martha Nussbaum, makes against the ethics of care.  
Nussbaum’s liberalism makes for a particularly interesting contrast in that, while it possesses 
many practical similarities, it is ultimately derived from a different, justice-based foundation.  
Nussbaum’s position appears to be aligned with the ethics of care in its acceptance of a place for 
the emotions in human ethical thinking.  At a deeper level, however, it is incompatible in its 
basic assumption of individual, rational, autonomy as the starting place for any adequate ethical 
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theory. In my discussion below, I show that the twin sentiments of natural and ethical caring do 
much to resolve Nussbaum’s criticisms, but are not ultimately be able to reconcile the two 
contrasting foundations of these ethical theories.  
 
 In her book Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions, Nussbaum argues 
that the value and importance of emotions must be taken into account in any adequate theory of 
ethics.  Drawing upon ancient Stoic thought, Nussbaum argues that emotions constitute a form of 
judgment.  “Although I believe that emotions are, like other mental processes, bodily, I also 
believe, and shall argue, that seeing them as in every case taking place in a living body does not 
give us reason to reduce their intentional/cognitive components to nonintentional bodily 
movements,” she contends.405  Humans are, to recall Michael Northcott’s phrase, embodied 
reasoners and our emotions make up an essential aspect of that reasoning.  Thus far we find no 
significant disagreement with the ethics of care as it also grants the emotions a vital place in 
human moral thinking.  Nussbaum’s account also coincides with the ethics of care in its attention 
to particular others and concrete situations.  Emotions, she claims, possess a rich perception of 
their object that is highly concrete and detailed.  Simply thinking of a distant or abstract sorrow 
like the deaths of many people in an earthquake in a far away country a thousand years ago will 
not likely cause one to grieve, she claims.  An emotion like grief “is very richly particular.”406  
Nussbaum even approves of the emotional continuity between humans and animals that we have 
previously discussed.  Although she draws upon Stoic philosophy, she rejects their view that 
animals lack emotions because they lack complex language.  Such a view “flies in the face of our 
experiences of commonality between ourselves and many animals.  It also makes it impossible 
for us to give an adequate account of emotional development in infants and young children.”407  
Furthermore, she concludes that animal emotions have a cognitive element like human emotions, 
though they exist at a lower level of complexity.  Most animals have “something that we may 
call conscious awareness: that is, there is something the world is like to them, and that 
intentional viewing of the world is significant in explaining their actions; but this need not imply 
that they study their own awareness.”408   
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In her more recent book Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership, Nussbaum dedicates a large section to the just treatment of animals.  She agrees 
with the ethics of care that the emotions have a role to play in human moral deliberation and 
moral relationships with animals.  Yet, she disagrees as to what place emotions have to play in 
those relationships.  Like our relationships with mentally disabled humans or humans of another 
nationality, Nussbaum thinks that our relationships with nonhuman animals “ought to be 
regulated by justice.”409  She proposes a list that outlines the minimum qualities necessary for a 
dignified animal existence that humans must not intrude upon in our interactions with them.  
This list is later, perhaps unsurprisingly, sketched out as a species-specific modification of her 
capabilities list required for a dignified human life.410  Emotions and sympathy provide only 
assisting roles in this scheme.  Care, she says, “supports the capacity to play and enjoy life.  It 
supports control over one’s material and political environment,”411 or with regard to animals, 
care supports their obtaining adequate nutrition and physical activity or freedom from cruelty.  
“We certainly should not deny that compassion is very important in thinking correctly about our 
duties to animals,” Nussbaum claims.  “But compassion by itself is too indeterminate to capture 
our sense of what is wrong with the treatment of animals.”412  For Nussbaum, justice requires 
that we first consider animals as autonomous individuals who are the ends rather than means of 
our ethical thinking.  Autonomy and equality are purported as prerequisites of caring.  Virginia 
Held criticizes Nussbaum along these lines: Liberalism assumes “that we should start in our 
thinking with independent individuals who can form social relations and arrangements as they 
choose and that the latter only have value instrumentally to the extent that they serve the interests 
of individuals.”413  The caring perspective, on the other hand, maintains that relationships 
themselves and the emotions that these relationships promote provide the ground upon which to 
build a system of justice and equality.  In other words, emotional connections and caring 
relationships provide the source rather than mere support to a view of animals as also entitled to 
justice and the freedom to fulfill of certain species-specific capabilities.  The point that a “view 
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such as Nussbaum’s misses is the more fundamental one that turning everyone into a liberal 
individual leaves no one adequately attentive to relationships between persons,”414 or, we should 
add, between humans and animals. 
 
 This emphasis on reason and justice leads Nussbaum in an earlier book, Sex and Social 
Justice, to misrepresent Noddings’s description of caring.  “Emotions,” Nussbaum insists, “like 
other forms of thought and imagination, should be valued as elements in a life governed by 
critical reasoning.”415  She interprets Noddings as saying that “unless we give ourselves away to 
others without asking questions, we have not behaved in a fully moral way.”416  Obviously such 
a depiction of care cannot appeal to Nussbaum’s insistence that emotions be subject to reason.  
She seems to misread Noddings, however, as saying that the only morally valuable form of 
caring is nonreflective.  Noddings does insist that non-reflective mothering love possesses value.  
Yet, she does not think this is the only morally valuable form of caring.  Rather, this is the 
natural caring that humans share with animals.  Nussbaum appears to completely overlook 
Noddings’s long discussion of ethical caring which includes reflection and memory.  Against 
Noddings, Nussbaum asserts, “The liberal tradition is profoundly opposed to the idea that people 
should spontaneously give themselves without reflection, judgment, or reciprocity.”417  
Noddings, clearly influenced by Martin Buber as we have seen, does speak in this way of the 
“receptive mode” where reason does not play a role and the pure encounter with the other is 
most intense.   Yet, she also says that it is natural and appropriate not to remain in this mode.  
We must progress on to a mode of thinking in which we consider the specific problem with 
which the other encounters us and what action we may take to address it.  Full human caring 
necessarily involves rational reflection.  The point that must not be lost, however, is that caring 
also involves a foundational, pre-rational, emotional encounter.  The receptive mode, in this way, 
marks the starting place for the ethics of care.  It is not, however, the end.  Natural caring 
prompts and orients the rational reflection that characterizes our ethical caring.  Noddings’s 
ethics of care and Nussbaum’s justice based liberalism are in agreement, therefore, in insisting 
that an adequate ethical theory must incorporate both emotions and reason.  They are 
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irreconcilable, however, as to whether emotions and caring perform foundational or merely 
supporting roles in an adequate ethical theory. 
 
3.2 CRITICISM AND RESPONSE 
  
Because care and justice are based on different foundations, we find ourselves in this 
chapter unable to fully accept a justice-based theory of animal rights.  In practical application, 
however, both theories will often work together quite harmoniously.  Yet, if we advocate for an 
animal ethic informed by an ethic of care and, as I argue below, neighborly love, we can only 
accept a limited application for animal rights theory.  Feminist ethicist Marti Kheel argues that 
“the notion of rights can, in fact, be conceived only within an antagonistic or competitive 
environment.  The concept of competition is inherent in the very definition of rights.”418  The 
language of rights, therefore, can be helpful for talking about boundaries and the protection of 
individuals from the competing interests of others.  Several years after the publication of his 
groundbreaking book, The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan even admits that “any fully 
credible ethic will have to find a place for both justice and care.”419   Yet Regan, like Nussbaum, 
subordinates care to his theory of justice.   He claims that, “morally speaking, care is not enough 
. . . because it is too limited.”420  He does not see how care can extend past preexisting familiar or 
friendly relationships.  I take up this criticism in the first two subsections below.  First I 
demonstrate that, as Noddings articulates it, ethical caring possesses resources that direct it 
toward an extension to the stranger but proves ultimately inadequate without a theological 
foundation.  Therefore, in the second subsection I appeal to the concept of neighborly love as 
articulated in Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan to correct this problem.  I interrupt my 
defense of neighborly care in the third subsection to respond to Celia Deane-Drummond’s 
criticism of using the neighbor concept with regard to animals.  Finally, in the fourth subsection I 
return to the question of animal rights and propose that rights language may play a practical, 
though limited, role within a larger framework of care and relationship.   
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3.2a Extending Care to the Stranger 
 
 Regan sees an “insuperable dilemma” for a care based ethic: “either the ethic is 
grounded in the limited, partial care that people do have for others . . . or the ethic is grounded in 
an unlimited, impartial care for everyone.”421   In the first case, the ethics of care would seem to 
be constricted by an emphasis on parental and friendly images of caring.  In the second, it would 
appear to adopt the same universal, abstract principles that it criticizes in other ethical theories.   
Regan takes up this point in another article critical of caring by asking what resources this theory 
has for “people to consider the ethics of their dealings with individuals who stand outside the 
existing circle of their valued interpersonal relationships.”422  If caring is unable to attend to the 
unexpected human, he finds it especially inadequate with regard to animals.  Other than pets or 
“cuddly or rare specimens of wildlife” Regan does not find evidence that humans generally care 
very much about the needs of animals.  “What, then, becomes of the animals toward whom 
people are indifferent, given the ethic of care?”423  Noddings’s own account of caring for 
unfamiliar animals appears to succumb to Regan’s criticism.  Noddings states that because she 
has a caring relationship with her pet cat, she is able to extend that care to other members of the 
same species that she encounters.  When we care for a pet “we will be addressed, and not only 
by this particular creature but also by others of its kind.”424  She does not, however, feel so 
inclined to care for a rat were it to show up at her door begging for food.  “I am not prepared to 
care for it.  I feel no relation to it.  I would not torture it . . . , but I would shoot it cleanly if the 
opportunity arose,” she writes.425  At this point, the advocate of animal rights can step in and 
charge Noddings’s care for the stray cat over the stray rat as arbitrary.  As individuals, both are 
unfamiliar and capable of experiencing similar levels of pain. Therefore, favoring one over the 
other fits Regan’s criticism of caring only for “cuddly” animals.  
  
In an earlier passage Noddings describes the stranger as the “potentially cared-for.”  
Without the qualification we find in the later passage quoted above, Noddings’s account would 
appear quite amenable to an extension of care to the stranger. 
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Indeed, the caring person, one who in this way is prepared to care, dreads the proximate 
stranger, for she cannot easily reject the claim he has on her.  She would prefer that the 
stray cat not appear at the back door - or the stray teenager at the front.  But if either 
presents himself, he must be received not by formula but as individual, Noddings 
insists.426 
 
The stray cat at the door, however, is still an unknown individual.  Noddings’s familiarity with 
her own cat may aid her in being receptive to this stranger and in interpreting its needs, but it 
does not make this individual any less of a stranger.  The animal rights advocate would be 
correct, therefore, in noting the inconsistency in caring for a stray cat rather than rat.  As we will 
see in the following chapter, there are other historically relevant proximity factors relevant to 
differentiating our care for these two animals, such as the obligations that domestication places 
on human relationships with certain animals.  Noddings, however, does not turn to these factors, 
but rather to the fact that she has a preexisting relationship with another member of the same 
species.  Thus, she could just as easily refuse care to a stray dog that comes to her door.  The 
animal rights advocate will find fault with this logic primarily in its inability to extend similar 
treatment to similar individuals.  From the perspective of the ethics of care, however, this is most 
troubling because it marks a refusal to see each individual as an individual.  In Noddings’s 
statement about caring for the unexpected cat or teenager, she insisted that such strangers always 
be received as individuals rather than by formula.  Yet, the method she uses to disregard certain 
unfamiliar animals is itself formulaic in its grouping of different species into general 
familiar/unfamiliar categories.  In doing so it allows her to silence both the call of the particular 
animal that confronts her and her own receptivity to that animal.  Regan is correct to assert that 
care cannot be abstracted to everyone.  It only applies to those actual friends or strangers that 
meet us and to whom we can reply.  The problem we find with Noddings’s preference for stray 
cats, therefore, is ultimately not a failure of justice but of ethical caring.  As we noted in the 
previous section, ethical caring can develop out of a natural impulse to care for another or from 
the recollection of such caring and the judgment that relationships characterized by care are 
better than those characterized by indifference or exploitation.  The second of these origins is 
most relevant for extending care to an unfamiliar animal that we may encounter.  The concept of 
neighborly love found in the parable of the Good Samaritan provides a strong foundation for this 
kind of caring extension.  The Samaritan felt pity and cared for a man for whom under other 
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circumstances he would likely have felt hatred rather than mere indifference.427  This social 
reality is part of what gives the parable such rhetorical power.   
 
3.2b Good Samaritan Neighborly Care 
 
 The problems with Noddings’s account of caring for unfamiliar, or stranger, animals can 
be overcome by an appeal to the parable of the Good Samaritan.  I return in this subsection to 
Paul Ramsey’s reflections on Christian neighborly love that we first took note of in the 
Introduction.  According to the writer of the Gospel of Luke, a lawyer approaches Jesus with the 
question, “What must I do to obtain eternal life?” (10:25).  Jesus answers this question by 
combining two Old Testament passages, Deut. 6:5 and Lev. 19:18: “You shall love the Lord 
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your 
mind; and your neighbor as yourself” (Luke 10:27).  Yet, another question remains for the 
lawyer: “And who is my neighbor?” (Luke 10:29).  This second question, Ramsey asserts, “is in 
fact the most unanswered question in the entire New Testament!”428  While the Mosaic law laid 
down a clear definition of who constituted neighbor – those under the covenant – Jesus tells a 
story that defines instead the act of neighborly love.  In its Old Testament context, neighbor 
referred to a fellow Israelite or proselyte.429  For this reason, Old Testament scholar Jacob 
Milgrom translates Lev. 19:18 as: “love your fellow as yourself.”  That love for the resident non-
Israelite, i.e. non-neighbor, “is reserved for v. 34 implies that rēa’ here means ‘fellow Israelite.’ 
”430  Although on its own the Greek term for neighbor, ò πλησίον, admits a wider meaning, in its 
Luke 10 context the Leviticus definition takes priority; “this is how the lawyer could be expected 
to understand the phrase.”431  In this way, the lawyer’s question seeks to draw a line between 
those to whom neighborly love is due and those to whom it can be denied.  “The question really 
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means: Where do I draw the line?  How large must the circle be?”432  The surprising insight of 
the Good Samaritan parable is that true neighborhood escapes such exacting definition.  Ramsey 
observes that the parable’s most noteworthy quality lays in the fact that Jesus refuses to provide 
the lawyer with the strict taxonomy he desired.  
 
Jesus took the weight off of concern for first knowing the neighbor.  The question he 
really answered in this parable was not the one he was asked but the one which he 
himself addressed to the questioner: ‘Which of these three, do you think, proved 
neighbor to the man who fell among robbers?’ and promptly turned into a requirement: 
‘Go and do likewise.’433 
 
Jesus, in this parable, turns our attention to the loving act rather than the classification of its 
recipient.  He radically reinterprets the “ethical summit . . . of [all of] Scripture,” as Milgrom 
calls it,434 in the Holiness Code, which demands a similar love for the fellow Israelite as for the 
foreigner, for the neighbor as for the stranger (Lev. 19:18, 34).  In the parable Jesus declares that 
the very act of caring can transform two strangers into neighbors.  Jesus shifts the burden of 
proof from the one in need of care to the one who is able to provide care.  Thus, the stray animal 
that meets me at the doorstep, in Noddings’s example above, need not prove that it is a member 
of a specific species with which I already have an existing familiar relationship in order to 
qualify as a recipient of my care.  Following the parable of the Good Samaritan, I must rather ask 
whether I can care for the specific animal that meets me in its need and thus prove neighbor to it. 
 
This observation is significant and readily applicable to human relationships with 
animals because of the explicit presence of animals in the Mosaic covenant at Sinai.  Exodus 
20:8-10 reads:  
 
Remember the sabbath day, and keep it holy.  Six days you shall labor and do all your 
work.  But the seventh day is a Sabbath to the lord your God; you shall not do any work 
– you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your livestock, or the alien 
resident in your town.435  
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Although the other commandments concern themselves primarily with human-divine, and 
human-human relationships, here we find a clear concern for nonhuman animals.  
Anthropologist Mary Douglas observes, “The covenant with Moses on Sinai is the explicit 
assertion of God’s overlordship over the people of Israel and their livestock . . . From 
householder to children, servants to cattle, the animals come under the lines of authority drawn 
by the Sinai covenant.”436  The Sabbath commandment uniquely incorporates all three spheres in 
which humans exist in responsible relationship: divine, fellow human, and fellow animal.  Yet, 
while it is inclusive of all these relationships, the Mosiac covenant also privileges a specific 
group of humans and animals.  The line that distinguishes neighbor from foreigner or stranger is 
drawn not between humans and animals, but between those humans and animals within the 
covenant and those humans and animals outside the covenant.  As one scholar writes, neighbors 
here are “conceived not geographically but in terms of identity as members of the 
community.”437  The Sabbath command states that domestic animals, as members of the 
covenant community and fellow workers, also deserve rest and an exemption from working on 
the seventh day.  “They too need the opportunity to rest.”438   
 
Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok have also observed the presence of animals within the 
Sabbath commandment: “Since the Sabbath Day was instituted for animals as well as human 
beings the admonition to rest extended to all animals within the care of humans.”439  The last few 
words of this quote are especially significant – “within the care of humans.”  Although Linzey 
and Cohn-Sherbok do not elaborate on this fact, the only animals for which the command in 
Ex.10:8-10 explicitly demands care are the people’s domestic animals.  Wild animals, existing 
outside the covenant community, require no such special concern.  This is a point not lost on 
Stephen Webb in his examination of the same biblical passage.  He states, “It is important to 
emphasize that while God cares about all life, the Hebrews were asked to worry about the 
animals who were dependent on them and upon whom they were dependent.”440  The definition 
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of neighbor, as understood within the context of the Mosaic covenant, restricts itself to the 
people of Israel and their domestic animals.  This is further shown in the later instructions for the 
Sabbatical year in Ex. 23:10-12.  Every seventh year the land itself requires a kind of Sabbath 
and must be allowed to remain fallow.  On this year the wild animals are allowed to eat of 
whatever the land produces.  The human responsibility and concern for wild animals here differs 
from that owed to domestics.  The wild animals must be allowed merely the opportunity to 
secure their own food.  They are neither afforded nor require the more intensive care granted to 
domestic animals.  As neighbors in the covenant, however, the demands of caring for domestic 
animals may supersede the normal Sabbath regulations.  As we saw in the Introduction, Jesus 
refers to the common practice of continuing to care for one’s domestic animals on the Sabbath in 
order to justify his own act of healing a sick woman on the Sabbath. 
 
Jesus’ parable, however, opens up the bounds of our neighborly care for animals to 
include both domestic and wild animals.  It is reminiscent in this way to the universal appeal of 
the Noahic covenant in Gen. 9.  After the great flood of Genesis 7 God makes a covenant with 
all humans and animals that pays no regard to their clan or domestication status.   
  
As for me, I am establishing my covenant with you [Noah] and your descendents after 
you, and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic animals, and 
every animal of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark. . . . This [rainbow] is 
a sign of the covenant that I have established between me and all flesh that is on the 
earth (Gen. 9: 9-10, 17). 
 
Milgrom claims that this covenant, along with the prefacing blood prohibition of 9:4, stands 
higher than the Ten Commandments in the priestly scale of virtues.441  While the Decalogue 
provides the foundation for Israelite society, he maintains, this prohibition is given as the basis 
for a viable human society.  I will revisit the blood prohibition and other dietary laws in more 
detail in chapter six.  For now it is important to note the universal reach of the Noahic covenant.  
A sense of covenant community is established between all classes of humans and animals.  Here, 
Robert Murray writes, “the partners are God, humankind and all animals. . . . God is seen as 
promising to care for both orders of creatures.”442  Murray also finds parallels between the 
universal scope of the covenant in Gen. 9 and the eschatologically minded covenant in Hos. 
                                                
441 Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New 
York: Doubleday, 1991), 705. 
442 Robert Murray, The Cosmic Covenant (London: Sheed & Ward, 1992), 34, 102. 
 112 
2:18.  “The concept of covenant here is the cosmic one, not that associated with Sinai.”443  The 
Mosaic covenant, in this way, marks a restriction in the cosmic scope of the Noahic covenant.  
The Mosaic covenant does not replace the Noahic; it still imagines a basic community between 
humans and animals and the various food laws that develop in Leviticus still fundamentally 
respect the blood prohibition.  Yet, the inclusive nature of the human-animal community has 
become more limited in the Mosaic covenant.444  
 
 The restrictive nature of the Mosaic covenant is quite practical on the one hand because 
it allows for a more particular level of care.  By limiting the scope of neighbor to include only 
those humans and animals within the covenant, the Mosaic covenant is able to see these human 
and animal neighbors as individuals in a way that would seem more difficult from the cosmic, 
universal perspective of the Noahic covenant.  From an ethics of care perspective, this increased 
particularity must be seen as an advantage.  On the other hand, according to the rights-based 
criticism of care, such a restriction can appear to lay unfair prejudice against the needs of the 
stranger.  The innovation that Jesus’ parable brings to this problem involves an integration of the 
universal concerns of the Noahic covenant with the particular level of care in the Mosaic 
covenant.  The parable is able to do this by utilizing different criteria for limiting care.  Ramsey 
writes of neighborly love: “Since this man may be any man, such love is, of course, universal in 
compass, but only implicitly universal.  It begins by loving ‘the neighbor,’ not mankind or 
manhood.”445  Neighborly love is not applicable to a general concept of fellow humanity or 
fellow creatureliness.  As long as we are concerned with general classes or groups of humans 
and animals neighborly love remains only a potentiality.  It becomes actual when we encounter 
individuals.446  The issue is one of nearness rather than group membership.  A fuller exploration 
of nearness and neighborly love must await the following chapter, but we may still briefly note 
its import for our immediate concern.  Nearness can be understood in two ways.  It can refer to 
existing familiar or friendly relationships.  I can in this sense consider certain family members 
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near to me even though we reside in separate states or countries.  The moral responsibilities 
established in our previous relationships of care (previous to a physical relocation) do not simply 
dissolve for a lack of physical proximity, although they may become weaker.  Nearness can also 
be understood as physical proximity.447  The establishment of a relationship is still important 
here, but it is founded on presently recognized need rather than on preexisting care.  The 
Samaritan in the parable happened upon a needy stranger and offered him aid, thus becoming his 
neighbor, in a way that the priest and Levite failed to do even though they also came physically 
near the fallen traveler.  Both of these aspects of nearness are important for a Christian 
understanding of neighbor and neighborly love.  We cannot dismiss our responsibilities to family 
and friends, but neither can we limit our care to those in this circle.  Care can be extended in a 
particular manner to those individuals that encounter us with their need, regardless of their 
domestic/wild or familiar/stranger status. 
 
3.2c Animal Neighbors and Animal Friends 
 
We have seen how an ethic of care for animals, modeled on the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, can overcome the rights-based criticism of care as arbitrarily parochial.  In this 
subsection I address a criticism of the concept of neighbor from the other direction.  Celia 
Deane-Drummond criticizes the association of animals with neighbors in favor of a more 
intimate, though restricted, category – friendship.  Deane-Drummond writes, “The context in 
which moral consideration of non-humans needs to take place is that of friendship set in a 
cosmic covenant between God and all creatures.”448  She is unhappy with the ethical category of 
neighbor because, as she claims, “to act as neighbour puts rather less ethical demand on 
humanity than does the notion of friendship.”449  Yet, this is not always the case.  The needs of 
the neighbor may demand a far higher level of care than I am naturally inclined to give a 
stranger.  The fallen traveler in the parable required a significant dedication of the Samaritan’s 
time and resources.  The Samaritan “went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil 
and wine on them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of 
him.  The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said, ‘Take care of 
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him; and when I come back, I will repay you whatever more you spend’” (Luke 10:34-35).450  If 
the friend normally demands greater obligations than the neighbor it is only because of the time 
and consistency required for the creation and sustenance of friendship.  Practically, Deane-
Drummond admits, “friendship will be most easily realized towards those creatures that are 
significant in human communities.”451  In other words, friendships will develop among humans 
and those animals with which humans have sustained and regular contact.452   
 
Furthermore, Deane-Drummond asserts, “Neighbourliness seems to imply a lack of 
reciprocity, which might be truer of some creatures than of others.”453  The capacity of an animal 
to reciprocate human care appears to determine its eligibility for friendship.  As we saw 
previously in chapter 2.2, the caring relationship requires some level of actual reply.  The 
concept of care is inappropriate for those creatures, like plants, that merely respond to human 
concern and action.  Yet, the lack of a need for full reciprocity is precisely what makes 
neighborly love such a helpful concept with regard to animals.  Paul Ramsey clearly articulates 
the danger in caring for another out of a desire or need for reciprocity.  “In the case of a friendly 
neighbor it is possible in loving him to love only his friendliness toward us in return.  Then he is 
not loved for his own sake.  He is loved for the sake of his friendliness, for the sake of the 
benefits to be gained from reciprocal friendship.”454  Very often, he says, love for a friend shows 
up as “enlightened selfishness.”  This is better than a crude selfishness, but it is not neighborly 
love.  The “full particularity of neighborly love” demands that we find “the neighbor out by first 
requiring nothing of him.”455  Love for neighbor in this sense requires a certain level of 
disinterest.  It cannot be concerned with whether or not the neighbor in turn reciprocates care.   
This is significant for human relationships with animals, because, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the realities of dependency mean that even the most intimate relationships of care, such 
as between a mother and child, will not always involve reciprocation.  Similarly, in caring for an 
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animal, reciprocation cannot be our primary concern.  Ramsey concludes that the true test of 
disinterested love comes in our relationship to our enemies rather than our friends.  “If a person 
loves his enemy-neighbor from whom he can expect no good return but only hostility and 
persecution, then alone does it become certain that he does not simply love himself in loving his 
neighbor.”456  On the other hand, he insists that in friendships there is always the hope and 
prospect of requital.  The impetus of the parable of the Good Samaritan lies simply in proving 
neighborly, not in first deciding whether the one in need is my friend who will reciprocate my 
love at a later date.  I do not want to argue that animals may never reciprocate human care.  We 
saw a touching example of this in our introductory story of Old Man and Marc.  I want to 
emphasize, however, that the realities of vulnerability and need do not discriminate between 
individuals that have friends and those that do not.  Neighborly love understands this and is 
therefore ready to act whether the need we encounter derives from a friend, stranger, or even 
enemy.  The actions of Rick toward Jojo in our other introductory story demonstrate that a 
neighbor can require just as much, if not more, risk and care than a friend, despite his inability to 
reciprocate.          
 
In contrast to Deane-Drummond’s view, Ruth Page rejects the concept of friendship 
precisely because of the high level of intimacy and ethical demand usually associated with 
friendship.  Page prefers the term companion because “one could scarcely ask a farmer to be 
friend of every sheep, cow, or chicken on the farm.  But a sense of companionship with the 
creatures, as opposed to thinking of them as incipient commodities, or even only as stock, seems 
a possible fruitful way to behave for their good and the farmers.”457  In another place, Page 
additionally uses the concept of neighbor, though not necessarily as articulated through Jesus’ 
parable in Luke 10, to describe human relationships with and care for animals.458  These two 
categories, however, need not be seen as mutually exclusive.  One can be both friend to certain 
animals and neighbor to others.  To refer again to Noddings’s example, there is no reason why I 
cannot accept the high level of responsibility entailed in friendship with my housecat while still 
being open to the possibility of providing neighborly care to the stranger animal that meets me at 
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the back door.  The underlying problem with setting friend and neighbor in opposition as Deane-
Drummond and Page do is the assumption that these concepts are static or that any single 
category can effectively encompass all human relationships with animals.  Firstly, there is no 
reason why a relationship that begins with neighborly care cannot develop over time into a 
friendship.  We saw an example of this in the story of Pitcher and Lupa in the previous chapter.  
Secondly, just as the categories of friend or neighbor/companion do not exhaust all human-
human relationships, human relationships with animals operate at several levels.  Similar to the 
way in which the Mosaic covenant did not replace the Noahic covenant, the concern for friends 
need not displace openness to the stranger.  One key insight of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, as we saw above, lays in the moral significance it gives to relationships of nearness.  
This idea will be explored at length in the following chapter’s discussion of human relationships 
with wild, domestic working, and pet animals. 
 
3.2d Protective Animal Rights 
 
In this last subsection I return to the question of animal rights and consider its 
compatibility with the neighborly caring ethic we have been developing.  Rights language 
presupposes an antagonistic or competitive environment between individuals.  In as much as an 
ethic of neighborly care presumes mutual dependency and relationship to be the fundamental 
realities of creaturely existence, it must reject the rights premise.  Yet, in light of existing 
competition between humans and animals, we may find a helpful, though limited, place for 
rights language within an ethic of neighborly care for animals.  Although he does not entertain 
the idea of animal rights, Karl Barth’s discussion in Ethics of the neighbor as a bearer of rights 
helps clarify this idea.  “The Thou of the neighbor,” he claims, “becomes an authority to us from 
the standpoint of the right (or law) which protects him and which is represented by him.”459  The 
very existence of the neighbor constitutes an authoritative presence in one’s moral deliberations.  
Barth’s concept of right also assumes an adversarial state of affairs.  “The problem of right 
begins where the collision of my own activity with the social order begins; where this collision 
cannot be eliminated;…where [the neighbor] claims publically acknowledged and protected right 
for himself against me.”460  Rights, in this way, help to protect individuals in situations of 
conflict and competing interests.  So far Barth’s description is similar to other secular rights 
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theories and appears to offer no significant advantage for our own caring perspective.  The 
significant insight Barth brings to the discussion comes in his theological assessment of the 
adversarial basis for rights.  Public legislation and the punishment of parties who violate the right 
of others “makes sense only if man is a sinner against whom others have to be protected.”461  The 
theological presupposition for rights is not simply individuals existing in competition with one 
another, but “fallen Adam expelled from paradise.”462  That we require rights to protect other 
humans or animals from ourselves acknowledges that human relationships are not what they 
should be.  Barth writes, “Wittingly or unwittingly it [societal law] accepts thereby a theological 
presupposition.  We are forced to say that the dogma of original sin is much better preserved by 
the police than by teachers or even by modern pastors.”463  The need for rights arises because 
humans find themselves in a historical reality that is different from either the ideal relationships 
depicted in the Genesis creation narratives where humans and animals live together peaceably on 
a diet of plant food or the prophetic visions of an eschatological peace between all creatures (for 
example Isaiah 11).  To use Barth’s later terminology in the Church Dogmatics, rights are 
necessary under the present “caveat” (Vorbehalt) between God’s original plan and final goal for 
creation.464  Rights, therefore, must be seen as a temporary protective measure for the interim 
period between creation and recreation.  They serve to remind us of the present reality of broken 
relationships and our need for the renewal made possible through grace rather than as an ideal or 
foundation for human existence.465    
 
Stephen Webb puts forth a criticism of animal rights that holds particular import for our 
present discussion.  He begins with an acknowledgement that the language of rights “emerges 
from a social situation of mistrust and opposition.”466  He then observes, “Ironically and 
tragically, giving animals rights could only result in giving humans even more power over the 
animals, because humans would be the ones determining what those rights are and how they 
                                                
461 Ibid., 378. 
462 Ibid. 
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464 Barth, CD III.4, 353; KD III.4, 402. 
465 I am using “historical” in the way that Barth uses it to describe the present reality of sin and the 
covenant of grace.  The peace depicted in the opening chapters of the Genesis “saga” in this sense is not to 
be understood as some “golden age” to which we should hope for a return.  In a similar manner the 
prophetic expectations represent a “post-historical era” of peaceful relationships.  I am, thus, outlining a 
specifically theological limitation for rights language as appropriate for the time in between “creation and 
perfection.”  See Barth, CD III/1, 211-212.  I explore this notion of historical caveat in which violence and 
competition are possible in greater detail in chapter 6.2c.   
466 Webb, God and Dogs, 55. 
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should be enforced.”467  Animals are unable to speak out for any protections they might demand.  
The best humans can do is represent animal interests, similar to the interests of human children, 
by some kind of proxy.  Philosopher Joel Feinberg has made this very suggestion.468  Granting 
animals rights does not free them from human control or management; it simply stipulates the 
kind or degree of management.  Webb’s most shrewd criticism, however, is the observation that 
“if we are the ones who give rights to animals, then the act of giving precedes the acquisition of 
rights.  We will only give rights to animals if we act out of love and compassion toward 
them.”469  Therefore, he contends, the most important task for humanity is to reform those 
institutions that promote compassion rather than relying on the legislative protection of rights.  
Andrew Linzey’s concept of “theos-rights” for animals rests on an explicit, theological pillar in 
addition to the basic presumption of adversarial relationships between individuals; yet, it is 
susceptible to a similar criticism.  In sum, Linzey argues that God, as Creator, has absolute right 
over God’s creation.  Animal life has inherent value to God and therefore by granting animals 
rights, we are simply respecting the divine right and valuation of God’s creatures.470  Even this 
articulation of rights, however, is based more fundamentally on care and relationship.  We 
respect God’s creatures because we respect God.  The assignment of derivative rights for 
animals, therefore, arises out of humanity’s prior relationship with God.  Love and relationship 
still proceeds the granting of rights.   
 
The best candidate for a relationship where rights language would appear appropriate 
lays in human relationships with wild animals.  This is because human responsibility for wild 
animals is characterized primarily by a position of restraint.  Grace Clement points out that, “just 
as the ethic of justice would say, it seems that they do need only that their space be protected 
from others’ intrusions.”471  Such an idea seems clearly in line with Barth’s suspicion that 
without the protection of rights “the exercise of [one man’s] own specific right in life will be 
unpleasant for his fellows.”472  Thus, for humans and wild animals to flourish and live together 
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the drawing of certain restrictions and boundaries could prove beneficial.  Accordingly, Andrew 
Linzey states that “the language of rights is indispensible as the provider of markers and pointers 
to the minimum obligations we should extend to animals, such as not harming, not causing 
suffering, not wantonly destroying.”473  Respecting the ‘rights’ of wild animals, therefore, would 
mean allowing them space and opportunity to remain free from human interference.  It would 
mean, essentially, following the guidance of the Sabbatical year command in Ex. 23:10-12 that 
we observed above in section 3.2b.  Tom Regan’s notion of duties of assistance can be placed 
within this framework.  By duties of assistance, he means that justice imposes the duty to assist 
those who suffer from injustice in addition to regular duties of nonharm.  Regan writes, “If you 
have a right to noninterference, then my duty to you in this regard does not consist merely in my 
minding my own business; I also have a prima facie duty to assist you if others deny you the 
exercise of this right.”474  Protection remains the underlying theme – I must protect you from 
myself as well as others.  Yet, outside of these minimal, protective obligations, rights language 
falls short.475  Rights language possesses no way to articulate other circumstances where nurture 
and growth in relationship are called for rather than autonomy and protection.  Rights, therefore 
prove less appropriate for those domestic and pet animals that are dependent on humans and thus 
demand more than protective noninterference.   
 
With regard to wild animals rights also lose traction when we face situations where harm 
has been caused but rights have not been violated.  Such situations would include accidental 
harms or harms caused by natural disasters or amoral agents (“moral patients” in Regan’s 
terminology) such as wild predators.  In these cases, strictly speaking, no injustice has been done 
and therefore no protective duties of assistance are required.  Dale Jamieson notes this problem 
with rights language.476  In response, Regan states, “I do not maintain that we owe nothing to 
those in need who are not victims of injustice.  What I do maintain is that we do not owe 
anything to such individuals on the grounds of justice.”477  He admits that rights theory in this 
regard is not a complete theory and is open to the possibility of providing aid for reasons other 
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than the demands of justice.  Clement provides an example, surprisingly similar to that of our 
parable, of how incorporating rights language into a larger caring framework will help correct 
this problem.  Under normal circumstance, humans should follow, as much as possible, a policy 
of noninterference toward wild animals and their habitats.  But when we encounter an individual 
wild animal with a specific need that we can meet, caring is possible and even necessary.  
Clement’s example: A human is hiking through the woods and happens upon a wounded bird 
lying by the side of the path.  The hiker feels pity on the bird and gives it aid.  She insists, “This 
is not to claim that there ought to be public policy devoted to the alleviation of wild animal 
suffering, only that when an individual human being is confronted by the suffering of an 
individual animal, it would be morally unacceptable to say that we have a moral obligation not to 
relieve that suffering.”478  We find a striking example of this interaction between rights and 
caring as a legal precedent in Britain.  Humans are largely forbidden from keeping or killing 
certain protected animal species.  If however, a human happens upon a representative of one of 
these protected species that is injured she may care for it with the intent to release it when it has 
recovered or kill it if no hope of recovery exists.479  I am not suggesting that British legislators 
had these two ethical theories in mind when framing this law.  I am only citing it as an example 
of how a limited, protective understanding of animal rights might fit into a larger caring ethic in 




 Humans answer the call of the other as whole human creatures.  In other words, while 
the human response to the neighbor possesses a cognitive element, it also contains an essential 
emotional, or sympathetic, component.  Human mental capacities may provide the instruments 
allowing us to respond responsibly, but our sympathies provide essential motivation and content 
to that answer.  In this chapter we have described this interaction between emotion and reason as 
the twin sentiments of natural and ethical caring.  By appealing to the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, we then took up a critique of caring made by the animal rights position.   We found 
that an ethics of care for animals can readily extend to the stranger animals if informed by the 
Christian concept of neighborly love.  Nevertheless, we observed finally that the language of 
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479 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Part 1.10.3. http://www.jncc.gov.uk/page-3614. 
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justice and rights can have a limited role to play within a larger context of care for animals.   
Commenting on the relationship between care and justice Virginia Held writes: 
 
This relational view is the better view of human beings, of persons engaged in 
developing human morality. We can decide to treat such persons as individuals, to be the 
bearers of individual rights, for the sake of constructing just political and legal and other 
institutions. But we should not forget the reality and the morality this view obscures. . . . 
We should embed this picture, I think, in the wider tapestry of human care.480 
 
Care is primary, she claims, because human life simply cannot exist without it.  Parental care for 
children, for example, marks a prerequisite for the very existence, much less flourishing, of 
human life and society.  It is possible to have relationships of care without justice, but not justice 
without care.  This point is particularly relevant for the theological account of animal ethics I am 
proposing.  We saw in chapter one that humans, as being created in the image of God, exist 
fundamentally as creatures in relationship rather than as the autonomous, individuals stipulated 
by a justice or rights theory.  It is within relationships of dependency and responsibility with 
God, other humans, and other animals that we express a truly human life.  The language of rights 
may be helpful in constructing just relationships between humans and animals; however, we 
must remember that such language is suitable only if the more primary relationships of 
responsibility and care have given way to indifference or exploitation.  Caring seeks to avoid 
such outcomes, but in our present historical ‘caveat’ to speak in a limited way of rights may be 
appropriate. 
                                                
480 Held, Ethics of Care, 72. 
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CHAPTER 4: DRAWING NEAR TO ANIMAL NEIGHBORS 
 
“But a Samaritan while traveling came near him” (Luke 10:33) 
 
“When I go off on an excursion perching along the river banks or lakes near a village, as 
I fly up over the banks, the children cry, ‘Look, there’s the Doctor’s pelican!’  And they escort 
me on my way.”481  In a short book, told from the perspective of the bird, Albert Schweitzer tells 
the story of his pelican. Over time Schweitzer and his pelican develop a mutual respect and the 
bird becomes his constant companion.  The pelican perches on guard outside Schweitzer’s room 
at night, greeting any intruders with a hiss and slap from his beak.  He even accompanies the 
doctor on his daily rounds at the hospital.  “The friendship between the Doctor and me gives me 
the right to be his companion wherever he goes.  I walk along beside him when we meet on the 
hospital street or down by the river.  I join in the conversations he has.”482   Schweitzer never 
cared for the pelican with the idea of making him a pet.  At the beginning of their relationship 
Schweitzer often wished that the bird would leave because of the strain he put on the hospital’s 
resources – particularly fish.  Yet, what would develop into a lasting friendship between man and 
bird began with a chance encounter.  The pelican, one of the numerous animals that Schweitzer 
took in at his hospital in Africa, was captured by traders from its nest as a chick.  Fearing that he 
would be sold to someone who would not care for him, Schweitzer bought the bird from the 
traders with the intent of releasing him back into the jungle when he was old enough to fend for 
himself.  This particular pelican, however, never flew off like the other animals.  He chose 
instead to spend his days near the good doctor.  Although Jesus never indicates that the 
Samaritan developed a lasting relationship with the fallen traveler, like Schweitzer and his 
pelican, the Samaritan was put in a position to respond to the traveler and provide care when he 
first, by chance, “came near him” (ἦλθεν κατ’) (Luke 10:33).  Along these lines this chapter will 
explore the many senses in which humans draw near to animals and become their neighbors, 
from helping an injured wild animal, working alongside a domestic animal, to befriending a pet. 
 
In the previous chapters we saw the essential role that caring plays in human moral 
relationships and asked whether animals were fitting subjects of human sympathy.  Having 
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established that humans can in fact care for other animals, we must now ask how far our care 
must extend to the countless animals species with which we share the planet.  Does the universal 
Noahic covenant mean that our care must also be universal and extend equally to all animals?  
We worked toward an answer to this question in the previous chapter with our emphasis on 
establishing caring relationships with concrete animal neighbors rather than with animals or 
species in general. I will suggest in this chapter that attention to nearness, or the proximity of the 
neighbor, also contains particular relevance for an animal ethic.  The Samaritan in our parable 
was not “moved with pity” by an abstract thought of a distant fallen traveler.  He could only 
offer the traveler true care after first “drawing near” (προσελθὼν) (10:34).  This chapter will 
proceed in two stages.  I demonstrate in the first section the important role that nearness plays in 
human care for animals as neighbors.  I argue here that relationships of nearness provide 
essential order to human moral relationships with other animals.  I argue in the second section 
that human responsibility for animals is not monolithic, but varies in degree according to the 
nearness of the animal to human society.  In other words we require a taxonomy of nearness, to 
adapt Clare Palmer’s phrase, in which duties to wild, domestic, and pet animals can be 
established and differentiated.483  In this way I articulate two strands in which neighborhood with 
animals is understood: First, animals are neighbors in that they exist in relationships of proximity 
and encounter with humans; second, these neighborly relationships possess a historical quality 
that we can and should account for in our dealings with them. 
 
4.1 THE ETHICAL IMPORTANCE OF PROXIMITY 
 
4.1a Similar Capacities ≠ Similar Care 
 
 A justice-based animal ethic that begins with values like equality will tend to treat all 
encounters with similar animals on a similar playing field.  For example, if the capacity to suffer 
                                                
483 I am here adapting Clare Palmer’s phrase “taxonomy of relationship.”  She keenly observes that “if 
relationship is the key ethical behavior towards animals, this opens up the possibility that humans might 
have different ethical obligations towards animals with whom they have different relationships.”  Palmer, 
Animal Liberation, 3.  I have modified this phrase in order to emphasize the role of nearness in 
relationship.  I want to emphasize that what distinguishes and defines the different relationships humans 
have with animals is the concept of nearness.  The characteristic that defines human relationships with 
wild animals, for example, is a lack of nearness.  Wording the phrase in this way also allows me to discuss 
the significance of the human-pet relationship, which can encompass both wild and domestic animals, and 
which Palmer leaves largely unarticulated. 
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is the qualification a creature must possess to count morally, then all creatures with this capacity 
will possess equal moral consideration.  This is the basic utilitarian position expounded by Peter 
Singer.  On these grounds, one cannot dismiss the interests of an animal simply because they 
derive from a member of a different species. This is the very meaning of speciesism.  But 
rejecting speciesism, Singer argues, does not necessarily imply that all lives are of equal moral 
worth.484  In choices that do not involve simply the infliction of pain, other capacities become 
relevant.  When faced with the necessity of killing a dog or a normal adult human, the human’s 
greater capacities such as self-awareness, planning for the future, and engaging in complex 
communication, take precedence.485  Along these lines we can assume that the same principle 
would hold true for choosing between the life of two animals with differing capacities, such as a 
dog and a mouse.  While both are capable of suffering, the dog has a greater capacity for self-
awareness, etc.  Therefore, while it would be wrong to inflict pain on both, we can still conclude 
that the life of the dog is more valuable than the life of the mouse.  Yet, if the choice is between 
two animals with similar mental capacities, such as a dog and a wolf, an utilitarian animal ethic 
can provide little guidance.  The interests of two individuals with similar capacities possess 
similar weight in an utilitarian calculus.  We are faced with a similar problem from an animal 
rights perspective, which also emphasizes equality.  All subjects-of-a-life demand similar basic 
rights, or protections, regardless of their species or location.  The rights view, Tom Regan 
asserts, is “categorically abolitionist” when it comes to the use of animals both in science and in 
agriculture.486  Whether an animal is wild or domestic matters not.  Thus, if equality is the 
guiding light, all animals that possess equal capacities demand equal treatment. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, however, justice-based theories like these are better 
at addressing abstract concepts and groups than our concrete relationships with individual 
animals. Clare Palmer astutely sums up the problem faced by justice-based theories of animal 
liberation: 
 
An endangered wild cat, a domestic house cat and a non-native feral cat all have 
(roughly) the same innate capacities.  There are no grounds for treating wild animals one 
way while regarding domestic animals with similar innate capacities differently.  This is 
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because contextual differences of this kind are not of ethical significance to 
philosophical animal liberation.487 
 
For Palmer, the creation of domestic species, and hence dependent species, marks an important 
contextual difference that places special claims on humans outside the basic equal consideration 
demanded by the principle of equality in utilitarian and rights based theories.  Sentience may be 
important for establishing our ability to care for other creatures.  The recipient of our care must 
be capable of a reply rather than a mere reaction.488  According to the ethics of care, however, it 
is one’s relationship with another that forms the basis for one’s care, not just comparable 
capacities.  Relationship, in this way, provides the contextual grounds for discriminating 
between our care for Palmer’s three kinds of cat.  Domestication constitutes a unique 
relationship between humans and certain animals.  It is not the same as the relationship between 
an individual human and an individual animal like that of Schweitzer and his pelican (although 
this relationship also places certain ethical demands on Schweitzer that would not arise if he 
were to encounter an unknown pelican).  I argue in this chapter that these different relationships 
derive from different kinds of nearness and that this has consequences for human moral action.  
Domestication is the result of a historic nearness with human society while wildness is 
constituted by a historic independence from humans.  A pet on the other hand, may be either a 
domestic or tame wild animal that is presently adopted into a more intimate, familiar relationship 
with humans.  These circumstances provide grounds for directing and ordering human care for 
animals that pure justice-based approaches lack.   
 
While more will be said about these contextual differences in the following section, it is 
important to note presently that such discriminating care does not equate to a prejudiced care.  
Mary Midgley writes, “The special interest which parents feel in their own children is not a 
prejudice, nor is the tendency which most of us would show to rescue, in a fire or other 
emergency, those closest to us sooner than strangers.  These habits of thought and action are not 
unfair, though they can probably be called discriminatory.”489   It is not a prejudice, she points 
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out, to acknowledge that some individuals, regardless of their merits or capacities, can be objects 
of concern before others.  Theologian Robert Spaemann makes a similar observation: “Standing 
before the alternative of saving the life of my child or of someone else, I would choose to save 
the life of my child.  And I would need the forgiveness of the one, who by this decision, was lost.  
Forgiveness, not in its narrower, moral sense, since I have no guilt.”490  The relationship that 
exists between Spaemann and his child places special, overriding claims on him that the other 
person does not.  It matters little whether Spaemann’s child and the other person have similar 
capacities; it is his relationship with his child that dictates the priority of his care.  If we speak 
explicitly about human care for animals we find that a similar ordering is appropriate.  In an 
article about the “humane” treatment of children and animals, child psychologist James 
Garbarino tells a story that holds particular relevance to our current discussion.  “When my son 
was six years old he was bitten by a raccoon in the forest. . . . There was a chance that the 
raccoon was rabid.  To rule out rabies, it was necessary to submit the animal’s brain to analysis, 
which meant that the raccoon had to die.”491  He regrets that the raccoon was killed, but 
nevertheless feels that it was the right decision.  Although the raccoon may have faired better 
under an ethic of animal rights, an utilitarian animal ethic would come to a similar conclusion.  
Because of the child’s greater mental capacities, rabies would be a greater evil for the child than 
the raccoon.  The scenario becomes more complicated, however, if we substitute the child for 
say a pet cat.  Because the raccoon and cat have similar capacities neither the rights nor 
utilitarian perspectives would have sufficient grounds for acting.  Neither animal possesses a 
greater right to life, nor is there any reason to believe that rabies would cause more pain in one 
animal over the other.  If we consider the relationship between the pet cat and its owner, 
however, we have the additional contextual data that makes moral action possible.  The 
raccoon’s death is still regrettable, but the owner’s responsibility to his pet overrides the equal 
capacities that both animals possess.492  
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4.1b Embodiment and Place 
 
We need such discriminatory guides because the outcomes of a strict egalitarian animal 
ethic are unrealistic.  Humans are embodied creatures and, therefore, finite and simply unable to 
extend equal care to all animals.  In his book, Happiness and Benevolence, Spaemann describes 
the human need of an ordo amoris, an order of love.  A tension exists between the “infinite 
horizon of responsibility” and the “finitude of the human as a living being, who cannot measure 
up to this responsibility,” he observes.493  Humans are not gods.  We cannot take up the divine 
perspective and have responsible concern for all suffering everywhere.  Any attempt to do so 
would be a denial of our natural finitude.  Our caring, therefore, must be ordered and attention to 
relationships of nearness provides one way to do so.  “Responsibility,” Spaemann contends, 
“always comes out of real perception, out of the face to face encounter, which brings us, perhaps 
completely by chance, to be the ‘neighbor’ of the animal.”494  Therefore, he continues, “not 
every pain of every animal can demand a human’s attention.”495  It is not possible for us to act 
with responsibility toward all pain and suffering in the animal world.  As such, the hare that is 
killed by the coyote in the uninhabited (by humans) prairie need not concern our moral action.  
Neither should the hungry coyote that is unsuccessful in her hunt.  Although some people may 
feel sadness at the mere abstract knowledge that such pain exists at some time at some place, the 
pain of an animal demands our attention only when we enter, for whatever reason, into nearness 
with that animal.   Spaemann is not alone among Christian theologians in acknowledging the 
relevance of proximity for human moral responsibility, although he is one of the few to make 
this connection with regard to human moral relationships with other animals.  In the fourth 
century Augustine of Hippo, for example, wrote, “All men are to be loved equally. But since you 
cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or 
place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you.”496  All humans may be 
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equally deserving of our love, but practically, we cannot truly care for humanity in general.  
Rather, we must direct our care towards those individuals in closer proximity to ourselves.497  
The same holds in respect to our care for animals.  All sentient animals may be deserving of our 
care,498 but we can only truly care for those who are near us.  Here we come to the very heart of 
neighborhood.  The word neighbour, πλησίον, literally means, “one who is near.”499  While all 
animals may be potential neighbors, only those animals with whom we draw near, for whatever 
reason, are our actual neighbors. 
 
The realities of human embodiment and finitude also mean that when we attentively 
draw near to an animal we must attend to the unique place of that animal.  We are not concerned 
here with an abstract notion of animal life or an abstract sense of space.  Here we find an 
interesting distinction between humans and other animals that holds particular relevance for our 
current discussion.  Miles Richardson writes that “as flesh and blood primates, we occupy space; 
as creatures of the symbol we transform that space into place.”500  In other words, humans, as 
animals, exist in the abstraction of space, but the human capacity for culture allows us to 
transform our general living space into unique places of meaning.  At first glance, Richardson’s 
assessment seems valid.  Yet, a closer investigation proves that just the opposite is true.  
Claiming that humans, as primates, occupy space implies that animals live their lives in 
abstraction rather than particularity.  This goes against an important distinction that many 
philosophers make between humans and animals – the capacity for abstract thought.  Thomistic 
philosopher Anthony Kenny states, “Only humans think abstract thoughts and make rational 
decisions.”501  Similarly, Spaemann argues, “The animal does not become real to itself, but 
remains in the centrality of the instinctual drives, its life does not become a whole.”502  In other 
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words, an animal cannot conceive of its life as a whole, but rather lives from one immediate 
moment to the next.  This means that an animal does not have the ability, like humans, to live in 
space, abstracted from his/her immediate surroundings and relationships.  Therefore, if an animal 
cannot abstract, how, we may ask, can they live in anything but the particularity of place?  Thus, 
it may be more accurate to claim that humans, as primates, live in place, but our capacity for 
abstract thought allows us to transcend the particularities of our specific place.   
 
This ability allows us to look past our own species and enter into relationships with other 
animals that amount to more than simply seeing them as objects for our consumption.  On the 
other hand, our closest biological relatives, the Neanderthals, failed to form relationships with 
other animals that approach anywhere near the complexity of those we find between humans and 
animals.  Archeologist Stephen Mithen attributes this failure to Neanderthals’ feeble capacity for 
abstract thought.  “This was a serious constraint on the type and range of relationships that could 
be formed with animals,” he claims.503  Yet, this very ability that makes complex relationships 
with animals possible also allows us to ignore the particularity of relationships in place and live 
instead in abstract, isolated space.  Ironically, our capacity for abstraction, which can prove 
helpful for realizing our commonality with other animals, can also prove detrimental to our 
caring for any particular animal.  If we remain in the world of human abstraction and never 
attend to the actual places that we inhabit, we may never see the animals that live there too.  
Nearness, on the other hand, represents a constant feature of an animal’s lived experience that it 
cannot overlook or deny.  Thus, while animals may tend naturally to care for those near them, for 
humans, this requires deliberate choice. To recall Augustine’s point in On Christian Doctrine I, 
we must love all equally, but we cannot do good to all equally.  Therefore, neighborly love is 
concerned less with doing good to abstract concepts of human or animal-kind than focusing 
instead on those real individuals we encounter in the specific places we occupy.   
 
                                                                                                                                           
observation of animal behavior, a gradated view seems more appropriate.  Such a conception would allow 
differing levels of understanding and abilities for different kinds of animal life, with some approaching 
nearer to that of humans than others.  Alasdair MacIntyre critiques Kenny, who posits a similar chasm 
between humans and animals as Spaemann, along similar lines.  MacIntyre states we should think “in 
terms of a scale or a spectrum rather than of a single line of division between ‘them’ and ‘us.’” MacIntyre, 
Dependent Rational Animals, 57.     
503 Stephen Mithen, “The Hunter-Gatherer Prehistory of Human-Animal Interactions,” in The Animal 
Reader: The Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings, ed. Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald (Oxford: 
Berg, 2007), 125.  
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4.1c More than Physical Proximity 
 
 Mere physical proximity, however, does not suffice for making one a true neighbor.  To 
become a neighbor we must actually meet or encounter the other individuals with whom we are 
proximate.  In other words, neighborhood requires nearness and relationship.  In two important 
essays, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger makes several valuable insights into the link 
between these two concepts.  According to Heidegger, the concept of nearness (Nähe) cannot be 
defined simply by describing the length of space or time between two objects.  “Short distance is 
not in itself nearness.  Nor is great distance remoteness,” he claims.504  Nearness, itself, cannot 
be experienced directly; yet, we can obtain nearness by attending to that which is near.505  
Heidegger explicitly ties his understanding of nearness to the concept of neighborhood in his 
essay, “The Nature of Language.”  Here he writes that although nearness does involve distances 
of space and time, these measurements do not encompass the full nature of the concept.506  For 
example, he observes that two isolated farmhouses, separated by an hour’s walk across the 
fields, may in fact be the best of neighbors; on the other hand, two townhouses, across the street 
or even sharing a common wall, may know no neighborhood.507  A neighbor, he explains, “as the 
word itself tells us, is someone who dwells near to and with someone else…Neighborhood, then, 
is a relation resulting from the fact that the one settles face-to-face with the other.”508  Thus, it is 
the face-to-face, the relationship, with the other that grounds the nearness that makes 
neighborhood possible.   
 
We saw in the previous subsection that to become a neighbor, humans must enter into 
the concrete world of place.  For Heidegger, a place cannot be known independently from the 
beings that occupy it.509  It is in this way that the Samaritan in our parable can be said to have 
drawn near to the fallen traveler.  The priest and Levite saw the man, but did not exist in the 
                                                
504 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), 165. 
505 Ibid.,166.   
506 Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 103.   
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid., 82. 
509 Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 252.  To a degree, this can be said even of inanimate objects.  “When a 
bridge is built, the place on the river becomes a place.  Previously it has not been a place.  It merely was 
one of the many spots along the river for a possible bridge.”   
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same place as him because they chose to ignore his concrete needs.  They remained like the two 
townhouses, crossing paths but never acknowledging or entering into relationship with each 
other.  Australian environmental philosopher Peter Hay, however, criticizes phenomenologies of 
place as being too anthropocentric.  “Most theories of place, including those whose identification 
with environmentalism is overt . . . , assume a human environment. . . . At least, following 
Heidegger, it is primarily concerned with the question of how humans should be in the world.”510  
Hay, however, forgets that we who are philosophizing are in fact humans.  Phenomenology, as 
an analysis of perception, says this is significant.  Accordingly all phenomenology done by 
humans is necessarily anthropocentric.  A phenomenology done by tigers would be tigercentric.  
Similarly, the only ethics we can truly know anything about is human ethics.511  We can 
distinguish, in this way, between a vicious anthropocentrism and a necessary anthropocentrism.  
A vicious anthropocentrism overlooks the reality that animal lives comprise of more than their 
relationships with humans.  An animal’s relationship with other proximate creatures and 
existence in its place hold significance for the animal itself.  A necessary anthropocentrism, on 
the other hand, marks a necessary limitation for any human ethic – especially one concerned 
with nonhuman creatures.  We must remember that we have responsibility only for our own 
response to other animals.  Thus, when we do attend to place and draw near to animals as 
neighbors, we must remember that we do so as one specific sort of creature among a number of 
other specific inhabitants of a particular place. 
 
 We find another approach to the relationship inherent in nearness in Karl Barth’s divine 
command ethics.512  Unlike Heidegger’s phenomenological account, Barth’s approach to the 
question of neighborhood begins with the Word of God and that Word’s encounter with 
creatures through the incarnate Christ.  Barth’s approach is no less anthropocentric than 
Heidegger’s but, even if Barth fails to take notice of it himself, his strong Christological focus 
                                                
510 Peter Hay, A Companion to Environmental Thought (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 
2002), 170. 
511 For more on this idea see the following paragraphs on Barth as well as chapters 1.2 and 6.2a. 
512 In an article discussing the different rhetorical strategies in Barth and Heidegger’s work, David 
Klemm writes that these two thinkers present us with “forking paths into new worlds of meaning,” with 
Barth giving voice to the Christian language of the Word of God and Heidegger speaking ontologically of 
the meaning of being.  David E. Klemm, “Toward a Rhetoric of Postmodern Theology: Through Barth and 
Heidegger,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, no. 3 (1987): 445. 
Barth does not engage Heidegger specifically on the issue of nearness, but his comments on 
Heidegger’s concept of time are informative for how such a critique might run.  He finds Heidegger’s 
concept of time particularly troubling because it lacks a place for God and revelation (CD I/2, 46).   
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prohibits him from completely overlooking nonhuman animals.  For Barth, God is always 
present in creation, but God dwells in creation, or we might say draws near to creation, in 
particular ways and places throughout history.  We see this in the Old Testament in such places 
as Sinai and the tabernacle.513  This culminates, however, in the New Testament when the divine 
Word becomes incarnationally present to creatures in the person of Jesus Christ.  “The reality of 
the definite, distinct dwelling of God in the world is now made clear in this…‘The Word...was 
made flesh, and dwelt among us.’”514  In doing so, I will argue, Christ became neighbor to all 
living creatures of flesh – including animals.  Consequently, by drawing near to animal life in 
this way, Christ’s incarnation and resurrection provide the basis for our own drawing near to 
animals as neighbor. 
 
To say that this is not obvious by a cursory read through Barth’s Church Dogmatics, 
however, would be an understatement.  In CD III/1 Barth writes, “God’s eternal Son and Logos 
did not will to be an angel or animal but a man.”515  Andrew Linzey comments on this passage: 
“What is so problematic is the way in which God’s ‘yes’ to humankind in the incarnation 
becomes a ‘no’ to creation as a whole.”516  It is difficult, Linzey says, to see how the flesh that 
Christ takes up in the incarnation cannot include the flesh of animals as well as humans.  
Linzey’s intuition is correct.  Yet, to say that God’s ‘yes’ to humanity rules out a similar 
affirmation of animals or the cosmos in general is an overstatement.  To realize why this is so we 
must attend to the theological context in which Barth’s statement is made.  In the specific 
context of the Church Dogmatics, Barth is here explicating how the phrase “heaven and earth” 
denotes the sum of reality, which is distinct from God.  It is because of this distinction that we 
are able to name God as both Creator and Redeemer.  Regarding the divine Word’s human 
incarnation specifically, Barth’s statement must also be placed within its larger theological 
context.  Two patristic theological concepts can be seen as significant here: 1) the notion of the 
                                                
513 Barth, CD II/1, 479. 
514 Ibid., 481-482.  In summary Barth says: “We have spoken about the general and special presence 
of God in His creation.  By the general presence we understood God's presence in His creation in its 
totality; by His special presence His presence in His definite and distinct action in His work of revelation 
and reconciliation within creation.” Ibid., 483. 
515 Barth, CD III/1, 18. 
516 Linzey, Animal Theology, 9.  Linzey makes the same criticism in Linzey, Christianity and Rights, 
34. 
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human as microcosm, and 2) that what Christ “has not assumed He has not healed.”517  Although 
“strangely few references were made to their views by Barth,” Thomas F. Torrance astutely 
notes the many continuities between Barth’s theology and that of the Greek Church Fathers.518  
The subtle differences between Barth’s concept of humanity existing in the middle of the cosmos 
and the Greek notion of humanity as a microcosm enveloping the cosmos are not significant 
enough to posit a large break between their anthropologies.  As a microcosm, the human 
possesses both spirit and material flesh and, thus, the entire created universe.  Gregory of 
Nazianzus, for example, speaks of the human as a “mingled worshipper; . . . earthly and 
heavenly; temporal and yet immortal; visible and yet intellectual; half-way between greatness 
and lowliness.”519  Humanity in this way unites the spiritual and the material worlds.520  
Similarly, Barth writes that in the human creature “heaven and earth are together in this fixed 
order; because man is and represents the secret of the creature . . . - that he is on earth and under 
heaven, and therefore between these two worlds, which for all their distinction are still the one 
world created by God.”521  With regard to our second concept, Linzey criticizes Barth for not 
attending to the “ancient patristic principle that what is not assumed in the incarnation is not 
healed in the redemption.”522  Torrance, however, notes on multiple occasions the significance 
that this concept has for Barth’s theology.  In fact, he claims, “it is one of the most significant 
contributions of Karl Barth that he reintroduced this great evangelical principle back into 
dogmatic theology.”523  For Barth, along with the patristics, the only way for Christ to redeem 
sinful humanity was to take up sinful humanity.  In other words, if Christ has assumed a neutral 
humanity, i.e., non-sinful humanity, “He would bring us nothing new. He would not help us. He 
would leave us in the remoteness.”524  When taken in hand with the idea of humanity uniting 
                                                
517 Gregory of Nazianzus, Letter to Cledonius in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 
7, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. Charles Gordon Brown and James Edward Swallow, 1983 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1952), 440. http://www.ccel.org/fathers.html (accessed April 
2009). 
518 Torrance, Karl Barth, 202.  Torrance’s personal and scholarly interactions with Barth grant him 
great credibility when he speaks about these connections.  While in Basel, Barth directed Torrance’s thesis 
which was later published as The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers.  Ibid., 124.  Although 
Torrance mentions specifically only the second of the two concepts I refer to here, I believe evidence 
exists for an implicit assumption, or at least continuity, of the first as well. 
519 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 38.11, 348.  
520 Sigurd Bergmann, Creation Set Free: The Spirit as Liberator of Nature, trans. Douglas Scott 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eedmans Pub., 2005),  86. 
521 Barth, CD III/1, 18. 
522 Linzey, Animal Theology, 10. 
523 Torrance, Karl Barth, 104. 
524 Barth, CD I/2, 115. 
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heaven and earth we can see that in becoming truly human Christ heals not only all of human 
nature, but consequently all of Creation as well. 
 
It is in this context that we can make better sense of Barth’s statement about the Word 
becoming human rather than angel or animal.  If the Word had become an angel, or taken up 
only a heavenly nature, his salvific effects would have applied only to heavenly creatures.  
Conversely, if the Word had become an animal, or taken up only an earthly nature, only other 
earthly creatures would have been restored.  But by becoming incarnate as human, the creature 
that stands in between heaven and earth, Christ’s benefits have significance for creatures in both 
realms.  “He (in His humanity) is the centre of all creation, of the whole reality of which the 
creed says that God created.”525  Understood in this way, the Word becoming human is no slight 
to animals any more than to angels.  Unfortunately Barth himself does not expound the impact of 
the cosmic reach of Christ’s incarnation and resurrection with regard specifically to animals.  He 
instead allows this to remain in the realm of mystery.526  Torrance is critical of Barth in this 
regard.  He asserts that if the Word of God who created all things became incarnate in the man 
Jesus, “then we must think of the whole creation as having been affected by what he has 
done.”527	   Although Barth says little to this effect explicitly, his line of reasoning points toward 
the inclusion of animals, as fellow earthly creatures, into the train of Christ’s salvific effects. 
 
This is significant for our understanding of the neighbor because it is through the 
incarnation and resurrection that Christ becomes a neighbor to creatures.  Barth says that we 
realize our neighbor in either the one who meets us as benefactor (Wohltäter) or the one to 
                                                
525 Barth, CD III/1, 19. 
526 In CD III/4 Barth accepts the commonality of human and animal life (they are both created on the 
same day in Genesis and share life and flesh), but he refuses to say much more than that this commonality 
exists and places special responsibilities on humans.  “But whether and in what sense we may also ascribe 
to [animal life] a kind of rationality, and how we are to conceive of its relation to the impulses, and above 
all whether and in what sense it not only derives from God but also moves towards Him, remains an 
enigma.” CD III/4, 348.  This reticence perhaps derives from Barth’s rejection of natural theology and 
insistence that we can only know God’s Word from our own human perspective.  “How can we know of a 
command that refers to the life of animals and plants and life generally? Such a command may exist in a 
hidden form. There is an infinite range of possible but unknown realities in the relation of Creator and 
creature. We may thus give free rein to our imagination in this field. But we must not maintain that we 
have any knowledge.”  CD III/4, 333.  If the Word of God addresses itself to animals, humans, as human 
and not animal, have no way of knowing it. 
527 Torrance, Karl Barth, 236.  Along these lines Torrance asks, “even if we grant to Barth that the 
incarnation has the effect of giving a central place to the problem of man in dogmatics, why did he limit 
his account of the created order so severely to man in the cosmos, without very much to say about the 
cosmos itself except in respect of his magnificent discussions of time and providence?” Ibid., 132. 
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whom we server as benefactor.528  Because of the healing benefits Christ grants us through his 
incarnation and resurrection, we are able to see Christ as our neighbor in this way.  “The Son of 
God has made himself my neighbour in his incarnation and revealed Himself my neighbour in 
His resurrection,” Barth asserts.529  Christ draws near to us in his incarnation and becomes our 
benefactor in his resurrection.  As I have argued above, however, these events are not solely 
anthropocentric in scope.  Christ’s incarnation and resurrection have truly cosmic effects.  By 
taking up humanity’s earthly human nature, Christ becomes neighbor not only to humans, but 
also to all creatures of the earth.  “He has become a neighbour to individual men who can as such 
be good neighbours to us, because in them Jesus Christ is present to us, and in hearing them, we 
hear Him (Lk.10:16).”530  Because Christ has become our neighbor, we can then be neighbor to 
others.531  If we consider the larger implications of Christ’s incarnation and resurrection, we can 
see how it is conceivable for us to be good neighbors to animals as well.  Because Christ drew 
near as neighbor to all earthly creatures, we are able to do the same.   
 
Barth describes this act of drawing near and giving or receiving benefaction as an event 
(Ereignis).532  Nearness, in this way, is not bound by the specific places that we call home.  
Nearness is an event that occurs whenever and wherever a caring relationship is established 
between two individuals.  This is in fact a vital point of the parable of the Good Samaritan.  Like 
the fallen man in the ditch, the Samaritan is also a traveler.  Yet the two become neighbors when 
the Samaritan by chance draws near and offers the man aid.  The priest and Levite, on the other 
hand, also happened upon the fallen traveler.  Yet because they were unwilling to offer him aid, 
they also attempted to avoid coming near – they “passed by on the other side” (Luke 10:31,32).  
While it may be most comfortable to care for those that share a natural proximity to us (like 
nationality, race, or even species), the parable shows us that our neighbor can also be the one 
who we draw near to by chance.  David Clough notes that while Barth appears to imply in places 
that Christians find their neighbor most readily from within the Church, “where Barth introduces 
the parable of the Good Samaritan, he is forced by the text to conclude that our neighbour may 
                                                
528 Barth, CD I/2, 420; KD I/2, 463. 
529 Ibid., 424. 
530 Ibid. 
531 This is a common pattern in the New Testament.  Christ’s original being or action grants his 
followers the ability to be or act in a similar manner.  For example, Christians are adopted through Christ 
as children of God (Rom. 8:17).  Or in another passage, “we love because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19).    
532 Barth, CD I/2, 420; KD I/2, 463. 
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be foreign to us.”533  Moreover, the cosmic implications of Christ’s incarnation and resurrection 
mean that the foreignness of our neighbor may not be limited to national or ecclesial affiliations.  
In connection to the parable Barth recognizes, “I must be ready to obey the summons to go and 
do likewise, that is, to be myself a benefactor.”534  Understanding the event-like quality of this 
divine command means that we approach it with great openness.  Like the Samaritan and the 
fallen traveler in the parable, we cannot expect to know ahead of time whom our neighbor will 
be nor to whom we ourselves may be called to be neighbors.  Commenting on Barth, Robert 
Willis concludes that “the actual situation in which man finds himself is that of having to seek 
anew, in each context, the meaning of God’s command ‘without having the answer already 
prepared, and really without being able to provide it ourselves.’”535  The summons to go and do 
likewise cannot always be anticipated. We cannot always know when or where the call of the 
other will become authoritative for us as the Word of God summoning us to draw near and 
become a neighbor.  With those that we already share a close relationship, our responsibility to 
care is often obvious.  Yet, the parable of the Good Samaritan shows how we can become a 
neighbor in the very event of drawing near and caring.  The taxonomy of nearness outlined in the 
second half of this chapter will provide general guidelines for discerning our various 
responsibilities to the different kinds of animals we encounter.  Yet, we must not let this scheme 
deafen our ears to the call of those animals that “when hearing them, we hear Him.”  The 
summons to be a neighbor is never exhausted by our existing relationships of nearness.      
 
4.2 A TAXONOMY OF NEARNESS 
 
 Because it is concerned with aggregating pleasure and pain, an utilitarian animal ethic 
would classify animals according to their differing capacities for experiencing these conditions.  
In other words, it would rank them according to their level of sentience.  An animal rights 
position would do the same, but for different reasons.  An animal with more complex capacities 
would also have more complex rights that require protecting.  Along these lines, Clare Palmer 
writes that the central notion “of philosophical animal liberation seems to be that animals possess 
certain innate capacities, and that these determine - and solely determine - moral significance.”536  
                                                
533 David Clough, Ethics in Crisis: Interpreting Barth's Ethics (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005), 87. 
534 Barth, CD I.2, 420.   
535 Willis, Ethics, 179. Barth quotation from CD II.2, 718. 
536 Palmer, “Rethinking Animal Ethics,” 184. 
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As such the animal liberationist would have no way of articulating different relationships or 
responsibilities for animals with similar capacities.  He/she might even dismiss such an attempt 
as an “arbitrary discrimination.”537  To build up his qualifications as a dispassionate moral 
philosopher, Peter Singer, in the preface to the second edition of his Animal Liberation, makes it 
a point to mention that he and his wife keep no pets.  “We didn’t ‘love’ animals.  We simply 
wanted them treated as the independent sentient beings that they are.”538  Yet, as I have argued in 
the previous chapter and section, factors like emotional connection and nearness are important 
for ordering human care for other animals.  The possession of sentience alone is not enough to 
determine human moral relationships with other animals.  We must speak of human 
responsibilities, rather than responsibility.   
 
Therefore, I am proposing that, rather than ordering our care for animals solely around 
the specific capacities that they have, we construct a taxonomy of nearness.  In this section we 
explore how the realities of nearness distinguish and define the relationships and consequently 
the responsibilities we have for the different kinds of animals we encounter.  We can organize 
these animals and our corresponding responsibilities into three basic categories: responsibilities 
for wild animals, domestic animals, and pet animals.  For example, a wolf and a dog, though 
possessing roughly similar capacities, will not necessarily demand upon us similar moral 
responsibilities.  Yet before we begin, I must state a short word of caution.  We must resist the 
urge to conceive of these categories, and the responsibilities they imply, as fixed. They serve 
instead as guides.  In our actual encounters with animals, we may find that a specific animal does 
not easily fit into just one category.  Furthermore, as we saw above with Barth and the Good 
Samaritan parable, we may be called to draw near and care for an animal that we happen upon, 





                                                
537 Singer, Animal Liberation, x. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Because I conceive these as guides that leave room for discernment and practical flexibility, I have 
chosen to utilize only three broad categories.  Others have proposed more complex schemes of relational 
classification.  Palmer, for example, groups pets and service animals together under the umbrella of 
domestication and lists several intermediate levels between wild and domestic such as scavenging, feral, 
and captive.  Palmer, Animal Liberation.   
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4.2a Wild Animals 
 
 Archaeozoologist Juliet Clutton-Brock defines wild animals as those animals that “are 
living independently of human handling and control.”540  They react to humans with either 
ferocity or great shyness and run away on sight.  We find a similar depiction of wild animals in 
the Bible.  From a biblical perspective, Robert Murray writes, “it is simply given that some 
animals are domesticated for the benefit of humans, while others are wild and hostile.  It is right 
for humans to care for the former (Prov. 12:10 and various laws, e.g. Deut. 25:4), while wild 
animals depend on God’s care (Ps. 104:10-30).”541  The book of Job provides vivid examples of 
this idea.  God’s providence is seen to reach even those animals, like the mountain goat and wild 
ass, which live their lives outside the scope of human observation.  Susan Bratton claims, “The 
point is not that the wild ass cannot be tamed - a young ass can be easily captured and trained.  
By God’s mandate, however, a large part of creation is not under human control and is not 
intended to be.”542  Wildness, in this way, constitutes an essential characteristic of the created 
order and the nature of particular animals within that order.  God is even seen to take particular 
delight in those wild animals that refuse human attempts at taming.  The mighty Behemoth, for 
example, is “the first of the great acts of God - only its Maker can approach it with the sword” 
(Job 40:19).  Humans are not asked or expected to provide great care for these animals.   
  
Can you hunt the prey for the lion, 
      or satisfy the appetite of the young lions,  
when they crouch in their dens, 
   or lie in wait in their covert?  
Who provides for the raven its prey, 
   when its young ones cry to God, 
   and wander about for lack of food? (Job 38:39-41). 
 
We have already observed in past chapters that the primary responsibility humans have with 
regard to wild animals is to respect their wildness.  In chapter three we saw that under the 
Mosaic covenant, human care for wild animals takes the form simply of ensuring for them places 
to live (Ex. 23:10-11).  There we also looked to the language of rights to provide them basic 
                                                
540 Juliet Clutton-Brock, Domesticated Animal from Early Times (London: British Museum of Natural 
History, 1981), 12. 
541 Murray, Cosmic Covenant, 95. 
542 Susan Power Bratton, Christianity, Wilderness, and Wildlife: The Original Desert Solitaire 
(Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1993), 86. 
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protection from human incursion.  Of the three categories of animals that we are looking at here, 
wild animals represent the circle farthest removed from human culture and society.  Wild 
animals, by definition, are not dependent on humans.  Therefore, our responsibilities for them are 
minimal and characterized largely by noninterference.  
 
 On the surface, the mantra of simply letting wild animals be543 seems like a simple enough 
guideline for our moral relationships with these most distant of animal neighbors.  Yet, the 
reality of our relationships with actual wild animals proves more complicated.  The sad fact is 
that humans have already greatly interfered with the lives of wild animals.  Accordingly, humans 
may need to take a more active role in ensuring the well-being of certain wild animals.  I will 
mention three specific areas in which a more active responsibility is necessary.  The first has 
been observed by Palmer.  She argues that no relationship of material dependence has developed, 
but “by taking over wild animals’ territory [humans] have a collective casual responsibility for 
the presence of such animals in urban areas.”544  Many of these wild animal species are 
migratory or simply unable to relocate at the speed of human urban development.545  Palmer 
suggests that we owe these “relict populations” space in our cities for them to continue living, 
i.e., places to “rest, breed, and roost.”546  Our cities’ architecture and management of roads and 
green spaces should reflect their presence.  The second area in which more active human 
responsibility is required for wild animals is in the expansive network of roads and highways we 
have created to connect these nodes of urban life.  Although millions of animals are killed or 
injured by automobiles each year, “perhaps the most serious of all the negative effects on 
wildlife is the highway’s fragmentation of habitat.”547  Highways create a “barrier effect”548 that 
                                                
543 This is a common refrain found among many ethical theorists, from Holmes Rolston and his 
environmental land ethics to Tom Regan’s animal rights.  See for example Holmes Rolston III, “Wildlife 
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confines and fragments wild populations to smaller ranges and groups than their normal 
foraging, mating, and nesting habits permit.  In addition to creating fewer roads though wild 
spaces, a potential relief to this human interference is the creation of wildlife crossings.  These 
structures, when properly adapted to the target species of a place, 549 can provide safe areas for 
wild animals to cross over, or under, an otherwise deadly human motorway.   
 
 These first two concerns involve a degree of human planning and action, but still aim 
primarily at keeping wild animals isolated from human involvement.  Our third concern entails a 
far more active form of human care.  Anthropogenic climate change has the potential to destroy 
the habitats of wild animals in ways that surpass the creation of cities and roads (although the 
three are not unrelated).550  In a provocative article, Christopher Southgate argues that “even the 
minimum level of likely climate change will eliminate many habitats, particularly in tropical and 
subtropical zones, so the letting be of wild nature in reserves is no longer an adequate 
strategy.”551  He proposes that a strategy of “assisted migration” for certain species into new 
environments where they can be expected to continue to flourish might be the only responsible 
thing for humans to do for those wild animals that are incapable of adapting or migrating to new 
habitats on their own.  As evidenced from the American South and Australia, however, 
introduced species have historically been quite destructive to both indigenous fauna and flora.  In 
addition to the enormous economic cost and political measures that assisted migration would 
entail, this danger makes such schemes both costly and risky.  Therefore, while assisted 
migration may remain a live option, our economic, technical, and political efforts should be 
directed first to mitigating the advance and impact of climate change on existing ecosystems.552 
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Spanish motorway,” Biological Conservation 124 (2005): 397. 
549 For example, cougars prefer low, narrow, well-covered crossings, while grizzlies, elk, and deer 
prefer crossings that are high and open.  Anthony Clevenger and Nigel Waltho, “Performance Indices to 
Identify Attributes of Highway Crossing Structures Facilitating Movement of Large Mammals,” 
Biological Conservation 121 (2005): 462. 
550 The IPCC has stated with “very high confidence . . . that recent warming is strongly affecting 
terrestrial biological systems, including such changes as earlier timing of spring events, such as leaf-
unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying; and poleward and upward shifts in ranges in plant and animal 
species.” IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, ed. by The Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. 
Pachauri, and Andy Reisinger (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008), 33. 
551 Christopher Southgate, “The New Days of Noah: Assisted Migration as an Ethical Imperative in an 
Era of Climate Change,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, ed. Celia Deane-
Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 251. 
552 Southgate notes that “these measures will be easier, cheaper and more dependable as means of 
preventing mass extinction than great projects in assisted migration.” Ibid., 263. 
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4.2b Domestic Animals 
 
 While wild animals are defined by their separation from human society, domestic animals 
are characterized by just the opposite.  Zoologist Edward O. Price defines the process of 
domestication as “that process by which a population of animal becomes adapted to man and to 
the captive environment by some combination of genetic changes occurring over generations 
and environmentally induced developmental events reoccurring during each generation.”553  
Because of our long history together and the real physical changes that this has created in these 
animals, humans have special responsibilities for domestic animals that they do not have for 
their wild counterparts.  In what follows, I present an overview of the conditions and results of 
domestication followed by an outline of the implications this has for human responsibility.   
 
 In the mid-19th century Francis Galton proposed six conditions necessary for the 
domestication of an animal species: “1, they should be hardy; 2, they should have an inborn 
liking for man; 3, they should be comfort-loving; 4, they should be found useful to the savages; 
5, they should breed freely; 6, they should be gregarious.”554  More recently, Clutton-Brock has 
affirmed and updated Galton’s basic scheme.555  The animal must be able to adapt to a new 
captive environment and not naturally prone to instant flight like antelope or deer.  Because 
captivity makes many animals sterile a truly domestic animal must be able to not only stay alive 
in this new environment but breed there as well.556  The animal should also be useful in some 
way to human society or it would never have been domesticated in the first place.  Finally, it 
must be a social animal whose natural behavioral patterns are based on a dominance hierarchy so 
that it will accept a human as its leader.  In other words, the human and the animal must be able 
to communicate in a meaningful way.  “With the exception of the domestic cat,” she claims, “all 
domestic mammals are derived from wild species that are social rather than solitary in their 
                                                
553 Edward O. Price, “Behavioral Aspects of Animal Domestication,” The Quarterly Review of 
Biology 59, no. 1 (1984): 3. (Italics original) 
554 Francis Galton, “The First Steps Towards the Domestication of Animals,” Transactions of the 
Ethnological Society of London 3 (1865): 137. 
555 Clutton-Brock, Domesticated Animal, 10-16. 
556 Juliet Clutton-Brock, A Natural History of Domesticated Mammals, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7. 
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behaviour.”557  With such strict conditions, it is not surprising that, out of all the millions of 
animal species on the planet, only a handful have been successfully domesticated.558  Along 
these lines, Frederick Zeuner, an archaeozoologist in the early 20th century, claims, 
“Domestication presupposes a ‘social medium.’”559  With this medium in place, he proposes 
several stages of domestication.  Here humans begin a loose association with the individuals of a 
specific wild species, eventually begin to intentionally develop certain traits in these animals 
through captivity and selective breeding, and finally come to regard the wild ancestor as either 
an enemy or a nuisance.560 
 
 Humans and animals progressed through these stages slowly over many generations.  
Some scholars have even described this as a process of “co-evolution” which has resulted in 
changes to both the animal and the human.561  As such, the relationship is mutually dependent.  
A simple visual comparison, however, shows that these physical changes have been directed 
most significantly toward animals.562  With regard to humans, changes have been largely social 
or cultural.   Any physical adaptations have been relatively minor, such as the ability to 
metabolize lactase into adulthood among people with a tradition of dairying.563  Based on the 
                                                
557 Clutton-Brock, Domesticated Animal, 25.  Frederick Zeuner makes a similar assessment: “In the 
case of domestication by man, the only notable exception is the cat.  All other domesticated animals have 
in the wild a state of social life of some kind, forming packs or herds.” Frederick E. Zeuner, A History of 
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Conflict?” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (2006): 48. 
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breeds (as, for example, between a wolfhound and a Chihuahua) is sufficient to establish the extent of 
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process of evolution.”  Andrew Goudie, The Human Impact on the Natural Environment, 4th Ed. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), 89-90. 
563 Simoons argues that lactose malabsorbtion in certain human ethnic populations is due to their 
ancestors’ milk consumption patters over a long historical period rather than to random genetic drift.  
“With the origins of dairying, however, under particular ecological conditions there would have been 
selective advantages for the aberrant person who, through mutation, came to enjoy high intestinal lactase 
throughout life.” Frederick J. Simoons, “Dairying, Milk Use, and Lactose Malabsorption in Eurasia: A 
Problem in Cultural History,” Anthropos 74 (1979): 68. 
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condition of usefulness above, it may not be surprising that most of these adaptations have been 
made on the part of animals.  Yet, to assume that domestication is solely the result of human 
meddling would be shortsighted.  It reflects a modern vision of domestication that has more 
exacting purposes and is brought about by far more advanced scientific and technical means, 
such as direct manipulation at the genetic level, than were available to the first human 
domesticators.  Most dog breeds are even nineteenth century inventions.564  In addition to the 
animal being useful to humans, human society likely originally proved advantageous to the 
animals by providing food and protection from predators.  Stephen Budiansky has even put 
forward the provocative thesis that certain animals chose domestication.  Human choices and 
ingenuity clearly played a part, he says – “but only a part, insufficient in itself.”565  In an 
evolutionary sense, “domesticated animals chose us as much as we chose them.”566  Although 
some of his arguments are more convincing than others,567 Budiansky’s work clearly 
demonstrates that the adaptations animals made in order to better fit into human society were 
often advantageous to the animals themselves.568 
 
 Millennia of living in human society has selected traits in domestic animals that make 
them better adapted to this unique human inclusive habitat.  One scholar has described this 
development thusly: “Their nature as domestic animals has acquired a human element.”569  The 
animal that has enjoyed the longest period of domestication and arguably the most intimate place 
within human societies and families, the domestic dog, provides an apt example. Veterinarian 
and animal behavioralist Michael W. Fox notes, “Hand-raised wolves and coyotes, though 
extremely sociable and friendly towards their handler, are notoriously difficult to train.”570  Dogs 
have even adapted behaviorally and psychologically in order to communicate better with their 
human companions.  “The domestic dog has one capacity that is never well developed in any 
                                                
564 Stephen Budiansky, The Covenant of the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestication, Yale Ed. (New 
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566 Ibid., 24. 
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canid living in the wild, and this is the propensity to bark,” observes Clutton-Brock.571  A recent 
study, testing the abilities of young wolf and dog pups to understand human pointing gestures, 
showed that the wolf pups were only able to understand gestures at an older age and after several 
months of training.572  The dog pups could do this spontaneously.  Ten thousand years of 
domestication has made the dog more than simply a tame or friendly wolf.  Yet, when humans 
selectively breed animals with more regard for our own interests than that of the animals’, 
animal welfare is likely to suffer.  “From the ethical point of view, it is of course important to 
recognize that although the relationship may have been more or less reciprocal at first, humans 
have used their intellectual advantage over animals to exploit the weaker partner and make it a 
relationship of constraint.”573  For example, certain purebred dogs are prone to particular 
diseases, like types of cancer, deafness, blindness, and metabolic disorders, that are nearly absent 
in other breeds.574  Similarly, in recent decades the selective breeding and direct genetic 
manipulation of farm animals has tended to favor traits that promote efficiency and productivity 
rather than animal welfare.  For example, the high milk yield in dairy cows is connected with 
significantly raised levels of mastitis and reproduction problems and the high growth rate in 
broiler chickens often causes leg problems.575    
 
Domestication involves the creation of a unique kind of dependence and therefore 
unique responsibilities.  With its emphasis on the mother-child relationship as paradigmatic for 
human moral relationships, feminist ethics would seem to be especially relevant here.  After all 
this is essentially a relationship of dependence.  We have seen in the previous chapters how the 
feminist ethic of care can provide valuable insight for the development of an animal ethic.  There 
exists, however, a significant difference between the mother-child and human-domestic animal 
relationships.  The two kinds of dependence are not equal.  In the first instance, the mother takes 
                                                
571 Clutton-Brock, Domesticated Animal, 39. 
572 At 4 months old, only the dogs were able to use these cues to find food.  Only after several months 
of training and socializing were the wolf pups able to reach the same ability to recognize human pointing 
gestures as similar aged dogs.  Zsófia Virányi et al., “Comprehension of Human Pointing Gestures in 
Young Human-Reared Wolves (Canis lupis) and Dogs (Canis familiaris),” Animal Cognition 11 (2008): 
377, 384. 
573 Lund and Olsson, “Animal Agriculture,” 48. 
574 “Nearly half of genetic diseases reported in dogs occur predominantly or exclusively in one or a 
few breeds.” Nathan B. Sutter and Elaine A Ostrander, “Dog Star Rising: The Canine Genetic System,” 
Nature Reviews 5 (December 2004): 900.   
575 I. Anna S. Olsson, Christian Gamborg, and Peter Sandøe, “Taking Ethics into Account in Farm 
Animal Breeding: What Can the Breeding Companies Achieve?” Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 19 (2006): 39. 
 145 
her already dependent child and cares for it.  In the second, humans have taken once wild, 
independent animals and bred dependency into them.  Even if animals originally colluded in the 
arrangement, “the creation of domestics is the deliberate creation of dependence.”576  We may 
therefore describe the dependence present in the human-domestic animal relationship as a 
designed dependence.  The consequent responsibility inherent in this dependence surpasses the 
merely protective duties we have for wild animals.  It is much closer to the responsibility a 
mother has for her child, though its designed character produces differences here as well.  
Mothers expect their children to grow and mature so that the caring relationship becomes less 
materially dependent or possibly even reversed.  This is one of the key features of good 
parenthood according to Alasdair MacIntyre.  The role of the human parent is to instruct and 
provide an adequate environment for the development of the intellectual and moral virtues in her 
child that will allow the child to grow into an independent practical reasoner.577  Even for 
children that suffer from permanent disabilities, mental or otherwise, a degree of independence is 
desired.  This is not true, however, of domestic animals.  Domestic animals are designed to 
spend their entire lives in the company and service of their human caregivers.  Greater 
dependence rather than independence is the goal.  Therefore, the responsibilities humans have 
for these animals are unique.  In drawing domestic animals into human society and directing 
their evolution to make them better fit for a new, dependent existence, humans have assumed a 
responsibility for the animal’s long-term survival and wellbeing.578 
 
 I will now examine Val Plumwood’s proposal of “familiar” animals as an example of a 
relationship with domestic animals that exemplifies the special responsibility we have for them.  
Taking its name from the movie Babe, Plumwood’s suggestion is an attempt to overcome the 
modern “hyper-separation” of the animal viewed as a bourgeois “pet” or instrumentally as 
factory-farmed “meat.”  Such a contrast leaves no room for the animal to be an active participant 
in relationships with humans or society.  In contrast, the familiar, or working, animal, is “the 
subject of a deeply personal relationship, but also accorded the dignity of a co-worker and 
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577 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 90. 
578 Spaemann also notes the relevance of dependency in the human-domestic animal relationship.  
“The only animals for whom we have an inherent responsibility are those we have domesticated, those that 
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acknowledged for their skilful contribution to economic life.”579  We can take up aspects of 
Plumwood’s concept here as a way to attend to the designed dependency of domestic animals 
while still respecting their unique capacities.  Plumwood says that at one time these working-
class animals were valued for their sociability and difference from humans.  Consequently they 
had the ability to extend human sense and human powers.580  Gregariousness and usefulness, 
remember, were two crucial conditions for domestication.  Dogs aided humans in hunting, 
defending, and herding.  Horses and oxen provided essential skills and power to the human 
farmer and traveler.581  In modern times, however, these animals have become increasingly 
marginal to human lives in capacities other than the servile toy or commoditized food product.  
Thus, it is not simply that humans use these animals, but how we use them that is of concern.  
Animal behaviorist and ethicist, James Serpell maintains that “not all methods of employing 
[animals] are necessarily contrary to their own best interests.”582  In the case of working animals 
like these, “the animal seems to enjoy the work, so the person has little reason to feel guilty 
about using it.”583  The Samaritan’s animal in our parable serves as just such an example.584  In 
exchange for their labor and loyalty, humans provide domestic animals with food and protection.  
It is, as Plumwood describes it, a kind of contract (though obviously not of the same kind 
described by Rawls of which rational agents freely agree to).  Unlike with wild animals, lifelong 
human companionship and care are vital to our relationships and responsibilities for domestic 
animals 
  
 While Plumwood’s model seems apt for describing proper human relationships with 
domestic working animals, it falls short when attempts are made to extend it to all animals.  
First, although she has defined familiars as “domesticated or semi-domesticated animals with 
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whom we have economic as well as affective relations,” she remarks at the end of her discussion 
that they could also, “if you are very lucky, be a wild free-living animal in your local 
surroundings you can see sufficiently often to come to know individually.”585  Including wild 
animals into the ranks of familiars, however, stretches the concept too far.  We may have 
affection for such a wild animal but it is difficult to imagine how we might enter into an 
economic relationship with it like we have with domestic animals.  Both dependence and respect 
are important aspects of a proper relationship with domestic but not wild animals.586  Thus, we 
require a different category for the more intimate kind of relationship with a wild animal than 
Plumwood mentions here – perhaps one closer to the pet relationship like Schweitzer and his 
pelican.  Second, Plumwood, admittedly, describes only one extreme of the human-pet 
relationship.  Pet animals are not simply living accessories to a bourgeois lifestyle.  Although 
exceptions exist, as we will see in the following subsection, pet animals enter the closest circle of 
human relationships and are most often viewed as valuable additions to the human family.  We 
require, therefore, a way to articulate the multiple relationships humans have with other animals 
rather than a single, all-purpose term or concept.  As argued in this chapter, this is possible by 
attending to conditions of nearness. 
 
4.2c Pet Animals 
 
 We would be amiss if our exploration of nearness based human-animal relationships 
ended with the domestic, working animal.  Humans have and continue to enjoy an even closer 
relationship with a particular class of animals called pet, or in some recent literature “companion 
animals.”587  In 2007, the American Veterinary Medical Association estimated that 37.2 per cent 
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of households in the United States owned pet dogs and 32.4 percent owned pet cats.588  
Psychiatrist Ann Ottney Cain has defined a pet as “an animal that is tamed, kept as a companion, 
or to which one forms an emotional attachment.”589  The great majority of pet animals today 
consist of domesticated animals590 and our responsibilities to them are consequently similar.  
Yet, because pet animals can also include tame, or once wild, animals, the responsibilities we 
have with regard to them do not stem necessarily from a historical relationship of designed 
dependence.  Pets are unique in that they inhabit the most intimate circle of human relationship – 
the family.  I do not mean by this that humans simply recognize the pet animal as biologically 
kin, sharing a common evolutionary history with our own species.  If this were so the adjective 
“pet” would apply to all animals and especially to the great apes, though these do not actually 
make good pets.  A pet, rather, is family in the sense of nearness of relationship, occupying a 
role similar to that of parents and siblings.  Surveying the role that pets play in families, Cain 
found that 87 percent of respondents considered their pets members of the family.  “These 
answers clearly support the concept that the pet is an actual member of the family system.”591  
Yet, before we explore the place animals have in human families and the responsibilities this 
implies, we must first demonstrate that pet keeping is more than mere sentimental gratuitousness 
or upper-class indulgence. 
 
 As we saw from Plumwood above, it is possible to dismiss the human-pet relationship as a 
modern, bourgeois extravagance.592   To do so, however, overlooks the long history humans have 
of pet-keeping that reaches across social boundaries and the ways in which these pets were 
viewed as legitimate recipients of intimate human care. Serpell notes that “the existence of pet-
keeping among so-called ‘primitive’ peoples poses a problem for those who choose to believe 
that such behaviour is a pointless, modern extravagance; a mere by-product of western 
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decadence or bourgeois sentimentality.”593	     Francis Galton, for example, records his personal 
correspondences with 19th century English explorers who observed pet-keeping among the 
“savages” of North America.594  Even in classical Western culture, people of all classes kept 
pets.  Homer tells of the faithfulness of Odysseus’ dog, Argos, in his epic poem.595  Pliny further 
records several stories of dogs, “the most faithful and trustie companions of all others to a man,” 
not abandoning their masters’ bodies even at imprisonment or death.596  Ancient epitaphs and 
funeral epigrams mourn the loss of beloved pets.  Tombstones have even been found depicting 
humans with their pets in a public immortalization of the bond between the deceased and their 
beloved animal.  Surveying these ancient epitaphs, Liliane Bodson, concludes, “Pet-keepers of 
both sexes and all ages mourned their companions.  Their social status, although often unknown, 
ranged all the way from Athenian aristocrats, Alexander the Great or the Roman emperor 
Hadrian to the lowest cobbler or slave sailor.”597  The witch-hunts of sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England also demonstrate that old and solitary people frequently cared for pet animals, 
despite being poverty-stricken themselves.  These animals were known as “witches’ 
familiars.”598  
 
 Christian scripture and hagiographies also abound with stories of pet-like animals.  
Among the saints’ lives two examples are prominent: the dog that brought food daily to St. Roch 
after he was stricken with the plague in Medieval France and the tame wild stag that 
accompanied the sixth century Irish St. Ciarán on all his journeys.599  These animals often 
accompany both saints in their religious iconography or representations.  Though they are few, 
pet animals are not absent from biblical sources either.  In the apocryphal book of Tobit, a dog 
accompanies the young Tobias on his journeys (6:2; 11:4).  Perhaps the most moving story, 
however, comes from the prophet Nathan to King David after the king’s affair with Bathsheba 
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and murder of her husband Uriah.  Nathan tells David of a rich man who steals and eats a poor 
man’s lamb.  “The rich man had very many flocks and herds; but the poor man had nothing but 
one little ewe lamb, which he had bought. He brought it up, and it grew up with him and with his 
children; it used to eat of his meager fare, and drink from his cup, and lie in his bosom, and it 
was like a daughter to him”  (2 Sam. 12:2-3).  Midgley keenly observes three important details 
about this story: “1. The man is poor.  We are not dealing with the follies of the idle rich.  2. He 
is not childless; his children share the lamb’s company with him.  3. The relation is regarded as a 
perfectly natural one.”600  More than the previous examples, Nathan’s story of the poor man and 
his lamb clearly demonstrates the nearness of the human-pet relationship.  The lamb is more than 
a domestic working companion; it is accepted like a daughter into the man’s family.  The animal 
does not replace the man’s human daughters, but instead lives among them as a valued member 
of the family unit.  “The ewe lamb did not come between the poor man and his children.  Instead 
it formed an extra delight which he could share with them, and so strengthen the family bond.”601  
Midgly notes that he was not so undiscriminating as to cuddle with a cushion.  The lamb was a 
living creature in need of, and able to respond to, parental care. Furthermore, the legitimacy of 
the relationship is never questioned.  The king’s anger is aroused by the rich man’s act precisely 
because David recognizes the deep relationship that can exist between humans and animals.  
David sees the rich man’s sin as more than the mere stealing of property; it is rather that the rich 
man “had no pity” (2 Sam. 12:6).  Nathan chooses to tell the tragic story of a family and their pet 
in order to stir up the king’s anger about the tragedy the king, himself, brought upon another 
family – Bathsheba and Uriah.   
 
 We have seen from the above story how a pet can enter the most intimate circle of human 
relation.  We will now explore the intricacies of this relationship and the various roles that pets 
play within the human family.  Pets often receive similar treatment as that enjoyed by other 
human members of a family.  They are often treated with human food, given Christmas presents, 
celebrated on their birthdays, and even included in family portraits.602  Child psychologist Boris 
Levinson, who first coined the phrase “pet therapy,” has outlined specific roles that pets play 
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within families: bridge, sibling, friend, and child.  As a common object of responsibility and 
focus, a pet can serve as a bridge narrowing the generation gap between children and adults.603  
Additionally, “a pet can be a brother, sister and friend.  From the pet, a child can acquire a sense 
of stability and continuity as the family moves from one neighbourhood to another.”604  A pet 
can become a child’s trusted ally and help him/her gain confidence in areas from fear of the 
unknown and discharging responsibility to toilet training.605  Pets often take on the role of child 
as well.  Pets aid young couples to gain confidence in their ability to care for a human child and 
help alleviate the sorrow that comes when children grow older and leave their parents’ home.  
Adults play with a pet and respond to its sexuality and excretions as if it were a child.606  Many 
people even speak to their pets in a similar manner as they do with small children.  This 
“motherese,” “characterized by short utterances, many repetitions, and few grammatical errors, 
among other features,” has been observed in connection to both human children and pets.607  
This childish role should not come as a surprise, at least not for domesticated pets that are the 
most common.  Many domestication characteristics are really juvenile traits persisting into 
adulthood – a process known as neoteny.608 
  
 We can also perceive the intimacy of the pet relationship in the way that the death of a pet 
is sometimes mourned like that of a human family member, though often to a lesser scale and 
intensity.  In a study carried out among Scottish school children veterinarian Mary Stewart found 
that 44 percent of children aged 7-8 years were reportedly “sad or very sad” at their pet’s death.  
This percentage rose to 80 for children aged 12-15.609  Even adults find the death of a beloved 
pet distressing.  Stewart recognizes many qualities similar to Khubler Ross’s five stages of grief 
                                                
603 Boris. M. Levinson, “Pets and Environment,” in Pet Animals and Society, ed. R. S. Anderson 
(London: Bailliere Tindall, 1975), 10. 
604 Ibid., 9. 
605 “The child feels hurt and dissatisfied when he fails to control his bladder or bowel functions and is 
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608 Zeuner, A History, 73. 
609 Mary Stewart, “Loss of a Pet - Loss of a Person: A Comparative Study of Bereavement,” in New 
Perspectives in Our Lives with Companion Animals, ed. Aaron Honori Katcher and Alan M. Beck 
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among her clients when they are faced with a pet’s death.610  A few veterinary hospitals and 
schools even offer pet-loss support hotlines or social work services for bereaved pet owners.611  
After experiencing the death of his own family pet, one pastor has lamented the great lack of 
such services in many churches.  In addition to support groups and funerary customs, “sermons 
and services pertaining to loss and grief might intentionally name companion animal loss, doing 
so as a means of public acknowledgment and legitimation of the grief endured by many sitting in 
every congregation on any given Sunday.”612  Services celebrating the lives of animals, usually 
associated with the feast day of St. Francis of Assisi, have been steadily growing among North 
American churches.613  Having taken my own pet to such a service at the Duke University 
Chapel, I can attest to the appreciation parishioners feel for such public ecclesial celebration of 
animal lives and acknowledgement of the important place animals have in the lives of humans.  
Yet, having experienced the loss of beloved family pets, I can also appreciate the need for 
churches to develop similar resources to help families mourn the death of the significant animals 
in their lives. 
 
 Because pet animals occupy a legitimate place of nearness in the human family our 
responsibilities for them necessarily differ from those owed to domestic working or wild 
animals.  This responsibility closely resembles that which we have for other human members of 
this closest circle of relation.  Yet, because animals are also a different species, adopted rather 
than born into human families, they mustn’t be treated as human family members.  These two 
aspects, family member and other species, must be held in tension as we consider our 
responsibilities toward pet animals.  Veterinarian Joan Joshua asserts that although many people 
“make our dogs a child substitute, but there is no need whatever to try to humanize the dog; this 
is repulsive and unnatural and is extraordinarily bad for the wretched animal who is never 
allowed to behave like a normal canine.”614  Joshua is correct to insist that pets be allowed to 
exhibit species-specific behaviors, but what it means to behave like a “normal canine” is a 
                                                
610 Mary Stewart, Companion Animal Death: A Practical and Comprehensive Guide for Veterinary 
Practice (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1999), 39. 
611 Stephens and Hill, “Loss,” 207. 
612 Tarris D. Rosell, “Grieving the Loss of a Companion Animal: Pastoral Perspective and Personal 
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614 Joan O. Joshua, “Responsible Pet Ownership,” in Pet Animals and Society, ed. R. S. Anderson 
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slightly ambiguous concept when speaking of dogs.  Dogs, as opposed to wolves, foxes, or other 
canine species, are domesticated and this means that their “normal” life will possess one 
significant difference from that of their canine cousins – it will include a human element.  As we 
saw earlier, domestication has resulted in both biological and psychological changes in the dog 
that make it fit for a mixed human-animal environment.  We cannot forget this human 
component when we consider the most appropriate life for a dog, especially a dog that has been 
adopted into a human family.  Most people, however, are able to distinguish between their care 
for human children and for pets.  For reasons covered in previous chapters (human responsibility 
and imago Dei, human ethical rather than simply natural caring) love for pets is analogous, but 
not equal to, love for human children.  George Pitcher, from chapter two, admits paternal 
feelings for his two adopted dogs but is not fooled into thinking they are actual children.  
Describing his feelings toward them as paternal, he insists, “was [not] perverted, misplaced, or in 
some other way not quite right: I want merely to indicate its quality.”615  The nearness of the 
human-pet relation means that care with a brotherly or parental character for these animals is not 
only common, but also quite appropriate.   
 
 We can see now the full relevance of Spaemann’s  earlier dilemma – whether to save the 
life of his child or a stranger.  The nearness and dependency of one’s child creates certain 
overriding obligations.  A pet, holding an analogous relational position, demands similar 
overriding preference.  This is why a Christian animal ethic that takes nearness seriously cannot 
agree to the universalizing tendency of the animal rights position.  Based, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, on the principle of equality, the animal rights activist sees all subjects-of-a-life 
(Regan) or holders of theos-rights (Linzey) as possessing these qualities equally and thus subject 
to equal treatment because of them.  If Regan, for example, takes an absolute “abolitionist” 
stance with regard to the use of animals in science and agriculture,616 he must also stand against 
the keeping of animals as pets.  If farm animals have a right not to be kept and used for human 
purposes then neither do pet animals.  Thus, “on the basis of standard animal rights philosophy 
the logical conclusion is that it is unethical to keep pets.”617  Yet, as we have seen, historic and 
present relationships of nearness do matter in our ethical consideration of animals.  To apply 
                                                
615 Pitcher, Dogs Who Came, 143. 
616 Tom Regan, “The Case,” 113. 
617 Stuart Spencer, et al, “History and Ethics of Keeping Pets: Comparison with Farm Animals,” 
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different levels of care to different types of animal is not, as some would argue, simply a form of 
speciesism.618  To “liberate” one’s pet and begin treating it as if it were a wild animal would be a 
betrayal of the close relationship of care and dependence that one has established with it.  To 
care for wild, domestic, and pet animals differently, therefore is not arbitrary or unjust. Rather, it 
is to take seriously the differing levels of responsibility that the concept of nearness places on 




In this chapter we have seen first how the criterion of nearness provides essential 
guidance or order the human moral life.  As embodied, finite creatures we simply cannot care 
equally for all humans, much less all animals.  Any attempt to do so would render inert our 
capacity to act morally.  Yet by attending to contexts of nearness, our caring becomes ordered 
and our moral responsibilities manageable.  We then proposed a taxonomy of nearness to 
broadly outline the responsibilities inherent in three proximity-based relationships between 
humans and animals: wild, domestic, and pet.  This classification was not based on the specific 
capacities of individual animals, but on their nearness to human society.  Because they exist 
independently from humans, our responsibilities to wild animals possess a general character of 
noninterference.  In a seeming paradox, we care for them by restricting our interactions in their 
lives.  We allow them space to remain independent.  Domestic and pet animals, on the other 
hand, are defined precisely by their close relationships with humans.  I have described domestic 
animals as those animals that have a long history of coexistence with and dependency on 
humans.  They are Plumwood’s “familiar” animals with whom humans share a close working 
relationship.  From this perspective we can see that the great tragedy of factory farming comes 
not simply from the treatment of sentient animals as if they were machines or commodities.  
Both utilitarian and rights-based animal ethics perceive this problem.  Attending to nearness, 
however, exposes the factory farm as a betrayal of the human-domestic animal partnership.  
Such practices deny these animals a place of active participation in human communities and take 
advantage of the relationship of dependence that domestication has bred into them.  These large, 
intensive farming operations are often placed in remote locations.  Plumwood describes this as a 
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kind of “spatial remoteness”619 – the very opposite of nearness.  This is designed to preclude 
even the chance encounter or event of the neighbor relationship.  Pet animals, because of their 
more intimate relationship with human families, are often saved from such treatment.620  But the 
temptation to commodify them in different ways is no less present.  This is particularly true of 
exotic, undomesticated animals that are kept as symbols of their owner’s power or wealth.621  
According to the description of pet animals given in this chapter, however, such animals may 
better be labeled as captive, wild animals than true pets.  Pets are adopted into human families, 
the nearest circle of human relation, and consequently demand the deepest forms of supportive 
care.  It is possible to argue that an adequate taxonomy of nearness requires more numerous and 
specific categories than the three that I have outlined.  As I stated earlier, however, this 
taxonomy is best used as a guide rather than a strict rule.  It outlines the basic responsibilities we 
can expect when encountering an animal.  If it were more specific it would be in danger of 
becoming rigid and allowing no room for the unique circumstances of the actual animals we 
meet.  The event-like quality of drawing near and becoming a neighbor, as we saw from Barth, 
means that any individual animal that we encounter may demand more or less than these broad 
proximity-based categories dictate.   
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Chapter 5: Human Dominion and Animal Neighbors 
 
“God blessed them, and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue 
it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living 
thing that moves upon the earth’” (Gen. 1:28). 
 
One of Karl Barth’s favorite pastimes was horseback riding.  He first became a 
“passionate horseman” while living in Bonn.  Later when he returned to Basle to teach he rode 
regularly with colleagues.  In a personal correspondence with Wilhelm Vischer he recalls the 
many times “we rode through the fields of Muttenz and Pratteln or dashed through the woods of 
the Hardt at an exhilarating gallop on the brown and the grey, thus representing at least half of 
the horsemen of the apocalypse!”622  Riding produced such an impact on Barth that he thought 
immediately of this activity when expounding the verse in Prov. 12:10: “A righteous man 
regardeth the life of his beast.”623  The good horseman, thus, becomes his model for describing 
human dominion over animals. 
 
As it is the first word the Priestly writer of Genesis uses to describe human relationships 
with nonhuman animals, a Christian animal ethic would be incomplete without addressing 
human dominion.  Drawing on the earlier themes of responsibility, care, and nearness my 
examination and critique of human dominion in this chapter proceeds in three stages. First, 
according to a close reading of Gen. 1:28, dominion over animals (rādâ) is distinguished from 
subduing the earth (kābaš).  According to ancient Hebrew thought, Old Testament scholar 
Gerhard vod Rad asserts, plants do not share with humans and other animals in life, or breath 
(nephesh).624  For this reason, two distinct words are necessary to express humanity’s 
relationship to the rest of Creation.  Human dominion describes a relationship between two 
relational subjects, like that of the ancient shepherd king, or Martin Buber’s more contemporary 
I and Thou.  Subduing, on the other hand, represents a subject-object relationship.  Second, in 
light of this distinction between dominion and subdue, I critique a common tendency in both 
Christian stewardship ethics and environmental ethics of lumping together animals, plants, and 
                                                
622 Quoted in Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. 
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inanimate natural phenomena into a singular other to which humans have a singular 
responsibility. Such a compilation ignores important differences between these different kinds of 
creatures.  As such, I present human dominion over animals more as a relationship of responsible 
care for one’s neighbors than a kind of stewardship for the natural environment in general.  
Third, I consider Karl Barth’s description of the responsible horseman as an exemplary model of 
“responsibility as understood in the limits of dominion.”625  The human and animal in this 
example partner together to achieve a common goal.  To revise Kantian terms, the animal is used 
as a means, but not reduced to a means.  Its individual subjectivity as an end is always 
respected.626 
 
5.1 DOMINION VS. SUBDUE 
 
The creation story in Genesis 1 both links humans to and separates them from other 
animals and the natural environment.  Humans are created on the same day as the other land 
animals and given the same blessing to be fruitful and multiply.  Yet, the unique language 
surrounding the creation of humans also distinguishes them from the other creatures.627  Humans 
are created in the divine image and given dominion (Gen. 1:26).  They are assigned a task that is 
defined in relation to the other living creatures and to the earth, feminist Old Testament scholar 
Phyllis Bird asserts.628  In verse 1:28 God expounds the content of this task by speaking directly 
to human creatures.  Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann claims that, because of this 
direct communication, humanity possesses a unique, intimate relationship with its creator.  The 
human creature “is the one to whom God has made a peculiarly intense commitment (by 
speaking) and to whom marvelous freedom had been granted (in responding).”629  
Brueggemann’s conclusion closely resembles our own from chapter one where we followed Karl 
Barth in interpreting the imago Dei as the human summons to responsible relationship with God 
and others.  We saw there that responsibility characterizes the human relationship between God 
                                                
625 Barth, CD III/4, 352. 
626 For a brief introduction to the complex history of Christian interpretations of the dominion text see 
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and other humans; accordingly, we will see below how responsibility, in the form of dominion, 
also characterizes human relationships with other animals.  At times this takes the form of a 
benevolent working relationship (as in not muzzling an ox while it is treading grain, Deut. 25:4).  
On other occasions it may be spontaneous care (as in aiding a lost or overburdened animal, Ex. 
23:4-5; Deut. 22:1, 4).  In what follows I argue that humanity’s unique relationship with animals 
derives from their common creation as fellow living beings.  This builds upon the distinction we 
have already noted in chapter two between human relationships with animals and plants as well 
as the emotional connection between humans and animals.  Next, according to my relational 
reading of the imago Dei, I articulate a distinction between dominion and the subsequent 
command in Genesis 1 to “subdue” the earth.  I conclude with a subsection investigating the 
relevance of Martin Buber’s I/Thou philosophy for human dominion over animals.  
 
5.1a Fellow Living Creatures 
 
For the priestly writer of Genesis 1 animals and plants represent two distinct kinds of 
creatures.  Plants, along with inanimate natural phenomena, form the environment that other, 
living creatures inhabit.  According to ancient Hebrew thought, Von Rad claims, plants did not 
share in “nepeš (‘life’) like the animals.”630  Both humans and animals, however, share in life, or 
breath, and consequently they are both given vegetation as food in Genesis 1.  “It is perhaps 
strange,” writes John Black, “that a distinction should be drawn between plants, which could be 
eaten, and had, presumably, no life, and animals, which could not be eaten and had life.”631  Yet, 
respect for the ‘life’ of plants, he claims, has simply never captured the Western imagination or 
ethic like that for animals.  This seems most obvious in the food laws of the Old Testament that 
center around animal rather than vegetable meat.632  “By contrast, man’s awareness of his 
biological relatedness to the rest of the animal kingdom is apt to intervene in the process of 
domesticating nature.”633  Although farming food crops necessitates an intimate knowledge of 
the growth cycle and needs of the plants, the continuity between humans and animals sets animal 
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life apart.  For this reason, two distinct words are necessary to express humanity’s relationship to 
the rest of Creation – dominion and subdue. 
 
Immediately after creating human beings, Gen. 1:28 reports God’s first words to these 
new creatures: “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over 
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the 
earth.”  The blessing to be fruitful and multiply connects humans to the other ‘living’ creatures, 
the animals, and distinguishes both from the creation of plants and the earth.634  God recognizes 
the land and vegetation as “good,” but bestows no similar blessing on them.  Yet, in addition to 
the common blessing they share with animals, humans uniquely receive instructions to subdue 
(kābaš) and have dominion (rādâ).  These two terms are often glossed as if they refer to a single 
command.  More precise commentators, however, see these as two similar, but distinct 
injunctions.  In this way, we read a double command referring, on the one hand, to the 
“domestication of animals (represented by rādâ)” and, on the other hand, to the “cultivation of 
the earth (represented by kābaš).”635  Westermann explains this distinction: “In the scope of the 
speech and thought of P and the Old Testament, dominion can only be given over living 
things.”636  Because they lack responsibility, or the image of God, human relationship with other 
animals cannot be one of equals; yet, because both humans and animals share in ‘life,’ their 
relationship is distinct from human dealings with plants and the land.637   
 
Theologian Andrew Linzey, who has written extensively on animal rights, also 
acknowledges this difference in much of Old Testament thought between animals and the natural 
environment.  This distinction provides the foundation for his conception of “theos-rights.”  “We 
are justified in claiming rights for [animals] and for ourselves,” Linzey asserts, “in the context of 
God’s right to have what he has given honored and respected.”638  God, in other words, possesses 
absolute right and human and animal rights derive from this.  While I noted the problematic 
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nature of rights language with regard to animals in chapter three, the important point to grasp 
from Linzey for the moment is his account of the distinction between animals and plants.639    
While “all living things have value to God, the election of Spirit-filled creatures, composed of 
flesh and blood, gives them what we may call ‘inherent value’ by virtue of their capacity to 
respond to him.”640  In light of von Rad’s observation that “life” refers only to humans and other 
animals in ancient Jewish thought, Linzey’s use of “all living things” in this quote is misleading.  
It would be better if he wrote: “all created things,” because he clearly intends to distinguish 
humans and animals from the other orders of creation.  Both humans and animals, Linzey 
observes, are consistently described in the Old Testament as possessing spirit or breath 
(ruach).641  “Doubtless there is something beautiful about flowers and magnificent about the 
intricacies of insects.  Doubtless trees too have some dignity and standing before God. . . . And 
yet the glory of created [beings] must not blind us to the reality of individuals filled with the gift 
of the Spirit.”642	  	  The significance of flesh and blood emerges in Genesis 9 where God covenants 
with “all flesh that is on the earth” (9:17) and forbids the eating of “flesh with its life, that is, its 
blood” (9:4).  Linzey’s account may prove questionable with regard to the extension of rights to 
nonhumans, but it does undoubtedly bear witness to the unique relationship humans and other 
animals share.   
 
It is possible to summarize Linzey’s concern in the more concise phrase, “living 
creatures” (פנ  ׁשחּיה) (nephesh chayah) (Gen. 1:20, 24; 2:7; 9:10).  This phrase explicitly 
connects humans and animals as opposed to plants or other aspects of the natural environment at 
two crucial moments in the primeval history:  at the creation of living creatures and at their 
initiation into the universal Noahic covenant.  Karl Barth also observes this biblical distinction 
between living creatures and the rest of the natural environment.  Scripture, he says, views 
humans in all their unique individuality, yet not in isolation from their fellow living creatures.  
The human creature exists “in association with the various tame and creeping and wild beasts of 
the land which like himself, and like the fish and fowls before them, but now immediately and 
unavoidably, as his inseparable companions, are living creatures (lebende), i.e., living in 
                                                
639 A critique of the animal rights position follows in a subsequent chapter. 
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641 See for example, Ecc. 3:19-21 and Ps. 104:29. 
642 Linzey, Christianity, 86.  I substitute “created [beings]” for Linzey’s “created life” for the sake of 
greater clarity and consistency. 
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independent movement and multiplying themselves by free acts of generation.”643  Yet, rather 
than explicating the three attributes that Linzey proposes, Barth here emphasizes the common 
divine blessing that accompanies the creation of living creatures – be fruitful and multiply.  Both 
humans and animals, furthermore are dependent upon and receive the same benefits from their 
natural environments.  They both depend on the same night and day and, at least in Genesis 1, 
dine at the same vegetarian table.644  Humans and animals are again mentioned together as 
“living creatures” in Gen. 9:10.  Here we God enters into covenant with Noah and “and with 
every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic animals, and every animal of the 
earth with you, as many as came out of the ark.”645  That air and land animals are created on 
separate days marks little significance for the Priestly writer in connection to their inclusion in 
this covenant.  What matters is that they are all nephesh chayah.  Humans and animals possess 
life over against the waters, land, and vegetation that serve as habitat.  Consequently, human 
dominion with regard to animals necessitates a uniquely personal relationship, indicative of two 
parties that share a covenant.646 
 
5.1b Dominion (rada) 
 
A range of Old Testament texts employ the verb rādâ to articulate, in various ways, the 
rule of kings over subjects, masters over servants, or one nation over another.647  This rule 
describes the relationships between subjects and subjects, not between subjects and objects.648  
This verb alone, however, does not denote how dominion is to be carried out.649  Lev. 26:17 and 
Num. 24:19 refer to the conquering rule of one nation over another.  Yet, when dominion is used 
within Israelite society, it most often takes on a dimension of benevolence and peaceful 
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leadership.  In Lev. 25:43, 46, and 53, for example, dominion describes the authority of the head 
of the house over the household servants.  The emphasis here falls on the qualification that “you 
shall not rule over them with harshness” (25:43).650  Even kingship in ancient Israel, Richard 
Bauckham claims, emphasizes the “horizontal relationship” between the king and his subjects.  
According to Deut. 17:14-20, Israel’s king must be a fellow Israelite not “exalting himself above 
the other members of the community” (17:20).  The king’s rule “becomes tyranny the moment 
he forgets that the horizontal relationship of brother/sisterhood is primary, and kingship 
secondary.”651  The same is true, he insists, of the dominion in Genesis where “the horizontal 
relationship is that of fellow creatures.”652  Baukham’s comparison could be strengthen by 
attending further to the distinction the Genesis text makes between creatures.  The horizontal 
relationship of dominion, in this way, is not simply between fellow creatures, but between 
fellow, living creatures.  
 
The comparison between human dominion over fellow, living animals and benevolent 
kingly rule over fellow, Israelite subjects is further supported by the ancient notion of the 
“shepherd king.”  In places, the Old Testament depicts the reign of king Solomon in this very 
light.  1 Kings 4:24 describes Solomon’s rule “expressly as a peaceful dominion.”653  Solomon’s 
wise dominion produces peace and prosperity rather than animosity and exploitation.  We find 
this idea again expressed in Solomon’s prayer for wisdom in Wisdom 9.  In God’s wisdom, God 
creates humans to have dominion over animals and rule them with holiness and righteousness 
(9:2-3).  In this prayer Solomon asks for that same wisdom to rule over God’s people.  The idea 
of the king as a kind of good shepherd, Barr claims, “supplied a ready analogy for the human 
dominion over animals expressed in Gen. 1:26-28.”654  Genesis 1, in this way, draws on language 
normally reserved for the spheres of household management and kingly politics to express an 
idea of human dominion over animals that brings about a similar shalom.655  This image of the 
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good shepherd “provided an ancient-pastoral society’s most tangible image of human dominion 
over animals.”656  The dominion articulated in Genesis 1, Walter Brueggemann contends, “is that 
of a shepherd who cares for, rends, and feeds the animals.”657  Christians, he claims, may find the 
ultimate example of such a shepherd in king Jesus, who laid down his own life for his sheep.658  
Thus, the reign of the shepherd king consists of dominion, but it is dominion that ensures the 
wellbeing of those ruled, not simply that of the ruler.  Along these lines, C.W. Hume writes that 
“neighbourliness towards animals was such a deeply rooted tradition among the Jews that it was 
taken for granted.  The care of a shepherd for his sheep [even became] the standard symbol of 
God’s beneficence.”659  The shepherd king analogy, in this way, extended even to the Old 
Testament conception of the divine rule. 
 
5.1c Subdue (kabas) 
 
The verb, “subdue,” on the other hand, has a better claim to be interpreted harshly, as 
physically trampling down one’s enemy and their land.660  In Num. 32:22, 29, for example, 
subduing the land and its people expresses a way for the Reubenite and Gadite tribes to fulfill a 
promise they made to their fellow Israelites.  Concern for the subjectivity of those they are 
subduing is not entertained. They become objectified – merely means to an end.661  This verb can 
even been translated as “rape” (Esther 7:8).662  A more striking form of objectification, 
transforming a subject into an object, would be difficult to find.  In its Genesis 1 context, 
however, subdue is used not of a human or animal subject, but of the land.  Here it possesses a 
generally agricultural meaning.  “Basically what is intended is tilling,” Barr observes.663  In this 
sense it has an obvious resemblance to the J creation story where humanity is created to “till and 
keep” the ground (Gen. 2:15).  Bird agrees, claiming that in Genesis 1 “the agrarian perspective 
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is obvious.”664  The command to subdue the earth, she claims, further distinguishes humans from 
the other animals in the creation story who appear to be simply “sustained by their environment 
rather than having to win life from it.”665  The author knew that the earth would support human 
life only when it was brought under control.  Farming in ancient Israel, which involved such 
practices as “terrace building, cistern hewing, and forest clearing,” required a significant amount 
of human labor.666  “The pressures to plow and plant propitiously, to harvest grains and gather 
grapes at favorable moments, and, in general, to muster a sufficient work force at the right time 
were real and great.”667   
 
The distinction between animals and plants, between dominion and subdue, is further 
reinforced in Gen. 1:29-30 where both humans and animals receive plants as food.  Vegetation, 
in this way, is given as the means by which living creatures are to sustain themselves, whether 
through simple sustenance or through subduing.  Even in Gen. 9:4, when humans are conceded a 
limited use of animal flesh as food, God warns them of the danger of taking another life – a 
warning seemingly unnecessary for a vegetarian diet.668  The important point in this discussion, 
for the moment, is to note that subduing connotes a relationship between a subject and an object, 
while dominion describes a subject-subject relation.  The command to subdue, however, does not 
grant license to abuse.  Subduing, in its Genesis 1 context implies use but not wanton 
exploitation.  This understanding of the earth and agriculture, Hiebert observes, developed out of 
a context of general human powerlessness rather than human power over the natural world.  The 
Genesis text “could not have signified the kind of control of nature now possible after the 
industrial and technical revolutions.”669  Steffens similarly argues that kābaš, in describing 
humanity’s relation to the earth, serves as a compliment to rādâ.  It “in no way violates the 
broader dominion attitude of benevolence toward creation.”670  
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5.1d Dominion Between I and Thou 
 
Humans and animals are united in their sharing of the breath of life (nephesh) and 
responsive natures.  Plant ‘life,’ on the other hand, provides habitat and sustenance for living 
creatures.  The human relationship with animals does not match the equality of that with other 
humans.  Yet, human dominion over animals does take on a level of personal, subject-subject 
relationality not possible in human relationships with plants.  Jewish theologian Martin Buber 
does not focus on the idea of dominion, but his I-Thou philosophy does provide an apposite 
foundation for understanding these differences. The I-Thou (Ich-Du) relationship, or I-You 
according to Kaufman, consists of a response between two subjects.671  “When I confront a 
human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among 
things nor does he consist of things.”672  I-It (Ich-Es), on the other hand, refers to a subject-object 
relationship.  “The world as experience belongs to the basic word I-It.  The basic word I-You 
establishes the world of relation,” Buber claims.673  When I encounter another as an It, I 
experience them as a thing.  I experience them as an object or a set of finite attributes to which I 
direct my own goals. Yet, “no purpose intervenes between the I and the You, no greed and no 
anticipation; . . . Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur.”674  The I-Thou 
relationship, for Brunner is spontaneous and reciprocal.  The two subjects do not encounter each 
other as means to their own private ends.  Rather, the I-Thou encounter is one of pure 
relationship where the other is simply present.   
 
While Buber dedicates the majority of his book, I and Thou, to explaining the human-
human or human-divine relationship, he does not fail to take note of human relationships with 
other creatures.  The various creaturely relationships humans have are ordered according to their 
level of mutuality.  We can represent this ordering by the following formula: human-human 
relationships encounter full mutuality; human-animal relations straddle the “threshold of 
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mutuality” (die Schwelle der Mutualität); and human-plant relationships remain at the “pre-
threshold” (Vorschwelle) of mutuality.675  An examination of the two brief passages in which 
Buber considers I-Thou encounters with a tree and a house cat will clarify.  It is possible, he 
claims, “if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and 
the tree ceases to be an It.”676  Yet, while the tree ceases in this instant to be an It, the tree never 
becomes a Thou to the same degree that another human or animal can.  The reason for this is 
reciprocity, or mutuality.  True I-Thou encounters can only occur between two truly responsive 
beings.  “It is part of our concept of the plant that it cannot react to our actions upon it, that it 
cannot ‘reply.’”677  Buber calls this the “pre-threshold” of mutuality and considers that the sphere 
of creatures that inhabit it range “from the stones to the stars.”678  With these non-living 
creatures, creatures that lack nephesh, humans share only a kind of physical, bodily mutuality.679  
Animals, on the other hand, experience what Buber describes as the “anxiety of becoming” 
(Bangigkeit des Werdens).680  This anxiety is “the stirring of the creatures between the realms of 
plantlike security and spiritual risk” of humanity.681  In this sense, animals exist at the 
“threshold” of mutuality.  They do not express the full responsiveness of human beings, but they 
do exist at a different level than that of plants or stones.   
 
When looking into the eyes of a house cat, Buber notices a “surprise and question” arise 
from within the animal: 
 
Can it be that you mean me?  Do you actually want that I should not merely do tricks for 
you?  Do I concern you?  Am I there for you?  Am I there?  What is that coming from 
you?  What is that around me?  What is that about me?  What is that?!682 
 
The “that,” Buber explains, represents the “the flood of man’s glance in the entire actuality of its 
power to relate.”683  In the flood of the human’s glance, the reciprocal glance of the animal rises 
to the very threshold of mutuality before setting again back into the world of I-It.  “No other 
event,” Buber claims, “has made me so deeply aware of the evanescent actuality in all 
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relationships to other beings.”684  Human-human relationships also exhibit this disposition to 
oscillate between I-Thou and I-It.  Humans, however, are capable of maintaining their I-Thou 
encounter for longer than a glance.  Yet, only the divine Thou never sees us as an It.685  That 
Buber has this encounter with a house cat is of no little significance.  While a human may 
occasionally encounter such contact with wild animals, “he obtains from [tame animals] an often 
astonishing active response to his approach, to his address.”686  It was Buber’s glance that first 
prompted the response from the house cat.  “On the whole this response is the stronger and more 
direct, the more [the human’s] relation amounts to a genuine You-saying.”687  In other words, the 
more a human opens him/herself up to a genuine Thou-encounter with an animal, the greater the 
animal’s response approaches the threshold of mutuality. The relational power of the human’s 
glance serves as a kind of catalyst for the animal’s own responsive nature.  True Thou-saying 
would obviously occur more with those animals that humans share a close physical proximity.  
An encounter without purpose, greed, or anticipation would likely be limited even further to 
human-pet relationships.688 
 
5.2 DOMINION, STEWARDSHIP, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
 
Theologian Douglas John Hall has proposed the concept of stewardship as an 
appropriate articulation of the human relationship with the nonhuman world.  Along these lines, 
he emphasizes the relational nature of humans being created in the image of God, similar to Karl 
Barth and Emil Brunner.  Yet, in a move that he sees as against or a further development of these 
theologians’ thought, Hall also wants to insist on the inclusion of nonhuman creatures into an 
understanding of humanity as “being-with.”  Hall’s extension, however, is too sweeping.  He is 
correct to acknowledge the extension of human responsible relationships past the divine and 
human spheres, but his “dominion as stewardship” is too broad a concept to account for the 
important differences inherent in human relationships with different kinds of nonhuman 
creatures. The problem with Hall’s solution lies in his lumping the entire nonhuman 
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environment, “trees, rocks, and whales,” together in this third point of relation.689  This is a 
tendency also found among environmental land ethicists.  In doing so, these ethical positions fail 
to make the distinction between human dominion over animals and human subduing of the earth 
that we have previously expounded from the Genesis text.  Living animals and ‘nonliving’ plant 
and natural phenomena represent two distinct kinds of creatures that humans have a dual, rather 
than a single, kind of responsibility for.  Human relationship with whales involves sympathy and 
a personalized responsibility while human relationship with trees and rocks involves something 
more akin to prudent tilling or conservation of habitat.  The remainder of this chapter will further 
critique this indiscriminate tendency found in Christian stewardship ethics and environmental 
land ethics.  Barth’s thought, on the other hand, will be shown finally to respect the biblical 
distinction between animals and plants and thus prove surprisingly apposite to our previous 
separation of the verbs rādâ and kābaš. 
 
5.2a Dominion and Christian Stewardship 
 
In his first book on the concept of stewardship, Hall writes that Christian theology has 
rarely explored the meaning of “this fundamental ontological assumption [humans as ‘being 
with’] for the third major dimension of our threefold relatedness as creatures, namely, our 
relation to the extrahuman world, the inarticulate creation. . . ‘Humanity with Nature.’”690  He 
further develops this idea in his later work, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship.  Here he 
attempts to overcome an omission that he sees in the relational theologies of Barth and Brunner.  
These two theologians emphasize human relatedness to God and fellow humans but fail, 
according to Hall, to fully account for human relatedness to the natural environment.  “If what 
we encounter in the Bible’s juxtaposition of the divine and human is indeed an ontology of 
relatedness,” Hall contends, “we can hardly be content with an articulation of this theory of 
being that stops with the divine and the human.”691  Created in the image of God, he asserts, 
humans are created as relational beings in connection to God, other humans, and the natural 
environment.  Stopping at the divine-human or even the human-human encounter is premature.  
“We name, then, three dimensions of human relatedness.  The human being is being-with-God . . 
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. ; it is being-with the human-counterpart . . . ; and it is being-with-nature.”692  Hall, in this way, 
elevates the human relationship to nonhuman creatures as an essential component of humanity’s 
relational imago.  Nature is no longer simply, as Barth writes, the “indispensable living 
background to the living-space divinely allotted to man.”693  Humanity’s relatedness to the 
natural environment, rather, is just as essential to humanity’s being as our relationship to God 
and to one another.  Furthermore, “these are not distinct and separate relationships,” Hall states, 
“but three aspects of a thrust outward, out beyond ourselves.”694  They are a “common quest for 
‘the other’ ” that is completed only in the discovery of all three intended counterparts.  
 
Human relatedness past the divine and human spheres means, for Hall, humans acting as 
stewards of God’s other creations.  Clare Palmer critiques the applicability of the concept of 
stewardship for a Christian environmental ethic by observing that “nowhere in the Bible is 
humanity actually described as a steward of the natural world.”695  She sees the notion of 
Christians as stewards of nature arising not from the biblical narrative, but from the upsurge in 
the use of the term “steward” in church financial campaigns of the 1950s and 60s.  Stewardship, 
thus, carries an implicit economic connotation.  “The primary emphasis is on the steward and the 
use of resources, rather than on the relationship between the master and the steward.”696  Hall’s 
articulation of stewardship from a Christological model comes close to averting this criticism, 
but in doing so creates other problems.  If Christians name Christ as Lord, Dominus, then they 
should relate to the earth in a manner that emulates “our Lord’s mode of ‘having dominion,’” 
Hall states.697  This can only mean “stewardship, and stewardship ultimately interpreted as love: 
sacrificial, self-giving love.”698  Christ, in this view, exercised his rule by giving up his own life 
in order to bring life to all creatures, human and nonhuman.  Describing Christ’s rule as akin to 
stewardship, however, is problematic.  On Trinitarian grounds, such a presumption begs the 
question of to whom it is that Christ is stewarding the creation for?  Christ could be stewarding 
the creation for the glory of the Father.  Yet, the Son, the one through whom all things were 
made, as the Nicene creed states, also possesses ownership of what is created.  As St. Paul 
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writes, “the earth and its fullness are the Lord’s” (1 Cor. 10:26). Christ’s sacrifice, in this way, 
restores creation to Himself not to some absent or other owner.  If Christ displays dominion, 
therefore, it cannot take the form of stewardship.   
 
Thus, Hall’s position never truly overcomes Palmer’s criticism of the steward as a 
manager of resources.  Even more so, it denies the subjectivity and relationality of the objects of 
stewardship.  This is the problem that has, and will continue to occupy this chapter – the 
conflation of the double command in Genesis, rādâ and kābaš, into a single charge of human 
stewardship over the natural environment.   In doing so, Hall ignores the significant differences 
between the different kinds of created beings – living breathing beings (nephesh chayah), and 
their sustenance and habitat.  The extra-human creation does not consist solely of resources to be 
managed, but also of other living creatures that summon humans to a relation of personal, if not 
mutual, encounter.  His scheme of three-point relatedness, thus, requires modification.  We 
cannot simply place animals into a broad third point called “Nature.”  If we must use Hall’s 
design, animals rather represent a midway point between human relatedness to fellow humanity 
and human relatedness to Nature.  We are not related to animals as equals because they lack 
responsibility, the image of God.  Yet, neither do we relate to them in the same manner as plants 
or inanimate natural phenomena, because animals, like humans, are fellow living creatures.   
 
5.2b Dominion and Environmental Land Ethics 
 
This practice of lumping animals together with the rest of the natural environment is a 
tendency also found in environmental land ethics.  In his A Sand County Almanac, Aldo 
Leopold, who is often considered the father of environmental land ethics, evidences this 
tendency in his famous “land ethic.”  Leopold’s ethic is commendable for its reprove of the 
modern loss of a truly ecological education, the interdependency of all creatures, and insistence 
that “a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided.”699  
Leopold, like Hall, also names the land, or nature, as a “third step in a sequence” of expanding 
ethical relationships.700  Yet, rather than God and fellow humanity, Leopold’s first two steps of 
ethical relation are individuals with individuals followed by individuals with society.   Despite 
this difference, both accounts of the third step or point of relatedness are virtually identical.  
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Leopold writes: “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include 
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”701  Both land ethics and stewardship 
ethics indiscriminately group together animals, plants, and inanimate natural phenomena - “trees, 
rocks, and whales.”        
 
This tendency is still found in modern interpretations of Leopold’s ethic and has even 
erupted into a rhetorically quite hostile debate between environmental land ethicists and animal 
rights advocates. The differences between animal ethics and environmental ethics are 
comparable to the disagreement between Barth and Brunner over natural theology and the “point 
of contact.”  When looked at broadly, “from the context of the history of theology,” as Hart 
writes, no two theologians could be more similar.702  From this perspective the disagreement 
appears trivial.  Yet on closer inspection, very real and consequential differences begin to 
appear.  Similarly, with regard to animal ethics and environmental ethics, Linzey observes that 
“on paper, the agreements appear so considerable that many cannot quite see that there is an 
issue of difference at all.”703  Both speak of the continuity between humans and other creatures 
and value nonhuman creatures for their own sakes rather than, or in addition to, their 
instrumental value for humans.  Yet on closer inspection significant differences arise between 
these two positions as well.  This debate centers around two fundamental differences.  While 
these are worth mentioning briefly, in keeping with the scope of this chapter, I will limit my 
main criticism of land ethics to its failure to distinguish human responsibilities to animals from 
human responsibilities to the land.  First, there exists a sharp division “between animal activists 
who focus on the rights or liberation of individual animals and the more ecologically oriented 
approaches that aim at the preservation of a larger whole, such as species or an ecosystem.”704  J. 
Baird Callicott makes this point explicitly in his influencial article, “Animal Liberation: A 
Triangular Affair.”  Animal rights, he says, is “atomistic” (based on Bentham) while 
environmental ethics is “holistic” (based on Leopold).705  Similarly Mark Sagoff contends, “For 
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the most part, individual animals are completely expendable.  An environmentalist is concerned 
only with maintaining a population.”706  Another environmental philosopher, Eric Katz, attempts 
to bridge this divine by proposing a “two-principle environmental ethics” that takes seriously 
both the integrity of the ecosystem and the individuals that make up that ecosystem.  The good of 
the individuals, however, is clearly ranked lower than the good of the community in Katz’s 
proposal.  Even though the title of his paper assumes a concern for animals within the 
environment, his proposal fails to truly distinguish the nature of individual animals from other 
individual natural phenomena.  “As long as the welfare of the community is not at stake, 
individual natural entities - including animals - must be protected.”707  My reading of dominion 
in Genesis is, thus, closer to the animal rights position on this point by insisting on a 
consideration of the individuality of animals in human interactions with them.   
 
The second point of disagreement centers on the issue of animal pain.  The animal rights 
position, so environmental ethicists claim, inevitably implies the ecologically “nightmarish 
program of humane predator extermination.”708  Because, as Tom Regan writes, “Pain is pain 
wherever it occurs,”709 the animal rights position must be indiscriminate toward preventing pain 
in the lives of domestic animals and wild animals.  If this is true of the animal rights view, my 
own position, although for different reasons, would tend to side with that of the environmental 
ethicists here.  Environmental ethics, as Holmes Rolston argues, sees pain in wild nature as 
beneficial to the long-term survival of a species.  “Predation prevents overpopulation from the 
surplus of young and culls the aged and the diseased.”710  This is surely true from an 
evolutionary point of view.  My own position, however, sees the pain caused by wild predators 
as less morally problematic than anthropogenic pain because of the responsibility inherent in 
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humanity being imago Dei.  As I argued in chapters one and three, because they are fellow living 
creatures animals form complex relationships with others; but animal relationships, unlike those 
of humans, do not connote responsibility in any morally relevant sense.  Or, put in Kantian 
terms, animals are independent but not autonomous agents.  This distinction between human and 
wild animal predation will later prove important for my case in chapter six for Christian moral 
vegetarianism.  It is questionable, however, whether the animal rights position would truly lead 
to the elimination of wild predators.  For example, Regan prefers a hands-off, “let them be” 
approach to wild animals.711  “Most prey animals, most of the time, are perfectly capable of 
eluding their predators without anyone’s assistance.  Thus it seems to be human arrogance, not 
informed responsibility, that leads humans to believe that the rights of wild animals obligate us 
to ‘police’ nature.”712  Environmental ethicists, however, find this approach lacking because it 
does not provide a way of valuing “individuals that do not obviously have rights, such as plants 
or trees, or what Regan calls ‘inanimate objects.’”713  By emphasizing a distinction between 
human responsibility to animals and human responsibility to the “land,” I am not fully endorsing 
the animal rights position.  This would be impossible, for as I have already discussed in chapter 
three, my position is critical of the extension of human rights to nonhuman animals.  Yet, neither 
the rights, nor feminist caring perspectives need discount the value of plants or the land by 
taking seriously the individuality of animals and their suffering.  Shrinking and degraded habitats 
naturally lead to an increase in the suffering of the animals and humans that reside in them. 
 
5.2c Dominion and the Environmental Ethics of Holmes Rolston III 
 
The concept of animals as fellow living creatures posses a particularly interesting 
paradox in the environmental thought of Holmes Rolston.  Rolston acknowledges the uniqueness 
of animal life from plants and the land, but because of his dedication to holism, this distinction 
does not appear to have an effect on his environmental ethics.  Rolston explicitly names higher 
animals as “subjects” in a way that other aspects of the environment are not.  “Instrumentally 
grass and mussels are more important in ecosystems than eagles or panthers. . . . Nevertheless, 
the charismatic species, often at the top trophic rungs in ecosystems, have high intrinsic value, 
                                                
711 Regan, The Case, 361.  
712 Tom Regan, “Ethical Theory and Animals,” in Defending Animal Rights (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2001), 19. 
713 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 158. 
 174 
animal excellences that embody superb evolutionary achievements.”714  The health of plants and 
other similar creatures are essential for the overall health of an ecosystem.  They form the living 
space and resources, the habitat, necessary for the life of “charismatic” animals.  The unique 
abilities that allow such animals to have subjective lives grant them a value beyond that of mere 
instrumentality.  They are subjects, not just objects or resources.  At one point, Rolston even 
sounds like a student of Martin Buber: “We have direct encounters with life that has eyes; our 
gaze is returned by another concerned outlook.  The relation is I-thou, subject to subject, more 
lively than experiencing a flower, I-it, subject to object.  There is something behind the fur or 
feathers.”715  Rolston does not expound on the glance of the animal or any specific I-Thou 
encounter with an animal like Buber does,716 but his language clearly identifies a distinction 
between human relations to animals and to plants.  Animals are subjects of their own lives and in 
this capacity respond to humans in a uniquely personal manner.  
 
This almost Buberian conception of animal life, however, fails to find its way into 
Rolston’s environmental ethic.  This is because Rolston’s unit of ethical consideration is the 
species not the individual.717  Such a collective perspective may be appropriate for plants and 
ecosystems, but the individuality inherent in animal life, I argue, necessitates a more personal 
approach.  Two examples from Rolston’s work will demonstrate this point: 
 
In the spring of 1984 a sow grizzly bear and her three cubs walked across the ice of 
Yellowstone Lake to Frank Island, two miles from shore. . . . [When the ice melted] they 
were starving on an island too small to support them.  The mother could swim to the 
mainland, but she would not without her cubs.  On this occasion park authorities rescued 
the mother and her cubs.718   
 
Park officials normally take a hands-off approach to the animals that reside in Yellowstone.  
They only intervened in the plight of these bears because grizzlies are an endangered species.   
“They were not rescuing individual bears so much as saving the species.”719  Wildlife officials 
                                                
714 Holmes Rolston, III, Conserving Natural Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
103. 
715 Ibid., 101. 
716 He does not even mention Buber in his bibliography. 
717 To be more precise, Rolston values the processes that create a variety of species.  Holmes Rolston, 
III, “The Land Ethic and the Turn of the Millennium,” Biodiversity and Conservation 9 (2000): 149.  
Practically speaking, however, protecting the processes that create species means protecting the species. 
718 Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, 113. 
719 Ibid. 
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valued the bears not because of their capacity for personal encounter, but because they 
represented endangered parts of a larger ecosystem.  Had this been the family of a more plentiful 
species, such as deer, stranded on the island, the park service would not have intervened.  A 
second example comes from San Clemente Island off the coast of California.  Here the US Fish 
and Wildlife Service and California Department of Fish and Game asked the US Navy to shoot 
2000 feral goats to save three species of endangered plants.720  The family of grizzlies and the 
group of three San Clemente plants are, thus, approvingly treated in identical manner in 
Rolston’s holistic environmental ethic.  The animals are no longer valued as individual, 
subjective, living creatures, but, like plants, as component parts of a natural ecosystem.  They are 
preserved for the sake of the species they represent.  “Happily,” Rolston writes, “the Fund for 
Animals rescued most of the goats.”721  This rescue, however, should not be considered simply a 
happy afterthought.  A Good Samaritan animal ethic that takes seriously the difference between 
human relations with animals and plants would make a rescue attempt the necessary 
precondition of such a policy of species preservation.   To forgo such an attempt not only 
disregards the subjective, individuality of animals, it also breaks the Noahic covenant between 
God, humans, and animals – a covenant that, while conceding to humans a diet of flesh, still 
demands respect for the life blood of any fellow living creature they kill. 
 
Although the question of killing animals will be covered more fully in my final chapter, 
it must be briefly mentioned here as well.  Rolston’s concern for species over individuals and his 
conflation of animals and plants show themselves most clearly in this regard.  Rolston uses the 
strong term “murderer” in reference to human caused extinction of species, but not to the human 
killing of individual animals.  Extinction, he says, “shuts down the generative process.  The 
wrong that humans are doing, or allowing to happen through carelessness, is stopping the 
historic flow in which the vitality of life is laid.”722  Yet, individuals within a species, according 
to Rolston, are expendable and may be dispatched by humans for the sake of the species or when 
such killing poses little threat to the survival of the species.723  Along these line, he speaks of 
                                                
720 Holmes Rolston, III, “Duties to Endangered Species,” Bioscience 35, no. 11 (1985): 722. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Ibid., 723. 
723 Rolston also makes a distinction between anthropogenic extinction and natural extinction.  Natural 
extinction, he says, opens the door to other more adapted species.  Human caused extinction, on the other 
hand, only shuts doors.  For this reason, “humans have no duties to preserve rare species from natural 
extinctions, although they might have a duty to other humans to save such species as resources or museum 
pieces.”  Ibid., 724-25. 
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wildlife managers growing a healthy “crop of deer” for human hunters to shoot.724  Human 
hunting of wildlife, for Rolston, is comparable to animal predation.  From a theological 
perspective, this analogy alone presents a highly suspect picture of human nature and I critique it 
further in my final chapter.  For now I would like to address the problematic implications of 
using a word like “crop” in reference to animals.  Similar language is not limited to hunting.  
Author, Barbara Kingsolver, for example, refers to her family’s “harvest” of turkeys.725  To 
speak in these terms, I am arguing, is a fundamentally incorrect way of speaking.  To refer to a 
group of animals as a “crop” or a “harvest” denies them the subjectivity and relational nature that 
they possess as fellow living creatures.  It equates their nature with that of a kind of creature, 
namely plants, that they are not.  This results in a distorted view of both the kind of creatures that 
animals are and the kind of relation and responsibility humans have for them.  Such instrumental 
language, even if it is geared toward conservation, befits subduing rather than dominion. 
 
5.3 DOMINION AND THE GOOD HORSEMAN 
Hall sees his work as a correction to Karl Barth’s overly anthropocentric interpretation 
of the imago Dei.  Yet, Barth’s theology cannot be written off so easily.  Stewardship ethics and 
environmental land ethics are both commendable for their extension of human care and 
responsibility past either the divine-human or the human-human spheres.  They are found 
lacking, however, in their failure to fully account for the differences between human relations to 
animals and plants or other inanimate natural phenomena.  It is this fault that Barth’s thought 
helps to rectify.  “‘O Lord, thou preservest man and beast’ (Ps. 36:6), is a thread which runs 
through the whole of the Bible,” Barth asserts, “and it first emerges in a way which is quite 
unmistakeable when the creation of man is classified in Gen. 1:24f. with that of the land 
                                                
724 Rolston, Conserving Natural Value, 114.  Rolston says that in addition to their use for hunters, 
wildlife officials are also “concerned with wildlife for what they are in themselves.”  What he means by 
this is that they are concerned for the “wildness” of the animals, not for the animals as relational subjects.  
Even when humans intervene to increase their population, officials do not want to tame them.  They want 
wild animals to remain wild. 
725 Barbara Kingsolver, Animal, Vegetable, Miracle (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 220.  She also 
forbids her daughter to give the turkeys individual, personalized names. 
Feminist scholar Carol J. Adams also criticizes this use of language in “Feeding on Grace: 
Institutional Violence, Christianity, and Vegetarianism,” in Good News for Animals? ed. Charles Pinches 
and Jay B. McDaniel (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1993), 147.  For more see Appendix 4 on Adam 
naming the animals in Gen. 2. 
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animals.”726  As he reads the Genesis text, Barth affirms that both humans and animals share the 
potential for responsive encounters.  Animals are not freely responsive in the same way that 
humans are – they are not responsible.  Yet, their independent life demands a unique response 
from humans different to what is called for in human relations to plants.  In this sense “animals 
fare better” than plants in Barth’s ethics, claims Willis Jenkins.  “As Barth wrestles with the 
physical connaturality of animal and human life, he thinks their lives warrant something more 
than prudent conservation.”727  Human dominion over animals means responsibility for the life 
of fellow living creatures.   
 
5.3a Barth and the Biblical Distinction Between Animals and Plants 
 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics are not littered with long expositions of the differences 
between animals and plants, but the few passages that do express this idea are significant.  For 
example, when discussing the unique relational nature of humanity, he writes:   
 
If we think of the rest of creation without man, we can think in terms of something other 
than God, but only in the sense of something distinct from God and not a counterpart.  
Only with the first creatures with independent life do we begin to glimpse a true 
counterpart alongside and before God in the sphere of the rest of creation.  But not until 
the creation of man does it find a genuine and clearly visible form.  Only in him does a 
real other, a true counterpart to God, enter the creaturely sphere.728 
 
Before the creation of animals, God does not find a relational counterpart.  Yet, once animals 
enter the scene, those first creatures with independent life, we see a glimpse of such a 
counterpart.  Animals do not fulfill the role of created counterpart to God to the degree that 
humans do, but their appearance does merit attention and, as we will see, a special responsibility.  
Similarly, in his commentary on the fifth day of creation, Barth finds an “entirely new creation” 
in the appearance of the fish and birds.   
 
What God creates on the fifth day, in contrast not only to light, heaven, earth and the 
luminaries, but also to the vegetable kingdom, consists of creatures which live in 
autonomous motion, abounding and flying. Not by a long way do we see as yet the free 
                                                
726 Barth, CD III/1, 181. 
727 Although he does not make this distinction himself, Willis Jenkins does observe its presence in 
Barth.  “The biological kinship between human and animals lives seems to press against Barth’s 
categorical treatment.”  Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 168.   
728 Barth, CD III/1, 184 (italics mine). 
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decision and action which will make man man and for which man is ordained as created 
in the image of God; but we certainly have a first intimation of it. And if we do not have 
as yet living creatures which form the immediate companions and friends of man in his 
particular exaltation, we can at least see that as a living creature of this kind man will not 
be alone, but in similarity and dissimilarity he will stand at the centre and head of a 
whole world of such creatures.729 
 
Free-living creatures are distinct in that they inhabit what was created on the first three days.  In 
the creation of animals, Barth claims, “the previously established habitat now for the first time 
and in the first form receives a populace.”730  All that has come before represents “the common 
habitat” (des gemeinsamen Lebensraumes),731 the necessary conditions for the creation of 
autonomous, living creatures.  In this way, the Genesis 1 creation saga reminds humanity of both 
its limitations and dignity.  The fact that the animal creation along with humanity depends on 
“the same objective guarantee of its dwelling-place and the same light by day and by night, and 
has been assigned to the same table spread by God, is a living reminder to man of his own needs. 
The fact that it is subjected to his dominion is a living reminder of the responsibility.”732  Barth 
keenly observes that the novelty of animal life results in a unique relationship between them and 
humans.  Humans may not find an equal helper (Gen. 2:20) in animals, but their appearance is 
the first indication that humans will not be alone.  Just as animals do not represent the created 
counterpart to God, neither can they constitute the equal friend or companion to humans.  But 
lack of equality in nature does not mean that no companionship exists between humanity and 
animals. 
 
5.3b Barth, Buber, and Horses 
 
“Responsibility as understood in the limits of dominion,” Barth claims, will consist in 
what is proposed in Prov. 12:10: “A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast.”733  This 
statement lays within a later section of the Church Dogmatics where Barth speaks explicitly 
about the different responsibilities humans have toward animals vs. those we have toward plants 
                                                
729 Ibid., 168. 
730 “der zuvor begründete Lebensraum nun zum ersten Mal und in der ersten Form eine Bevölkerung 
bekommt” Barth, KD III/1, 188. 
731 Ibid., 198. 
732 Barth, CD III/1, 177. 
733 “Verantwortlichkeit in den Grenzen der so verstandenen Herrschaft,” Barth, KD III/4, 400.  
 179 
and the earth.734  As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the responsible horseman provides 
the exemplary model for Barth’s interpretation of this proverb.  “It is said of a good horseman 
that he is so completely one with his horse that he always knows exactly to take out of it no more 
and no less than what it can not only give but is willing and glad to do so.”735  Such a person, 
Barth claims, cannot possibly be ungodly.  Thus, humans are allowed to use animals for our own 
purposes, but this can only be done responsibly by entering into a relationship with the animal 
and attending to its specific needs and even of what it is “willing and glad” to give to its human 
caregivers.  The individual subjectivity of the animals must always be respected.  The human 
and the animal partner together to achieve a common goal.  A similar responsible relationship, 
Barth contends, should ideally exist between humans and wild animals that we have brought 
under human care, like those found in zoos.  For this reason, “the relation between man and 
animals which are caged or beasts which are tamed merely to provide a spectacle or pleasure will 
always have a doubtful element.”736  This is clearly different from human use of plants or 
inanimate objects.  Human use of animals represents a transaction between two subjects.  Human 
use of plants, on the other hand, consists of a subject-object relationship.  Plants and landscapes 
have no independent life with which to respond or cooperate with human intentions.       
A contemporary of Barth, Martin Buber, as we have seen, goes even further in his 
description of the encounter between human and animal.  Like Barth, Buber also found 
companionship in a horse.  When he was a boy, Buber used to summer at his grandparents’ 
estate.  There he often stole away into the stable and stroked the neck of his “darling, a broad 
dapple-gray horse.”737  Looking back on the experience, Buber recalls, “It was not a causal 
delight but a great, certainly friendly, but also deeply stirring happening.”738  In this encounter, 
he claims, he encountered not simply another, but an Other.  The horse was not simply an object 
serving his amusement but a true subject with whom he encountered.  “It let me approach, 
confided itself to me, placed itself elementally in the relation of Thou and Thou with me.”739 
                                                
734 “But this lordship, and the responsibility which it confers, is in the first instance a differentiated 
one in respect of the animals and plants” (CD III/4, 351).  This difference for Barth relates primarily to the 
difference in killing animals and plants and will be discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
735 Barth, CD III/4, 352. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), 
23. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Ibid.  “The horse, even when I had not begun by pouring oats for him into the manger, very gently 
raised his massive head, ears flicking, then snorted quietly, as conspirator gives a signal meant to be 
recognizable only by his fellow-conspirator; and I was approved.” 
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Giving attention to the fun that feeding and petting the horse gave him, however, put a barrier 
between himself and the animal.  The intimate I-Thou relation was lost and the horse reverted 
into the relationship of I-It, subject-object.  Thus, while humans may make use of animals, for 
Buber, a deeper encounter is always possible.  Yet, even in the use relationship Barth describes, 
a high degree of reciprocity remains.  The good horseman knows the animal’s abilities and 
limitations and considers its desires in his use.  Barth could not go as far as Buber and conceive 
of an I-Thou relationship with an animal,740 but both theologians clearly found a level of 
mutuality in human-animal relations not present in human relations with the natural 
environment.  The Thou in nature encounters us with mutuality (Gegenseitigkeit), Buber claims, 
only if “instead of considering nature as a single whole, as we usually do, we . . . consider its 




This separation of the creation of animals and human responsibility for them from the 
other orders of creation agrees with our observation of the distinction between rādâ and kābaš in 
Gen. 1:28.  Along these lines, dominion cannot simply be equated with a general notion of 
stewardship.  Dominion, rather, constitutes an extension of human responsible relationship.  Just 
as humans express responsibility in their response of love toward God and one another, they 
express responsibility in their dominion of love toward nonhuman animals.  Emil Brunner claims 
that the human distinctiveness is found in “his responsible relation to his fellow-creature.”742  
Olive Wyon’s translation of this statement is particularly interesting.  Brunner actually says 
“Mitmenschen,” or “fellow-man.”743  He uses the word “Mitkreatur” later in chapter 18.1 to refer 
to fellow-creatures, or animals.  Yet, if we consider humanity’s third dimension of relation and 
acknowledge the special place animals have in this sphere, Wyon’s translation becomes 
surprisingly accurate.  Humans truly are distinctive in their responsible relation to their fellow-
                                                
740 CD III/2, 277-78.  Maurice Friedman claims that many Protestant theologians such as Barth 
adopted Buber’s I-Thou philosophy, recasting it in ways that were not always compatible with Buber’s 
own thought.  Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 4th Ed. (London: Routledge, 
2002), 324.  The extent to which Buber actually influenced the development of Barth’s I-Thou, however, 
remains debated.  See Mark McInroy, “Karl Barth and Personalist Philosophy: A Critical Appropriation,” 
Karl Barth Society of North America, San Diego, CA, November 16, 2007. 
741 Buber, I and Thou, 172. 
742 Brunner, Man in Revolt, 110. 
743 Brunner, Mensch im Widerspruch, 100. 
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creatures – the animals.  It is precisely because humans stand at “the head of a whole world of 
such creatures” in “similarity and dissimilarity,” to use Barth’s language, that human relationship 
with animals takes the form of responsible dominion.  Barth’s assessment of the human-animal 
relation, preceding his example of the good horseman, is particularly insightful:  
 
Respect for the fellow-creature of man, created with him on the sixth day and so closely 
related to him, means gratitude to God for the gift of so useful and devoted a comrade, 
and this gratitude will be translated into a careful, considerate, friendly and above all 
understanding treatment of it, in which sympathetic account is taken of its needs and the 
limits of its possibilities.744 
 
Dominion, in this light, may be defined as a loving, personal response to our fellow living 
creatures, like the ancient image of the shepherd king.  Because animals are also living, 
relational creatures, human dominion over animals takes on a unique responsibility not present in 
human subjugation of the earth.  Other animals, like other humans, represent a community of 
living creatures that demand a personal response.  In this way, human dominion over animals 
will look more like love or responsibility for one’s neighbor than a general stewardship of the 
earth.  
                                                
744 Barth, CD III/4, 352. 
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CHAPTER 6: CHRISTIAN VEGETARIANISM AND ANIMAL NEIGHBORS 
 
“God said, ‘See, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is upon the face of the earth, and 
every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food’” (Gen. 1:29). 
 
“The fear and dread of you shall rest on every animal of the earth . . . Every moving thing that 
lives shall be food for you; and just as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything”  
(Gen. 9:2-3). 
 
My young nose began to tingle as it caught the sweet, spicy aroma floating down the 
hallway that led to the church’s basement kitchen.  Tonight was chili night at my church’s 
weekly Wednesday night bible study and “fellowship dinner.”  At ten years of age I especially 
looked forward to this night because I knew that, as opposed to the obligatory side salad on 
spaghetti night, the closest I would have to come to eating a vegetable would be in the form of a 
bread made of corn.  When I left my Texas home many years later to study in North Carolina my 
new church did not have Wednesday night dinners, but it was not unheard of for the choir to be 
treated to take-out “fried chicken ‘n biscuits” after a busy Sunday morning service.  The idea that 
consuming meat might pose for Christians, as Karl Barth writes, an important problem that “is 
genuine and cannot be ignored,”745 never crossed my mind during these early years.  That it is 
still a non-issue for many Christians was proved to me most recently as I was driving home for a 
short family visit.  I passed a large sign that read, “Man does not live by bread alone Deut. 8:3,” 
next to a portable meat smoker/grill in the parking lot of a local butcher shop.746  The previous 
chapter addressed the meaning of human dominion in the context of viewing animals as potential 
neighbors.  This final chapter explores whether this dominion grants humans a license to take the 
life of other animals.  Are we justified in killing those animals that we have responsibility for, 
care for, share covenant with, and draw near to, but ultimately have dominion over?  In other 
words, can we consistently view other animals as both neighbors and food?747 
                                                
745 Barth, CD III/4, 350. 
746 The full verse reads: “He humbled you by letting you hunger, then by feeding you with manna, 
with which neither you nor your ancestors were acquainted, in order to make you understand that one does 
not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth of the Lord.”  See Appendix for 
photograph. 
747 Muers points out that even a qualified “Yes” to the question, “Should I eat meat?” reinforces “the 
prior assumption that ‘meat’ is a valid category, and that animals can legitimately be portrayed as 
 183 
In this chapter I argue that killing animals represents an extreme case that is rarely, if 
ever, compatible with such a conception.  I build upon arguments in earlier chapters to make this 
case, but my primary conversation partner here is Karl Barth.  It may seem counterproductive to 
engage the thought of a theologian who once referred to “antivivisectionists or those who are 
vegetarian” as “fanatics,”748 but I believe Barth’s discussion of the dangers present in killing 
animals actually brings him much closer to the vegetarian camp than he admits in his writing.  I 
review the development of his thought on this subject as it progresses from a brief comment in 
his 1928 Ethics lectures to a full discussion over twenty years later in Church Dogmatics III/4.  I 
argue that placing the killing of animals for food within the context of substitutionary sacrifice as 
Barth does in CD III/4 is inconsistent with both his description of human responsibility and with 
regard to the actual language he uses to describe such killing.  The chapter proceeds in three 
stages.  First, I offer a brief introduction to the potential difficulties and pitfalls inherent in 
arguing for vegetarianism from a biblical or Christian perspective.  Second, I address human 
responsibility and the problem of killing animals.  Here I discuss Barth’s understanding of 
human nature and the “jungle” (Dschungel), the question of whether human hunting is 
equivalent to animal predation, and the idea of meat eating as a concession to human fallenness.  
Finally, in the third section, I discuss Barth’s concept of the “exceptional case” (Grenzfall) 
within an overall ethic of respect for life and demonstrate how this is a more appropriate 




The Christian scriptures are not replete with examples of characters who practice a 
meatless diet.  With the possible exceptions of Adam and Eve while in the Garden of Eden and 
Daniel and his colleagues while in Babylon (Daniel 1:5-16), it is difficult to make a case for 
vegetarianism based solely on biblical character witnesses.749  From antiquity to the nineteenth 
century in the West, abstention from meat was more closely associated with the ascetic diet of 
the Greek philosopher Pythagoras than with any character from the bible.  A meatless diet was 
even called the “Pythagorean diet” until the term “vegetarianism” was officially adopted in 1847 
                                                                                                                                           
‘becoming-meat.’” Rachel Muers, “Conclusion,” in Eating and Believing, ed. David Grumett and Rachel 
Muers (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 268. 
748 Barth, Ethics, 42. 
749 Christian patristic tradition also holds that the apostle James refrained from eating meat. 
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with the establishment of the Vegetarian Society in the south of England.750  This has not 
prevented some, however, from attempting to eisegete a meatless diet into biblical characters to 
justify the practice from a Christian point of view.  For example, the Quaker medical doctor 
Charles Vaclavick has argued that the real Jesus was a vegetarian who belonged to a Jewish 
Essene-like sect influenced by Pythagorean and eastern philosophies.  According to Vaclavick, 
later “orthodox” or “Catholic” Christians omitted and covered up the true vegetarian teachings of 
Jesus in the bible and other New Testament apocryphal writings.751  This thesis, however, is 
imaginative at best and not widely recognized by biblical scholars.  New Testament professor 
David Horrell writes, “Since meat was an occasional luxury in most ancient societies, including 
Jewish Palestine, it is unlikely that Jesus ate it frequently.  But to imply from silence that Jesus 
actively avoided meat, and did so on grounds of concern for animals, is historically 
implausible.”752  John the Baptist represents another favorite New Testament character on which 
Christian vegetarian sects based their own dietary practices.753  Yet, like with Jesus, it is hard to 
argue credibly for a strictly vegetarian John the Baptist.  Such arguments are problematic not 
only on anthropological and historical-critical grounds; they represent a “theologically 
superficial notion of the imitation of Christ.”754  Rather than seeking a deeper biblical or 
Christological pattern, these arguments merely operate at the level of asking what Jesus did and 
copying it.  Rather than looking for specific vegetarian exemplars, a more fruitful way forward is 
to consider the overall tenure of Scripture with regard to the killing of animals for food.  For 
example, modern Christian teachings against polygamy are better founded on broader biblical 
themes favoring monogamy that on specific monogamous exemplars.755   
                                                
750 Colin Spencer, The Heretic’s Feast: A History of Vegetarianism (Hanover, NH: University Press 
of New England, 1995), 252.  The more restrictive term “vegan” was dubbed later in 1944 to refer to a diet 
that consists solely of vegetable matter (i.e., no animal products like milk or eggs). Leah Leneman, “No 
Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909-1944,” Society and Animals 7, no. 3 (1999).   
751 Charles P. Vaclavik, The Vegetarianism of Jesus Christ: The Pacifist, Communalism, and 
Vegetarianism of Primitive Christianity (Three Rivers, CA: Kaweah Pub., 1986). 
752 David G. Horrell, “Biblical Vegetarianism? A Critical and Constructive Assessment,” in Eating 
and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspective on Vegetarianism and Theology, ed. David Grumett and 
Rachel Muers (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 49. 
753 Kelhoffer argues that locusts and honey were likely not John’s only foods because these would 
have not provided sufficient nutritional content.  “John's honey has more to do with where John was rather 
than what he ate. . . . John’s food is simply a reflection of what was plentiful in his midst: insects and 
uncultivated ‘honey.’” James A. Kelhoffer, The Diet of John the Baptist: “Locusts and Wild Honey” in 
Synoptic and Patristic Interpretation (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 98. 
754 Horrell, “Biblical Vegetarianism?” 49. 
755 This is an issue that plagued Augustine and his disputes with the Manicheans.  See Augustine, 
Reply to Faustus the Manichæan, Book 22.47 in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 4, ed. 
Philip Schaff, trans. Richard Stothert, 1887, Reprint (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1956), 
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 An even more compelling case can be made from a comparison of the biblical teachings 
on the killing of animals for food with the keeping of slaves.  Simply because a practice was 
considered normative in the past does not mean that it should be exempt from critical moral 
investigation today.  Arguing along these lines, Mennonite philosopher Gary Comstock writes, 
“Even though the Bible says nothing that could be taken as a direct condemnation of slavery, 
slavery is still wrong.”756  That Christian slaveholders in the past could point to biblical passages 
explicitly permitting slavery,757 does not obscure the reality that the overall themes of the bible 
include freedom, liberation, justice and mercy.  The narrative trajectory of the bible, thus, points 
in the opposite direction of human slavery.  In similar fashion, theologian David Clough argues 
that moral awareness develops over time.  “We have come to realize - as the authors of these 
texts did not - that the wider biblical account of what it means to be human is at odds with 
keeping slaves and with treating women as less than equal to men.”758  Christian ethics involves 
more than a mere mimicry of the patriarchs, St. Paul, or even Jesus.  “Christians are called to be 
followers of Christ, but not slavish imitators: we are called to take up our crosses (Matt. 16:28) - 
but not to be crucified for the redemption of the world; we are called to have faith, but not turn 
water into wine.”759  A Christian consideration of vegetarianism will take the biblical witness 
seriously, but it will bear in mind both individual biblical examples and the larger themes and 
narrative thrust.  Feminist scholar Carol Adams argues for a Christologically informed 
vegetarianism along similar lines.  She maintains we are “not concerned with whether Jesus was 
or was not a vegetarianism just as feminist theology rejects the relevance of the maleness of the 
twelve disciples.  This is not a quest for historical duplication but for the acquisition of an ability 
to discern justice-making according to the Christological revelation.”760  Merely following Jesus’ 
example without a larger vision of his salvific purpose and God’s goal for God’s creatures veers 
                                                                                                                                           
289. http://www.ccel.org/fathers.html (accessed April 2009).  Augustine makes a similar argument in On 
Marriage and Concupiscence, Book 1.10 in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5, ed. 
Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, 1887, Reprint (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.B. 
Eerdmans Pub., 1956), 267-268. 
756 Gary L. Comstock, “Pigs and Piety: A Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals,” in Good News 
for Animals? ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1993),114. 
757 Jon Butler, Grant Wacker, and Randall Balmer, Religion in American Life: A Short History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 254-255. 
758 David Clough, “Why Do Some People Eat Meat?” Epworth Review 32, no. 2 (2005): 36.  He 
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dangerously close to Pelagianism.  In John 14:12, Jesus says, “Very truly, I tell you, the one who 
believes in me will also do the works that I do and, in fact, will do greater works than these, 
because I am going to the Father.”  Christian ethics is influenced by Jesus’ life and just as much, 
if not more so, by his death and resurrection.  The grace and freedom of the kingdom of God that 
Jesus initiates opens up the possibility of renewed relationships between people and other 
creatures.  The rest of this chapter considers the implications of Christ’s incarnation, death, and 
resurrection on human relationships with other animals and specifically whether these “greater 
works” might include a call to see the killing of animals for food as an extreme rather than 
normative case in this relationship. 
 
6.2 HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WAY OF THE JUNGLE 
 
 Before we can think about placing the killing of animals for food under the category of 
Grenzfall, we must first consider what makes this practice so extreme or borderline.  As most 
environmental philosophers will agree, killing and consuming other life forms is a natural, 
evolutionary process and an essential component of healthy ecosystems.  Thus when humans kill 
and consume other animals we are simply imitating the natural processes that we see all around 
us.  I contend, however, that to read human meat eating off of animal predation is just as 
simplistic a hermeneutical move as justifying polygamy or slavery by citing specific biblical 
proof texts or examples.  Both methodologies fail to consider the larger picture of human nature 
and purpose.  Karl Barth describes the human creature as sharing in animal nature but also being 
called to responsibility before God and others.  I have already discussed what this means 
generally for drawing distinctions between humans and animals in chapter one.  In this section I 
explore its meaning for the specific case of killing animals for food.  My argument proceeds in 
three stages.  In the first subsection I outline Barth’s conception of responsible human life in 
opposition to animal life.  By participating in the struggle of the jungle for existence, humans are 
in danger of losing their humanity.  Killing is only acceptable under the command of God.  I then 
use this idea in the second subsection to critique the claim by environmental ethicist Holmes 
Rolston that human hunting is comparable to animal predation.  In the third subsection I show 
how competition and killing for food do not represent God’s original or final intent for human 
relationships with other animals.  The possibility of meat eating exists only in the caveat of 







6.2a Human Respect for Life 
 
Under the subject of “Respect of Life,” Barth admits in CD III/4 that “human life is 
always first a life of impulses.”761  Humans do not exist primarily as spiritual souls that merely 
inhabit physical bodies.  Physical bodies and their consequent impulses and passions form an 
integral part of real human life.  We observed in chapter two that human emotional continuity 
with animals allows for the creation of caring relationships between the two.  This is what makes 
animals, rather than plants or inanimate natural phenomena, proper recipients of human care.  
The reality of human embodiment means that when we are addressed by the command of God 
we are addressed as embodied creatures.  Animal impulses, Barth insists, are not given to 
humanity only to be suppressed.  Real human life depends on them.762  Yet, neither can human 
life simply be equated with animal life.  “The instincts undoubtedly belong to the animal element 
in human life, namely, to that which it has in common with animals.  But this does not mean that 
in so far as it is an impulsive life, it could and should be lived in animal fashion.”763  As we saw 
in chapter one, humans are also created in the imago Dei.  This means that human life is to be 
lived in free response to the divine call.  Human life is responsible life.     
 
And therefore, in so far as respect is due it, the important thing even in regard to these 
animal components is to live it humanly, i.e., not in the form of an automatic process, 
but in the form of a physical process guided and governed by the soul as awakened by 
the divine pneuma, and therefore in the form of freely chosen and executed decisions.764 
 
Barth makes a similar assessment earlier in Ethics: “We need not say more in defining the being 
of man than that we understand ourselves as beings that know of themselves and their kind that 
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their life transcends the perceptible processes of physical life in time and space.”765  As 
embodied creatures, humans share in the life of animals.  As responsible creatures, humans 
transcend the life of animals.  This transcendence is evidenced most acutely in regard to killing 
or joining in the animal struggle for life. Through the language he uses to describe these 
activities, Barth clearly associates them with the animal part of human nature. They must be 
governed responsibly, otherwise “the wolf slips the chain”766 and we draw too near the “jungle 
struggle” (Dschungelkampf) for existence.767  Although he admits that in God’s freedom the 
command to take life might be asserted, Barth gives this strong warning in Ethics: “The 
closeness to the jungle to which we give ourselves when we compete and kill will always make 
competing and killing a far more dubious action than one which totally or predominantly can be 
understood as the sparing, upholding, and cherishing of the life of others.”768  Barth allows for 
the possibility of killing and eating animals and even for war, but he also acknowledges the 
danger inherent in these actions.  He insists in both Ethics and CD III/4 that God’s normative 
command for humans opposes competition and killing.  The manner of life most suitable for 
human animals is one that embraces peace and the upholding of life rather than destruction and 
death.  Therefore, when we engage in violence and killing, our very humanity is at stake.  The 
question of whether an act can be considered human or animal is “summed up under the concept 
of competition, . . . in the face of all the possibilities of the killing of men by men, and even in 
the face of the many possibilities of our relation to the plant and animal world.”769  Thus, for the 
Christian, human life is guided by the command of God to respect life rather than by nature’s red 
tooth and claw. 
 
 As we noted in chapter 1.2b, Eberhard Busch offers an important insight into this area of 
Barth’s thinking.  “The problem with Darwinism is not that it sees the relation between humans 
and animals, but that it defines humanity in terms of the animal.”770  Barth accepts the 
continuities between humans and animals, but he also insists that human nature cannot be 
defined solely in terms of its biology.  Humanity’s unique responsibility before the Word of God 
allows humans to transcend their biological determinations.  “Losing their distinction from the 
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animals, humans also lose the capacity for a genuine relation to the environment, for they seek 
their humanity in the exercising of instinctive drives.”771  Thus, while human life may first be a 
life of impulses, it is not circumscribed by them.  Barth writes passionately against any form of 
natural theology that attempts to define God, humans, or human morality from sources other than 
divine revelation.772  We cannot simply assume that the natural rules of predation and 
competition for life, or even more benevolent observations like altruism and cooperation in 
animal life, represent the divine will for human nature or relationships.  “The humanity of the 
will to live,” Barth claims, “means that we do not just want to live as animals do or as plants in 
their struggle toward light and moisture; we will live in a human determination.”773  As we have 
seen in chapter one and above, this human determination is one that respects and upholds the 
lives of others in free response to the divine command.   
 
This is not to say, however, we must try to impose the divine command to humans on 
nonhuman creatures.  “That man lives in a cosmos, that he is the neighbour [Nachbar] of 
animals” is presupposed in the divine command to humans.  “Yet it does not follow by any 
means that the Word is also addressed to his neighbours in the cosmos in the same way as it is to 
man,” Barth claims.774  The command of God presupposes a community of relationship between 
humans and animals, but this does not mean that the respective members of this community are 
addressed in the same way.  We cannot deny that the divine Word may address animals with the 
same respect for life that it does with regard to humans, but neither, Barth insists, can we 
confirm it.  “We undoubtedly receive instruction concerning our life and it's nature, [yet] this is 
actually limited to our human life.”775  God’s Word does not meet creatures in an abstract, 
general way, but in the concrete, particularity of their existence.  This is consistent with Barth’s 
emphasis on the divine Word’s incarnation as a breaking into the temporal history of creatures in 
the real man Jesus of Nazareth.  Thus, the revelation that we receive concerning true human 
nature and morality is specific to us as human creatures.  “Man is not addressed concerning 
animal and vegetable life, nor life in general, but concerning his own human life.”776  Christian 
ethics, therefore, concerns itself with relationships that involve humans.  We took note of this in 
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chapters one and four.  We are concerned with human-divine, human-human, and human-animal, 
but not animal-divine or animal-animal, relationships.  Barth claims that, from the human 
perspective, the divine command to animals or other nonhuman creatures exists in hidden form.   
 
There is an infinite range of possible but unknown realities in the relation of Creator and 
creature. We may thus give free rein to our imagination in this field. But we must not 
maintain that we have any knowledge, namely, that we know a universal, all-inclusive 
command addressed to all creatures and therefore valid for us. This obviously involves an 
encroachment of naturalism and evolutionism which we have no reason to support.777 
 
In a similar manner, we cannot move in the opposite direction and suppose a command that we 
have with regard to human-human or human-animal relationships is likewise relevant for animal-
animal relationships.  While we can know that the normative command for humans involves the 
respect and upholding of life, we cannot be certain that animals have been given a similar 
command.  Thus, humans have no theological justification for policing violence or predation in 
wild nature.  We overstep the boundary in which the Word of God meets us if we attempt to do 
so in either direction. 
 
6.2b Human Hunting and Animal Predation 
 
 In his Environmental Ethics, Holmes Rolston distinguishes between human culture and 
wild nature with each sphere having its own set of moral codes.  He argues that when humans 
interact with nature in the struggle for survival, “the ethics that has proved appropriate within 
culture only partly deploys there.”778  Neighborly love may be appropriate for human-human 
interactions in culture, but survival of the fittest is the law of nature and when humans interact 
with other creatures in nature, we must follow nature’s rules.  Rolston defends human hunting 
along these grounds by comparing it to animal predation in nature.  “Analogous to predation, 
human consumption of animals is to be judged by the principles of environmental ethics, not 
those of interhuman ethics.”779  We have argued above, however, that animal or natural impulses 
alone do not guide human actions.  Humanity is defined not by nature but by its relationship to 
the Word of God.  Thus, from a theological perspective, we must disagree with Rolston when he 
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says, “Nothing is more natural than hunting for food.”780   If we conclude that hunting and killing 
are impulses that humans share with other animals, then we might be tempted to agree with this 
statement.  But to do so would place us in a theologically dubious position.  An individual 
human, Barth claims, is not identical with the “indwelling wolf.  It is not his nature.  It belongs 
to the corruption of his nature.”781  The bloodlust and readiness to kill that Barth sees in many 
human relationships is due to the corruption of sin in humanity’s nature, not to its true or ideal 
form.  Christian ethics, therefore, cannot make the same culture/nature distinction as Rolston.  
Created in the imago Dei, humans exercise their responsibility in their relationships with God, 
other humans, and other animals.  The command of God to respect and uphold life meets humans 
in all their relationships – not just their interhuman ones.782   
 
Although my arguments in this subsection are confined primarily to an engagement with 
the thought of Rolston, it is important to note that he is not the only environmental philosopher 
to defend human meat eating by comparing it to animal predation.  Erik Katz, for example, 
defends the institutional use and killing of animals by suggesting that “business, or any other 
human institution, would look to the operation of natural ecological systems as a guide to the 
proper behavior regarding animals and other natural beings.”783  Baird Callicott endorses hunting 
as well, so long as it is done in a way that respects nature’s example.  Thus, humans may hunt 
prey, but not predator species.  “Hunting timber wolves is wrong because these animals are top 
carnivores in their biotic communities, and to treat them as if they were prey is not 
appropriate.”784  Rolston also places a qualification on his endorsement of hunting.  Human 
hunting mirrors animal predation in that it must serve a higher purpose than human vanity.  
Thus, trophy hunting and some sport hunting would be largely prohibited according to Rolston’s 
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environmental ethic.785  “The best case that can be made for sport hunting,” Rolston claims, “is 
that it is not merely recreational but is a vicarious, therapeutic, character-building, re-creational 
event, where a visceral urge is vented in the sport hunt, carried forth in its ecological setting.”786  
Rolston’s distinction between culture and wild nature is open to the charge of arbitrariness at this 
point.787  Humans appear to be able to step in and out of culture when we deem fit.  We evade 
‘natural’ processes in our use of medicine to cure diseases, enforcement of justice, and granting 
of charity in interhuman culture.  Yet when we feel the “primordial drive” to conquer other 
creatures we can step into nature and kill animals.788  Fulfilling this urge by killing another 
human would violate the rules of culture, but eating animals is simply ‘natural.’  This overlooks 
the fact that animals regularly kill, members of their own species and sometimes even their own 
tribe.789  That a practice is good or morally commendable does not follow merely from the fact 
that it is ‘natural’ or observed in nature.790 
 
Val Plumwood also accepts a correlation between human meat eating and animal 
predation but she rejects any sharp distinctions between human culture and wild nature.   She 
adds a unique qualification that makes her position more unsettling but also more consistent than 
Rolston’s and the other environmental philosophers’ mentioned above.  For Plumwood, if 
humans desire to see other animals as prey, we must also be willing to see ourselves as prey for 
other predators.  “In a good human life we must gain our food in such a way as to acknowledge 
our kinship with those whom we make our food . . .  [and position ourselves] reciprocally as 
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food for others.”791  Plumwood’s unique perspective is likely due to her own experience of 
“being prey” to a crocodile in the Australian outback.792  Although Barth would not agree with 
Plumwood’s atheistic notion of morality that looks to natural processes in order to deduce 
correct human behavior, he does acknowledge, at least in passing, the possibility of humans 
being prey.  He claims that just as animals are sometimes called to sacrifice their lives for 
humans, we should remain open to the possibility that our own lives might present a similar 
offering for them.  “It can be that our own will to live in one of its components must be the 
instrument to make this offering, just as the world too, from the Bengal tiger to the race of 
bacteria, seems to be full of an alien will to live which makes us the sacrifice.”793  Both humans 
and animals receive their life from God and, accordingly, both may be called upon to offer it 
back.  Yet life can only be sacrificed in this way by the specific command of God.  We cannot 
discern a general principle for such sacrificing from looking at nature alone.  We concluded 
above that humans encounter the command of God in all their relationships – divine, human, and 
animal.  Therefore, we may commend the consistency of Plumwood’s position while still 
rejecting her source or method for discovering human-animal morality.  
 
 From this theological perspective we are able to defend against a challenge posed by the 
environmental ethicist to the animal activist.  Rolston values hunting for the way in which it 
allows humans to both learn about and participate in nature.  He claims that “some hunters need 
to be immersed immediately in the bloodletting” as a way to identify with “the tragic drama of 
creation. . . . In many ways that mere watchers of nature can never know, hunters know their 
ecology.”794  Influenced by Rolston, another scholar argues that by rejecting human hunting or 
meat consumption, animal activists are essentially rejecting nature.  They are left, therefore, 
“with the following options: either they must argue that animal predation is evil (and show that 
their arguments do not involve a hatred of nature) or demonstrate that there is some way to value 
animal predation as a good while consistently and plausibly condemning human predation.”795  
From a secular, environmental ethics perspective, it is possible to answer this challenge by 
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asserting that human hunting and meat eating are so informed with cultural meaning that they 
can no longer be called natural.  “That we eat may be determined naturally; what and how we eat 
is determined culturally.”796  A second potential response can be derived purely from the 
perspective of biology by denying that humans are in fact predators.  This has been a common 
vegetarian tactic from antiquity to today.  Plutarch, the ancient Greek philosopher and historian, 
considered absurd the argument that human meat eating is natural.  “For that man is not naturally 
carnivorous is, in the first place, obvious from the structure of his body.  A man’s frame is in no 
way similar to those creatures who were made for flesh-eating.”797  Humans do not possess 
hooked beaks, sharp claws, jagged teeth, or stomachs strong enough to assimilate a heavy diet of 
flesh.  Taking recent evolutionary and archeological data into account, Colin Spencer makes a 
similar argument: “Killing is not natural to humans, it does not fit either their physical or their 
dietary nature.”798  The distinguishing characteristics of humans, such as upright posture, bipedal 
locomotion, thumb and index finger precision, and expanded brainpower, were all present in 
early humans before they became successful as hunters or carnivores.  To view hunting and meat 
eating as the driving forces of human evolution and development fails to give sufficient weight 
to the crucial role that maternal care and social activities play in these processes.  Biologist 
Rosemary Rodd argues that “high intelligence seems to be linked more with social living than 
(as had previously been suggested) with activities like hunting.”799  The full validity of this 
second, biological response is still debated amongst anthropologists and scientists.  From the 
perspective of Christian ethics, however, this makes little difference.  Both of these defenses still 
rely on Rolston’s basic culture/nature divide for human morality.  In other words, the right or 
wrongness of human hunting and meat eating are still dependent on whether or not these 
practices are considered ‘natural.’ 
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A theological perspective, however, cannot accept this association.  This is because, as 
Neal Messer has recently argued, “theology is not the same kind of activity as biology.”800  He 
notes that to see the Christian doctrine of creation and Darwinian evolutionary biology as 
referring to the same world leads inevitably to a contradiction.  Thus, while predation plays a 
vital role in natural ecosystems, in answer to the above environmental ethics challenge, we must 
insist that even in wild nature it is not an extrinsic or absolute good.  At best we may view 
predation as a transitory good – at worst a necessary evil.  Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman 
put the matter incisively: “Acknowledging the tragedy of the natural world being at war with 
itself inevitably leads us to ‘survival of the fittest’ conclusions, unless we realize that ‘nature’ 
and ‘creation’ are not referring to the same world.”801  As we have already observed, the 
Christian understanding of human nature is not bound by environmental or biological analysis.  I 
now submit that the same holds true for the world as a whole.  The Christian scriptures are not 
unrealistic about the struggle for life that all creatures engage in.  They bear witness to human 
consumption of animals, animal consumption of humans, famine, drought, and war.  Yet these 
realities do not constitute the deeper biblical vision of creation.  They testify to our present 
experience, but not to creation’s original intent or final end.  We see a radical incongruity if we 
compare our present experience of the world with the Genesis account of creation or prophetic 
visions of a future creation such as in Isaiah 11.  The death and predation we see in nature are 
particularly discordant with the Christian revelation in Christ.  Christ’s death and resurrection 
testify to the deeper reality that the “struggle for existence did not have the first word, any more 
than it will have the last.”802  In comparison to the already and coming kingdom of God which 
has broken into our present historic reality through Christ, survival can only ever be a secondary 
commitment for the Christian.803  In this way, Christians do not “hate nature” in their rejection of 
predation as an extrinsic good; rather they see nature as a present historical caveat that exists 
between the original and final end of creation in the peaceful kingdom of God made possible 
through the divine will in Christ.   
 
6.2c The Killing Caveat 
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 We have seen that Barth does not believe true human actions can be determined simply 
by observing animal behavior or natural processes.  Human hunting and killing of animals for 
food are not equivalent to animal predation.  Humans do not live according to the jungle struggle 
for life.  Nevertheless, Barth also maintains that humans may sometimes justifiably kill animals 
for food and that this killing may even be commanded by God.  To make sense of this seeming 
contradiction, we must attend to the way in which Barth describes killing and the competition for 
life as an historical caveat.  As such these violent possibilities have no place in the original intent 
or final goal of God’s creatures.  They exist only in the interim period between the creation and 
the eschaton.  I argue in the present subsection that, viewed in this light, killing animals for food 
represents a divine concession to the present reality of nature and human sinfulness.  This can be 
seen through the way in which the Priestly writer of Gen. 9 speaks of the new relationship of fear 
and dread804 that is created when humans kill other animals and through a comparison with two 
other concessionary events in Israel’s early history.  I conclude by examining the impact this 
understanding of Gen. 9 has for other Priestly dietary laws in the Old Testament.   
 
In CD III/4 Barth describes killing and the struggle for life as transitory realities.  The 
first chapters of Genesis contain an unmistakable warning against killing.  It is very important 
for Barth in this regard that both humans and animals are given only vegetation for food.  
“Between beast and beast no less than man and beast the peace of creation seems to be quite 
unbroken, unthreatened by needs or dangers.  Man and beast find their table furnished by the 
world of plants, and cannot come into mutual collision.”805  We have already seen in the previous 
chapter how the bible distinguishes living creatures with blood and breath (humans and animals) 
from nonliving creatures (plants and inanimate natural phenomena).  In this way, the 
consumption, and thus destruction, of plants is still viewed as nonviolent and the peace of 
creation remains unbroken.  It is not until Gen. 9, Barth observes, that humanity is given 
authorization to kill animals for food.  This represents, however, a new and different order from 
that established in Gen. 1.  “Fear and dread” (Gen 9:2), rather than peaceful coexistence, now 
characterize the relationship between humans and animals.  Barth says this new relationship was 
                                                
804 These words reflect the “tragic awareness that somehow the relationship is less than it should be.” 
John Olley, “Mixed Blessing for Animals: The Contrasts of Genesis 9,” in The Earth Story in Genesis, ed. 
Norman C. Habel and Shirly Wurst (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 134. 
805 Barth, CD III/4, 353. 
 197 
not yet possible or real in the “pre-historical realm” (prähistorischen Bereich) of creation’s 
original fashioning by God.  It only exists in the present “historical realm of sinful man” 
(historischen Bereich des sündigen Menschen).  “In the view of Gen. 1 and 2 it should not be 
forgotten or expunged that it does not correspond with the true and original creative will of God, 
and that it therefore stands under a caveat (Vorbehalt).”806  Yet, God does not simply abandon 
God’s creatures to this distorted form of relationship in which violence and competition for life 
take the place of peace and companionship (Gen 2:18).807  The Word of God continues to sustain 
the existence of God’s creatures and lead them toward the final peace of the coming kingdom of 
God.   
 
The creation and consummation are the boundaries of history, and therefore of this 
interim time and therefore the space, in which the dominion of humanity over the animal 
can and must mean also that the animal threatens humanity and the human, in order to 
live himself, takes the life of the animal.808  
 
For Barth this hope is ultimately manifested in Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection.  The 
reality of Christ makes renewed relationship possible between all creatures.  Barth finds this 
final end spoken of in certain prophetic passages of the Old Testament (Is. 11:6-9; Is. 65:25; 
Hos. 2:18).  Here predator and prey species coexist peacefully on a vegetarian diet and are led by 
a human child.  It is only in the interim period between creation and new creation that a 
creaturely struggle for life occurs or is even possible.   
 
 In this light, we can view the human killing of animals as a divine concession to the 
present reality of history and humanity’s fallen nature.  Meat eating is not the ideal for human 
relationships with other animals; it is an activity that God regrettably permits during the interim 
period as we, along with all creation, await “the freedom of the glory of the children of God” 
(Rom. 8:21).   Andrew Linzey writes, “The radical message of the Noah story . . . is that God 
would rather not have made us be at all if we must be violent” (Gen. 6:7).809  The universal 
covenant that follows the great flood in Gen. 9, however, represents God’s commitment to 
                                                
806 Ibid., 353; KD III/4, 402. 
807 See Appendix 4. 
808 “Die Schöpfung und die Vollendung sind die Grenzen der Geschichte und also dieser Zwischenzeit 
und also des Raumes, in welchem die Herrschaft des Menschen über das Tier auch das bedeuten kann und 
muß, daß das Tier den Menschen bedroht, daß der Mensch, um selber zu leben, dem Tier sein Leben 
nimmt.” Barth, KD III/4, 402. 
809 Andrew Linzey, “The Bible and Killing for Food,” in Using the Bible Today: Contemporary 
Interpretations of Scripture, ed. Dan Cohn-Sherbok (London: Bellew Pub., 1991), 111. 
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creation in spite of its present violence.  The conditions that follow Noah’s permission to kill and 
eat animals serve to remind humans of the danger inherent in such actions.  In chapter five we 
noted that the vegetarian diet in Gen.1 did not require a similar warning.  The blood prohibition 
reminds us that humans usurp God’s rule when they fail to see that all life truly belongs to God.  
That Gen. 9:2-4 represents a begrudging acceptance that relationships between humans and 
animals are not what they should be has not been overlooked by modern scholars.  This passage 
has been variously described as a “concession,”810 “accommodation,”811 “permission rather than 
a positive command,”812 and a “grim prediction” or “divine curse.”813  
 
The concessionary nature of this passage is made even clearer when we compare it to 
two other similar events in Israel’s early history.  The first incident occurs during the people’s 
long wilderness wanderings after their exodus from Egypt.  Not content with the daily diet of 
manna and longing for the meat they ate in Egypt, the people cry out in complaint to Moses.  
Upon hearing this, God commands Moses to respond:  
 
The Lord will give you meat, and you shall eat.  You shall eat not only one day, or two 
days, or five days, or ten days, or twenty days, but for a whole month—until it comes 
out of your nostrils and becomes loathsome to you—because you have rejected the Lord 
who is among you, and have wailed before him, saying, ‘Why did we ever leave Egypt?’ 
(Num. 11:18b-20). 
 
A strong wind then brings a cloud of quail for the people and they greedily gather the birds for 
two full days.  Yet, the narrator tells us, while the animal flesh is still between the people’s teeth, 
“the anger of the Lord was kindled against the people, and the Lord struck the people with a very 
great plague.  So that place was called Kibroth-hattaavah, because there they buried the people 
who had the craving” (Num. 11:33-34).  We find our second event during the end of the judge 
Samuel’s life.  Desiring to become like the nations around them, the people cry out to Samuel to 
appoint for them a king.  Samuel warns them of the negative consequences of having a king, but 
they do not relent.  Finally, “the Lord said to Samuel, ‘Listen to the voice of the people in all that 
they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me from being king over 
                                                
810 Richard Alan Young, Is God a Vegetarian? (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 56; Stephen H. Webb, 
Good Eating, 72; Michael S. Northcott, “Eucharistic Eating and Why Many Early Christians Preferred 
Fish,” in Eating and Believing, ed. David Grumett and Rachel Muers (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 234. 
811 Linzey, “Bible and Killing,” 112. 
812 Horrell, “Biblical Vegetarianism?” 45. 
813 Comstock, “Pigs and Piety,” 113. 
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them’” (1 Sam. 8:7).814  These two stories share a common pattern – God establishes a specific 
ordinance, the people complain and rebel, God accommodates them, and disastrous 
consequences follow.  We find a similar pattern in the movement from peaceful relationships 
with animals in Gen. 1 to meat eating characterized by fear and dread in Gen. 9.  While meat 
eating clearly fails to meet the divine ideal for creaturely relations, it is a concession that God 
allows during the time between creation and new creation.  It is a temporary accommodation for 
creatures that are still awaiting their final redemption.  Yet while the human killing of animals 
for food remains a present possibility, as we will see in the next section, the Christian belief in 
the death and resurrection of Christ means that we cannot in any way consider this kind of 
animal sacrifice normative. 
  
I want to make the case now that this concessionary reading of Gen. 9:2-7 sheds light on 
other Priestly sacrificial regulations and food taboos.815  The rules governing ritualized animal 
sacrifices in Leviticus, thus, serve a similar function of encouraging humane respect for life and 
mitigating or controlling human violence.  The writer of Genesis 6 reports that God regretted 
ever creating humans after witnessing their wickedness and wanton violence.  Eventually this 
violence instigated the divine decision to destroy all flesh in the great flood (Gen. 6:5-7).  The 
later blood prohibition in Gen 9:4, therefore, is not simply a divine concession to human sin and 
violence, but a statement that if humanity is to continue to exist, its violence must be controlled.  
This general rule then becomes expanded and codified in the various dietary and sacrificial 
regulations.  They are, as one scholar writes, a way of mediating “the contradiction between the 
ideal of a non-violent world and the fact of unrestrained violence against animals.”816  Stephen 
Webb argues along similar lines: “The sacrificial ritual served to place slaughter in a context that 
mitigated the wanton taking of life.  Ritual slaughter, while it provides religious justification for 
meat eating, also disciplines and controls that eating.”817  After the flood and God’s covenant 
with all living creatures, humans are not allowed to revert to the unrestricted violent ways that 
originally prompted the whole disaster.  Although God has conceded to work in the midst of the 
                                                
814 Young and Webb also compare the Gen. 9 concession to Israel’s desire for a king in 1 Sam. 8.  
Young, God a Vegetarian, 58; Webb, Good Eating, 72. 
815 I do not, however, presume this theory encompasses the entirety of the meaning of the sacrificial or 
dietary systems.  Through the process of multiple redactions it is possible, as I point out below, for a 
system to develop multiple, though not mutually exclusive, meanings and purposes.      
816 Walter Houston, “What Was the Meaning of Classifying Animals as Clean and Unclean?” in 
Animals on the Agenda, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (London: SCM Press, 1998), 23. 
817 Webb, God and Dogs, 138. 
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reality of human violence, the dietary and sacrificial laws serve to moderate and soften this 
reality.  
 
Biblical scholar Jacob Milgrom suggests that this dietary system taught the Israelite reverence 
for life in three ways:  
 
(1) reducing his choice of flesh to a few animals; (2) limiting the slaughter of even these few 
permitted animals to the most humane way; and (3) prohibiting the ingestion of blood and 
mandating its disposal upon the altar or by burial as acknowledgement that bringing death to 
living things is a concession of God’s grace and not a privilege of man’s whim.818  
 
The sacrificial system of the Old Testament is not simply a divine sanction for meat eating.  It establishes 
a system for ordering human meat eating and, thus, curbing the human propensity toward violence after 
the flood.  Another scholar has suggested that the distinction between clean and unclean animals in the 
Mosaic food laws denotes an attempt to conform more closely to the vegetarian ideal of Gen. 1 and 
therefore represents an improvement on the conditional, but still undifferentiated, meat eating in Gen. 
9.819  Along these lines, the clean/unclean distinction represents a way to limit the impact of human 
violence on fellow living creatures by limiting the human diet.  The insights gained from reading the 
sacrificial and dietary laws in light of a similar concessionary reading of Gen. 9 need not, however, be at 
odds with other theories.  As Milgrom cautions, “No single theory can encompass the sacrificial system 
of any society.”820  For example, anthropologist Mary Douglas proposes a body/temple scheme for 
interpreting the clean/unclean distinction where both humans and animals are called to be separate and 
pure in a world of unclean nations and animals.  Yet, she also suggests that the designation “unclean” can 
serve as a protection for those animals so classified.  “To be classified unclean ought to be an advantage 
for the survival of the species.”821  If humans are forbidden from eating or touching the corpses of many 
animal species, the species are consequently protected from human violence.  Human violence is further 
limited by placing the killing of chosen animals within the context of sacrifice.  We should note, 
                                                
818 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 735. 
819 Nathan MacDonald, “Food and Diet in the Priestly Material of the Pentateuch,” in Eating and 
Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspective on Vegetarianism and Theology, ed. David Grumett and Rachel 
Muers (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 19. 
 820 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 442.  He considers several past theories before suggesting his own in which the 
Priestly division of animals into three concentric circles parallels a similar division of humanity: Mankind→ 
Israel→ Priests; Animals: All Animals→ Few Animals→ Sacrifices.  Ibid., 721-22.	  
 821 Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 141.  This represents a shift from her thought in Purity and 
Danger, first published in 1966 where she equates unclean with unclassifiable.  In the Preface to the 2002 
Ed., she admits that she was mistaken in this original suggestion.  See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger 
(New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), xiv-xv.   
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however, that the killing of an animal did not always constitute a necessary component of sacrificial 
worship.  If a person could not afford an animal, he could substitute a sacrifice of flour  (Lev. 5:11).  
Douglass makes that case that in Leviticus the animal sacrificed is also matched by a well-developed 
system of cereal offerings.822  Yet when the sacrifice does involve killing, the treatment of the animal 
before and during slaughter becomes an act of worship and must suit this context to be considered 
acceptable.  It must acknowledge the divine care and ownership of all life.  The kosher food laws 
developed in the Talmud make the animal’s death swift and attempt to minimize pain by specifying such 
conditions as the sharpness of the knife and placement of the cut.  Many ancient cultures believed that 
torturing an animal before slaughter would improve the taste and quality of its meat.  In his excellent 
chronicle of early modern attitudes toward animals in England, Keith Thomas demonstrates the 
persistence of this belief.  The belief that the violent activity involved in baiting a bull with dogs would 
make its flesh more tender was so prevalent that “in the late medieval and early modern period, 
accordingly, most towns had a rule making it compulsory to have a bull baited before it was slaughtered 
by the butcher.”823  It was also believed that prolonging the animal’s death would improve its meat so 
that one author recommends that in bleeding a pig, “He ought to be up to eight or ten minutes dying, at 
least.”824  Webb remarks, in contrast to the prevailing practices of surrounding cultures, the controlled 
violence of the biblical and Talmudic dietary laws “should be seen as nothing less than a revolutionary 
development in human history.”825   
  
6.3 MEAT EATING AS “EXTREME CASE” (GRENZFALL) 
  
We have seen so far that the strongest cases for Christian moral vegetarianism are made 
by taking the overall thrust of the biblical narrative toward peaceful relationships between 
creatures rather than attempting to isolate individual vegetarian exemplars from the Bible.  We 
then looked at Karl Barth’s understanding of human freedom and responsibility to argue that 
human morality cannot likewise simply imitate behaviors or processes we find in nature.  Human 
killing of animals for food, rather than finding its correlation in animal predation, is morally 
possible only as a divine concession to the present historical caveat characterized by the struggle 
for life and human sinfulness.  In the present section we explore the rare cases in which the 
                                                
822 Mary Douglas, “The Eucharist: Its Continuity with the Bread Sacrifice of Leviticus,” Modern 
Theology 15, no. 2 (1999): 223. 
823 Thomas, Man, 93. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Webb, God and Dogs, 140. 
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command of God for humans to respect life actually results in the destruction of life.  Barth 
writes, “We cannot deny the possibility that God as the Lord of life may further its protection 
even in the strange form of its conclusion and termination rather than its preservation and 
advancement.”826  This strange form, however, is always understood as the frontier or extreme 
case (Grenzfall) to God’s overwhelmingly normative command to respect life in the form of 
preservation and advancement.  John Howard Yoder is, thus, correct in his assertion that Barth’s 
position is nearer to Christian pacifism than that of “any really prominent theologian in the 
history of European Protestant dogmatics.”827  I argue in this section that, similar to the way 
human killing of other humans represents an exception to the divine rule to uphold life, human 
killing of animals can be appropriately viewed under the concept of Grenzfall.828  I proceed in 
three stages.  First, I provide an introduction to Barth’s understanding of the extreme case.  
Second, I demonstrate the similarities between this concept and his discussion of the human 
killing of animals.  I propose that Grenzfall is a more apposite concept under which to place this 
killing than the sacrificial, substitionary one that Barth finally uses.  Third, I compare the killing 
of animals for food with Barth’s discussion of killing in war.  I contend that the treatment of the 
Grenzfall in both cases is inconsistent with his overall definition and use of the concept. 
 
6.3a Introduction to the Extreme Case 
 
Barth introduces the concept of the exceptional case in his discussion of “Respect for 
life” in both Ethics and CD III/4.  He admits that his use of this phrase, “Respect for life,” is 
borrowed from the work of Albert Schweitzer.  Barth concedes the validity of Schweitzer’s 
concern, but remains unconvinced of the supreme place Schweitzer gives to it.  “According to 
him the first and last word of ethics is that life must be respected. . . . It goes without saying that 
theological ethics cannot accept this.  Where Schweitzer places life we see the command of 
God.”829  Christians cannot respect life itself as their highest authority because all life truly 
belongs to God.  Life, Barth asserts, is no second God.  God grants life to humans, as well as to 
                                                
826 Barth, CD III/4, 398. 
827 John H. Yoder, Karl Barth and the Problem of War (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 19. 
828 I am not the first to propose a theologically informed comparison of pacifism and vegetarianism.  
Most notably Hauerwas and Berkman argue along these lines in “Chief End,” 207.  I agree with the basic 
trajectory of their argument but differ from them as to the most appropriate analogy under which the 
killing of animals might be allowed.  Hauerwas and Berkman compare meat eating to just war theory 
while I compare it to Barth’s exceptional case.  This difference is elaborated below in the Conclusion. 
829 Barth, CD III/4, 324.  See also Barth, Ethics, 139. 
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animals, as a loan.830  Joseph Mangina remarks that, for Barth, “life is not an end in itself.  
Christians honour life not because it is intrinsically sacred, but because God commands them to 
do so in light of the incarnation.”831  I discuss the importance of Christ’s incarnation and 
resurrection with regard to respect for life further below.  For now, it suffices to note that life is 
not to be valued for its own sake, but rather because it is a gift from God.  Because God is the 
creator and source of creaturely life, God is free to command its preservation or termination.  
“Respect for life, if it is obedience to God’s command, will have regard for the free will of the 
One who has given life as a loan . . . without this closer definition [it] could be the principle of 
an idolatry which has nothing whatever to do with Christian obedience,” Barth says.832  Paul 
Nimmo describes Barth’s ethics in this regard as possessing an “actualistic ontology.”  As such,  
“No ‘ethical system’ and no ‘moral principles’ can ever fully grasp the revelation of God or 
adequately anticipate the moral encounter between God and the ethical agent.”833  Barth cannot 
accept a position like Schweitzer’s that grants upholding life the status of absolute moral 
principle.  In similar fashion, he rejects both absolute vegetarianism and pacifism.  Humans can 
gain a “broad but not infallible outline” of what the command of God will require of them.834  
For example, Barth insists that, without establishing an absolute law, we can still conclude that a 
situation like “killing in self-defence cannot possibly be the first word but only the tenth at the 
very earliest.”835  Nevertheless, Christians must always remain open to the divine command as an 
event in their moral lives to which they must give an answer.  If each encounter did not require a 
fresh response, the distinction between humans as responsible creatures and animals would cease 
to exist.836   
 
While the divine freedom allows for a command that calls us to respect life in the 
strange form of its termination, Barth warns that we must not view this possibility as a normative 
prescription.  The reservation against non-violent absolutism “cannot have more than the 
character of an ultima ratio, an exceptional case (eines Grenzfalles). . . . Hence it is not true that 
                                                
830 Ibid., 342. 
831 Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2004), 
150. 
832 Barth, CD III/4, 342. 
833 Paul T. Nimmo, Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth's Ethical Vision (London: T&T 
Clark, 2007), 60. 
834 Ibid., 61. 
835 Barth, CD III/4, 432. 
836 For my previous discussions of event and responsibility see chapters 4.1c and 1.2 respectively. 
 204 
respect for life is alternately commanded and then not commanded us.”837  Preservation of life 
remains the overwhelmingly normative meaning of the divine command to respect life.  “Even 
the way to these frontiers (Grenzen) [where life must be destroyed] . . . will always be a long one 
which we must take thoughtfully and conscientiously, continually asking whether that ultima 
ratio really applies.”838  We can never approach the possibility of killing with an attitude of 
arbitrariness or frivolity, Barth insists.  Barth’s comments regarding the Grenzfall here are 
directed most obviously toward the taking of human life, but, as I argue in the next subsection, 
they can similarly apply to the killing of animals.  Although he does not ultimately agree with 
the validity of this concept, Yoder provides keen insight into its use and meaning in Barth.  The 
“Grenzfall is not a prediction that there can or will be an exception to the general rule in a 
specific case; it is rather a sort of double negative.  It is not the statement that God will make 
exceptions, but the denial of man’s right to refuse God the freedom to make exceptions if he so 
wills,” Yoder writes.839  This is a significant observation.  It places the impetus for the 
exceptional case squarely under the divine prerogative.  The finitude of humans as created 
beings that possess life as a loan means that we lack the privilege of deciding when and under 
what circumstances life can be taken.  Furthermore, because the Grenzfall is not an affirmation 
that there will be an exception, any preparations we make for the exceptional case are speculative 
at best and counterproductive at worst.   
 
The normative command of God in this regard means the protection of life.  In the Old 
Testament this command is manifested in the commandment, “You shall not murder” (Ex. 
20:13).  Barth here makes a distinction between homicide, or killing, and murder.  He says that 
the bible recognizes “homicide which is not murder.”840  Yoder elucidates this distinction: 
“Killing, the taking of life in exceptional cases when God would have it so, is an expression of 
the respect for life, whereas murder is the taking of life which man permits himself when he 
ascribes to himself sovereignty over life and . . . decides when life is to be abandoned.”841  In this 
way, Barth is able to make sense of the instances where God appears to command killing in the 
Old Testament without implicating God as commanding murder.  He is surprised, however, to 
find in the New Testament that all cases of killing are not simply prohibited as murder. 
                                                
837 Barth, CD III/4, 343; KD III/4, 389. 
838 Ibid. 
839 Yoder, Karl Barth, 35. 
840 “Menschentötung, die nicht Mord ist.” Barth, KD III/4, 456; CD III/4, 400. 
841 Yoder, Karl Barth, 29. 
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But there can be no doubt that the protection of human life against willful extinction has 
acquired in the New Testament, on the one hand through the incarnation, through the 
identity of the actualised kingdom of God with the Son of Man, and on the other through 
His crucifixion for the sins of the world, a severity and emphasis which compel us, when 
we ask concerning our own conduct, to push back the frontier between the ultima 
ratione and forbidden murder.842 
 
At this point we can see the significance of Mangina’s reference to Christ’s incarnation above.  
Christians first respect life because all life derives from and belongs to God.  They do so 
secondly because God, in Christ, has taken up creaturely life into the eternal kingdom of God.  
Finally, we respect life because Christ has died for the sins of humanity and in his resurrection 
has conquered death.  This last point will prove especially significant for my discussion of the 
insufficiency of sacrificial language to justify the killing of animals in the next subsection.  
Respect for life as obedience to the command of God may, in exceptional cases, demand the 
destruction of life, but the thrust of the biblical narrative points toward the protection of life as its 
normative meaning.     
 
 Barth goes on to discuss several situations in which the Grenzfall may present itself as a 
possibility: suicide, abortion, killing in self-defense, capital punishment, and war.  This list 
represents an expansion from his earlier discussion in Ethics where he mentions only the latter 
three.  The most significant difference between these two works, however, seems to be Barth’s 
development of the extreme case argument in CD III/4.  He prefaces his discussion of killing in 
self-defense, capital punishment, and war in Ethics by stating that these are “borderline 
possibilities, extreme and by no means obvious or self-evident.” 843  Yet, he goes on to discuss 
them less as the extreme possibility that is only 1 out 100 times commanded by God and more in 
the context of the individual and corporate human competition or will for life.  This is evident 
even in the case of killing in self-defense where Barth is most skeptical of this extreme 
possibility arising.  His example of two castaways stranded in the ocean on a plank that can only 
support the weight of one, an example missing in his later discussion of self-defense in CD III/4, 
betrays a principally competitive outlook.  In Ethics, Barth seems far more confident that God’s 
command of respect for life will, although not as often, mean the destruction of life.  With the 
                                                
842 Barth, CD III/4, 400.  Yoder makes this same observation of Barth. 
843 Barth, Ethics, 144.  Suicide is discussed earlier in Ethics, 127, in the context of the will to live and 
fear of death. 
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writing of CD III/4, after the second world war, Barth appears to move much closer to the 
pacifist position and places killing more firmly in the context of extreme case than struggle for 
life.  For example, Barth writes here that the command of God tells us, “as forcefully as it can,” 
that even the natural instinct for self-defense is wrong.844  While an in depth discussion of this 
development is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is significant for my purposes in that Barth 
also takes the problematic nature of killing animals far more seriously in CD III/4.  When we 
move from Ethics to CD III/4 we find that the space dedicated to this issue has more than 
doubled.  In Ethics Barth treats the destruction of plants and animals in the same breath, whereas 
in CD III/4 he makes an important distinction between the two kinds of killing.845  He even goes 
so far as to say that killing animals is akin to homicide.  Killing animals is no longer simply the 
consequence of the competition or will to live between humans and other creatures; it is not 
spoken of as a participation in the universal struggle for life.  In CD III/4, the killing of animals 
has now become a truly “frontier” case.   
 
6.3b Grenzfall and the Problem of Killing Animals for Food in Barth 
 
 In between his introduction to the concept of Grenzfall and exploration of its various 
possibilities in abortion, euthanasia, etc., Barth addresses the problem of killing animals.  “Our 
starting point must be that, . . . as a living being in co-existence with non-human life, man has to 
think and act responsibly.”846  This responsibility will not be the same as that which we have for 
other humans, but the closeness of animals to humans means that we are “faced here by a 
responsibility which, if not primary, is a serious secondary responsibility.”847  Even in this 
animal sphere of human relationships the command of God confronts us and demands that we 
answer responsibly.  As we saw in the previous chapter, human responsibility for animals takes 
the form of dominion.  Barth thinks it obvious that such dominion includes taming and 
domesticating animals and even making use of their services for human ends.848  Yet, when he 
considers whether this dominion also carries with it a freedom to slaughter animals, Barth’s 
discussion exhibits far more uncertainty and reservation.  As we noted of in the previous chapter, 
he first distinguishes between the killing of plant and animal life.   
                                                
844 Barth, CD III/4, 433. 
845 Barth, Ethics, 143; CD III/4, 352. 
846 Barth, CD III/4, 350. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Ibid., 351. 
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For the killing of animals, in contrast to the harvesting of plants and fruit, is annihilation.  
This is not a case of participation in the products of a sprouting nexus of life ceaselessly 
renewed in different forms, but of the removing of a single being, a unique creature 
existing in an individuality which we cannot fathom but also cannot deny.849 
 
When we terminate the existence of a plant for our own sustenance, the peace of creation 
remains unbroken.  Yet, Barth claims, when we kill an animal we already presuppose that the 
peace of creation is threatened.  The killing of animals itself constitutes a continuation of this 
threat.850  “And the nearness of the animal to man irrevocably means that when man kills a beast 
he does something which is at least very similar to homicide (Menschentötung).”851  For this 
reason, we must never consider the killing of animals as “self-evident” in our dominion over 
them.   
 
Barth’s initial description here bears striking resemblance to his later discussion of 
killing in self-defense:  
 
He must never treat this need for defensive and offensive action against the animal world 
as a natural one, or include it as a normal element in his thinking or conduct.  He must 
always shrink from the possibility even when he makes use of it.  It always contains the 
sharp counter-question: Who are you, man, that you claim that you must venture this to 
maintain, support, enrich and beautify your own life?  What is there in your life that you 
feel compelled to take this aggressive step in its favor?852 
 
I certainly can and should wish to be protected in the possession and enjoyment of my 
goods, honour, freedom and finally and especially body and life, but not in all 
circumstances or with all means, since none of these possessions constitutes a supreme 
good with an absolute right to be maintained. . . . How far we have strayed from the 
command of God and obedience to it . . . [when the] exercise of self-defence has become 
the normal and natural thing which we think we can do at once should the need seem to 
arise.853 
 
In both cases the preservation of one’s own life is of secondary concern to his/her obedience to 
the command of God.  All living creatures receive their life as a loan and only the divine lender 
                                                
849 Ibid., 352.  Philosopher Charles Hartshorne makes a similar argument: “To cut down a tree is not 
analogous to killing a deer or even a fish, but rather to destroying a colony of paramecia or bacteria. . . . In 
itself, a tree is not on the supercellular level of individuality found in the higher animals.  Lacking a 
nervous system, its many cells are essentially on their own.” Hartshorne, “Foundations,” 155. 
850 Barth, CD III/4, 352. 
851 Ibid.; KD III/4, 401. 
852 Barth, CD III/4, 354. 
853 Ibid., 432. 
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has the authority to call it in.  The finality inherent in the use of lethal force cannot find sufficient 
justification in one’s own vanities or perceived needs.  The normative position of the command 
of God points so strongly toward the preservation and upholding of life, Barth claims, that the 
possibility of killing in self-defense seems almost entirely excluded.  Because of his emphasis on 
divine freedom, Barth cannot recommend that Christians take up an absolute stance of non-
violence like Tolstoy or Gandhi.  He does, however, insist that they were one hundred times 
nearer the truth than those that would argue for violence as having a legitimate and normative 
place in human life.854  In comparing the above two passages I contend that a similar assessment 
can be made for the killing of animals for food.  Given the fact that both Tolstoy and Gandhi 
considered vegetarianism to be an important element in their practice of non-violence, we may 
beg the question of why Barth considered abstaining from meat “radical” and “wanton”?855  If 
vegetarianism is taken as an absolute moral principle, the answer would seem obvious.  Thus, a 
position that views vegetarianism as normative while remaining open to the possibility a divine 
command to take the life of an animal in an extreme case would be acceptable.856  Yet, Barth’s 
argument veers in a different direction, which I contend is both problematic in light of the 
Christ’s death and resurrection and inconsistent in light of Barth’s overall description of killing 
animals as an unnatural and abnormal human practice.  
 
Looking to examples of animal sacrifice in the Old Testament, Barth maintains that the 
death of an animal for human purposes possesses a sacrificial, substitutionary element.  An 
animal is thus killed “not primarily for the satisfaction of his [the human’s] needs but as the 
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Essays and Letters. Vol. 46, The World’s Classics: The Works of Leo Tolstoy – I, trans. Aylmer Maude 
(London: Oxford University Press), 84. 
856 From an alternative Thomistic perspective, Andrew Tardiff argues against killing animals for food 
based on a comparison with Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of killing in self-defense.  Aquinas states that it 
is unlawful for a person, in self-defense, to use more than necessary violence (ST II-II, 64.7).  Tardiff 
couples this “double effect,” or appropriate proportionality, argument with Aquinas’s hierarchy of being to 
argue, “Whenever a person can serve his ends by killing plants instead of animals, then he may not kill 
animals since, as ontically superior to plants, doing so in those circumstances would constitute more than 
necessary violence.” Andrew Tardiff, “A Catholic Case for Vegetarianism,” Faith and Philosophy vol. 15, 
no. 2 (April 1998): 213 
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representation of his guilt, for which there is forgiveness.”857  We kill animals, therefore, not for 
our own pleasure or physical need, but to be reminded of the interim historical period in which 
we currently live in need of God’s grace.  The animal’s death symbolizes the death that humans 
deserve because of their sin and rebellion from God.  For Barth, meat, as a sacrificial meal, also 
points toward the substitutionary death of Christ that reconciles humans and all creation to God.  
The killing of an animal “can be achieved only in recollection of the reconciliation of man by the 
Man who intercedes for him and for all creation, and in whom God has accomplished the 
reconciliation of the world to Himself.”858  In this way, the killing of an animal represents our 
present historical reality as well as our future hope.  Barth writes, “The killing of animals, when 
performed with the permission of God and by His command, is a priestly act of eschatological 
character.”859  It is priestly because it represents humanity’s sin and God’s grace.  It is 
eschatological because it reminds us that reconciliation and new life are finally made possible 
through the ultimate sacrifice of Christ.   
 
Yet, viewing the killing and eating of an animal as a priestly, eschatological action in 
this way is highly problematic.  It seems strange, if not contradictory, to assume that 
participating in additional deaths can be an apposite representation of the Christian belief that in 
Christ’s ultimate sacrifice death itself is conquered.  By giving this much importance and 
significance to the sacrificial element of killing animals, Barth runs the risk of obscuring the 
reality that Christ is really the one in whom we obtain God’s grace and reconciliation.  In the 
“once for all” sacrifice of Christ (Heb. 10:10), the painting of additional animal deaths in the 
language of sacrifice seems largely unnecessary.  The most obvious practice that Christians have 
for remembering and celebrating Christ’s death and resurrection is the Eucharistic celebration.  
Although early Christians included a variety of food items in this celebration, Michael Northcott 
observes that it is what they excluded that is truly remarkable.  “Early Christian worship was 
organized around meals which excluded meant.  It was vegetarian worship.”860  In contrast to 
pagan meal celebrations, the foods consumed in the Christian Eucharistic meal were seen as 
fruits of a restored creation made possible through Christ’s life, death and resurrection.  “In the 
Eucharist, animals are no longer sacrificed or eaten, since sacrificial slaughter has come to an 
                                                
857 Barth, CD III/4, 354. 
858 Ibid., 355. 
859 Ibid. 
860 Northcott, “Eucharistic Eating,” 240. 
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end on the cross of Christ.”861  In his use of sacrificial language, Barth wants to acknowledge the 
gravity and great responsibility with which humans should go about killing animals.  Yet, this is 
already sufficiently noted in his assertions that killing an animal can neither constitute a normal 
element in human thinking nor be justified on grounds of human vanity or perceived need.  
Placing the question of killing animals under the category of Grenzfall rather than sacrificial 
substitution, as I am proposing, is, therefore, both more theologically appropriate and consistent 
with Barth’s overall thought. 
 
Feminist ethicist Carol Adams argues that meat eating in the context of modern, 
industrial farming embodies the opposite of reconciling grace and new life.  “The suffering of 
animals, our sacrificial lambs, does not bring about our redemption but furthers our suffering, 
suffering from preventable diseases related to eating animals, suffering from environmental 
problems, suffering from the inauthenticity that institutional violence promotes.”862  The large-
scale, intensive nature of these farms encourages the spread of disease and thus necessitates a 
high level of antibiotic use.  This unfortunately has resulted in the emergence of antibiotic 
resistant “superbugs” that are capable of crossing the species barrier and fatally infecting 
humans.863  At the beginning of the 21st century the outbreak of Mad Cow Disease, caused by 
feeding naturally herbivorous animals the reprocessed remains of dead livestock in large-scale 
farming operations, resulted in the death of over one hundred humans and over 2.5 million 
animals.864  The more recent deadly outbreak of swine flu has also been associated with 
intensive, factory farming practices.865  Rather than a renewing of creation, these practices also 
further the destruction of the natural environment.  Most of the deforestation in the Amazon, for 
                                                
861 Ibid., 238.  An early vegetarian pamphlet argues along similar lines against the meat intensive 
character of the traditional English Christmas dinner.  “Even the dainty Christmas cards show us 
arrangements of robins sitting on Christmas puddings, slaughtered birds hanging up by their legs, huge 
joints on dishes, and foaming tankards of beer, as though these represented the most appropriate means of 
commemorating the birth of the Prince of Peace.” Ernest Bell, Christmas Cruelties (London: 
Humanitarian League, 1906), 4. 
862 Adams, “Feeding,” 156. 
863 Cóilin Nunan and Richard Young, MRSA in Farm Animals and Meat: A New Threat to Human 
Health (Soil Association, 2007), 5 
http://www.soilassociation.org/Web/SA/saweb.nsf/89d058cc4dbeb16d80256a73005a2866/5cae3a9c3b4da
4b880257305002daadf/$FILE/MRSA%20report.pdf.  
864 Helena Norberg-Hodge, Todd Merrifield, and Steven Gorelick, Bringing the Food Economy 
Home: Local Alternatives to Global Agribusines (London: Zed Books, 2002), 61. 
865 Caroline Lucas, “Swine Flu: Is Intensive Pig Farming to Blame?” The Guardian, April 28, 2009.  
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example, is linked to agriculture, with cattle production identified as a prime causal agent.866  
With regard to factory farming practices, placing a large number of animals in a small space 
means that more manure is produced than the surrounding environment can safely absorb.  Spills 
and leaks from large manure storage facilities have contaminated rivers and aquifers, 
consequently poisoning millions of other creatures that depend on these sources of water for 
life.867   “Despite the obvious animal, ecological and health costs of the industrial meat system,” 
Northcott finds it strange that criticisms of factory farming come more from animal rights 
protestors than dieticians, medics, veterinarians, or virologists.868  We can see from these brief 
examples the relevance of Adams’s criticism.  The killing of animals for food, especially under 
factory farming conditions, brings only increased suffering and death rather than redemption.  
“One cannot feed on grace and eat animals,” she concludes.869 
 
Furthermore, the killing of animals for food is, as many modern scholars have pointed 
out, an inadequate reflection of the Christian eschatological hope.  Clough writes, “In a 
theological perspective, renouncing the unnecessary killing of our fellow creatures becomes a 
small sign of the present and future reality of God’s just and peaceful reign.”870  Christian 
vegetarianism, in this way, represents much more than the “wanton anticipation of what is 
described by Is. 11 and Rom. 8 as existence in the new aeon for which we hope,” as Barth 
describes it.871  By choosing not to take part in unnecessary meat eating, Christians can bear 
witness to the power of Christ’s death and resurrection for us now as well as anticipate our 
eschatological hope for the new aeon.  While vegetarianism as an absolute moral principle may 
run the risk of wanton anticipation, an acceptance of the current status quo preference for meat 
eating is not anticipating enough.  Hauerwas and Berkman write that “Christians must strive to 
live the relationship between human and animal life in terms of the common end being life in the 
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867 Confined animal feeding programs in the US produce about 300 million tons of manure per year – 
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CAFOs Uncovered: The Untold Costs of Confined Animal Feeding Operations (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2008), 2, 14. 
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868 Northcott, “Eucharistic Eating,” 233. 
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peaceable kingdom, the kingdom of God.”872  Christian vegetarianism, thus, becomes a “witness” 
to the world that God’s creation is not intended or destined to be at war with itself.  It is a 
witness to the reality that in Christ “death has been swallowed up in victory” (1 Cor. 15:54b).  
“One person,” claim Hauerwas and Berkman, “who understood the logic of our position, but 
who would not go along with it to its practical conclusion was Karl Barth.”873  Barth admits that 
a Christian protest against meat eating is both understandable and necessary, but he stops short 
of viewing this protest as the normative Christian position.874  As I will demonstrate further 
below, this is not the only time that Barth fails to follow through with the practical conclusions 
of his thought.     
 
“Whatever the biblical vision of the age to come, the Christian vocation is to live that 
vision in the present, to anticipate already the new creation that is not yet fully come.”875  We 
must be careful, however, to qualify this eschatological argument for Christian vegetarianism.  
To say that Christians can choose to not kill for food because of our eschatological hope is not 
the same thing as saying that our vegetarian actions will then result in animal-animal 
vegetarianism.  Nor does it mean that Christians should attempt to end predation in wild nature 
as a sign of the coming kingdom of God.  As we noted in chapter one, humans actively 
participate in the kingdom of God.  We are those creatures from whom God demands a free 
response to God’s Word.  Animals, on the other hand, participate passively.  Thus, while humans 
may take active steps, through the grace of Christ and power of the Holy Spirit, to transform our 
lives to better fit the coming of the kingdom now, animals must wait for the kingdom to be full 
established.  Humans can glimpse and take small steps toward the ‘already’ of the kingdom; 
animals must wait for the ‘not yet.’  
 
We are able to overcome these shortcomings in Barth’s sacrificial description of meat 
eating if we instead place the practice under his concept of Grenzfall.  The killing of animals for 
food can in this way be seen as an extreme case analogous to the other cases for which Barth 
employs the concept, like suicide, abortion, euthanasia, killing in self-defense, capital 
punishment, and war.  I refer presently to four specific ways in which the concepts and language 
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Barth uses to describe the killing of animals for food are similar to those he uses with regard to 
these other cases of killing.  First, Barth describes both human life and animal life as belonging 
ultimately to God.  “For the life of man belongs to Him.  He has granted it to him as a loan.”876  
“Animals and plants do not belong to him; they and the whole earth can belong only to God.”877  
Consequently, humans have no authority on their own to take the life of either another human or 
another animal.  Killing in either case can only be done at the command of God.  Second, the 
normative command of God directs humans toward the preservation rather than destruction of 
life.  “Self-defense and killing in self-defense cannot possibly be the first word but only the tenth 
at the very earliest.”878  “He must never treat this need for defensive and offensive action against 
the animal world as a natural one, or include it as a normal element in his thinking or 
conduct.”879  Simply because killing is possible in the present historical caveat does not mean 
that it should be considered normative in human thinking or relationships.  This is true for our 
relationships with humans and animals.  Speaking of the death of an animal as sacrificial or 
substitutionary, on the other hand, risks understanding it as normative or even necessary.  Third, 
Barth makes a distinction between “homicide” and “murder” with regard to both humans and 
animals.  The Bible, he says, recognizes “homicide (Menschentötung) which is not murder 
(Mord).”880  With regard to suicide, “if a man kills himself without being ordered to do so, then 
his action is murder (Mord). God may forgive him, but it is still murder (Mord).”881   With regard 
to animals, “the nearness of the animal to man irrevocably means that when man kills a beast he 
does something which is at least very similar to homicide (Menschentötung).”882  Because of this 
nearness a similar distinction may be drawn.  If the killing of an animal is done on a person’s 
own authority without the authorization of the command of God, he is “essentially already on the 
way to human-murder (Menschenmord), if he offends in the killing of animals, if he would 
murder (morden) the animal.  He must not murder (morden) the animal.”883  Because life belongs 
to God and the taking of life is not a normal practice for humans, the killing of a human or an 
animal without the authority of the command of God constitutes murder.  Fourth, Barth speaks 
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of both the killing of humans and the killing of animals as “frontier” possibilities. “Perhaps on 
the far frontier (Grenze) of all other possibilities, it may have to happen in obedience to the 
commandment that men must be killed by men.”884  “Those who do not hear the prior command 
to desist have certainly no right to affirm this freedom [of man to slaughter animals] or to cross 
the frontier (Grenze) disclosed at this point.”885  Existing on the far frontier (Grenze) of our 
normal ethical considerations, the killing of animals, analogous to the killing of humans, 
deserves to be categorized as a frontier or extreme case (Grenzfall).  Yet, by introducing the 
concept of substitutionary sacrifice in connection to the killing of animals, Barth fails to follow 
through with the logic of his overall treatment of killing and the exceptional case in CD III/4, § 
55. 
  
6.3c Grenzfall, War, and Vegetarianism 
 
In this subsection I compare Barth’s problematic discussion of the exceptional case of 
killing animals with another case in which his discussion of the Grenzfall is inconsistent with his 
overall definition and use of the concept.  Barth begins his discussion of killing in war by 
describing it as an exceptional case along the lines of his previous examinations of killing in 
abortion, euthanasia, self-defense, and capital punishment.  For example, he writes, “All 
affirmative answers to the question [of war] are wrong if they do not start with the assumption 
that the inflexible negative of pacifism has almost infinite arguments in its favour and is almost 
overpoweringly strong.”886  Similarly, “a first essential is that war should not on any account be 
recognised as a normal, fixed and in some sense necessary part of what the Christian view 
constitutes the just state, or the political order demanded by God.”887  War represents an extreme 
case that can only be taken up at the command of God whose overwhelmingly normative 
position is toward peace rather than war.  Yet, Barth goes on to explicate this exceptional case in 
ways that are in direct opposition to his initial assessment and use of the concept in other 
contexts of killing.  David Clough highlights the oddity in this move by pointing out that 17 of 
the 20 pages on war in CD III/4 emphasize the horror of war and the importance of conscientious 
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objection and building institutions for peace.888  In what follows I want to emphasize two 
significant problems in Barth’s use of the Grenzfall argument with regard to war and then draw 
parallels to the killing of animals for food.  First he sets up foreseeable conditions that, when 
met, will justify going to war.  Second, he says that we can then make present preparations for 
war.   
 
With regard to the first problem, Barth asks when Christians might be commanded by 
God to go to war.  He asserts, “The obvious answer is that there may well be bound up in the 
independent life of a nation responsibility for the whole physical, intellectual and spiritual life of 
the people comprising it, and therefore their relationship to God.”889  The extreme nature of these 
conditions does not obscure the fact that they are still conditions that can be conceived and 
planed for in advance.  This is inconsistent with what we have learned thus far from Barth about 
human nature and the Grenzfall.  One scholar critiques Barth in this regard: “human freedom and 
responsibility is the ability to decide in the midst of the situation what the will of God is for us.  
It is not a decision which we take ahead of time.”890  The Grenzfall is an extreme case precisely 
because it cannot be foreseen.  We do not consider it within the normal frontiers of our ethical 
thought and, therefore, must rely upon the command of God to make us aware of an instance 
when it is not only possible but necessary.  Yoder makes a similar criticism.  He says that to 
designate a case exceptional that can be described in advance and for which plans may be made 
is inconsistent with Barth’s earlier and predominant usage of Grenzfall.  Barth’s use of Grenzfall 
in war forms “a new principle, namely, the principle that there must be an exception to every 
rule.”891  Parallels with the killing of animals for food become immediately apparent.  It is 
possible for us to conceive of certain conditions in which meat eating appears necessary.  For 
example, we may posit that under conditions of poverty or a lack of education humans may 
legitimately kill animals for food.   
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Yoder says that Barth saw only two options for Switzerland during the Second World 
War; “there is the solution of defense against Hitler with the Swiss Army or the solution of 
unconditional cessation of the country’s existence.”892  Yet consistency with Barth’s previous 
use of the Grenzfall argument demands more than this “lesser-evil” line of thinking.  Yoder 
insists that a third option can often be found and that every other solution must be seriously 
attempted before the extreme case can be demanded.  Barth himself previously maintained that 
the Church must exhaust every possible avenue of procuring peace before accepting the 
possibility of war:   
 
It is better in this respect that the Church should stick to its post too long and become a 
forlorn hope than that it should leave it too soon and then have to realise that it has 
become unfaithful by yielding to the general excitement, and that it is thus an accessory 
to an avoidable war which can only be described as mass murder.893 
 
We may similarly apply Yoder’s third option critique to the practice of killing animals.  We do 
not normally have to choose between either eating meat or dying from malnourishment.  
Philosopher and animal ethicist Evelyn Pluhar attempts to put to rest the popular belief that meat 
consumption is an essential dietary requirement for certain human populations. She agues that 
those groups most often cited as requiring animal products for good health (pregnant women, 
infants and children, the elderly) can meet their proper nutritional needs through a balanced 
vegetarian diet.894  Achieving a proper balance is the most important aspect of human diet and 
this does not consist of a simple meat or malnutrition dichotomy.  Furthermore, to assume that a 
lack of dietary education suffices as a sufficient condition for eating meat assumes that a meat-
inclusive diet requires no instruction.895  Because of the health problems associated with an 
overconsumption of meat eating and the toxins and chemicals present in much of the meat 
humans now consume, like growth hormones, antibiotics, and residue pollution in wild animals, 
prudence seems to indicate that a non-vegetarian diet would require much more education. 
 
 If the dietary requirements of these groups prove to be an inadequate condition for meat 
eating it might be argued further that under certain conditions of poverty humans simply cannot 
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afford the cost of a nutritious vegetarian diet.  Yet, even here we must ask whether a third option 
exists.  We must ask why this is so.  The matter is not as simple as equating cheap meat with an 
affordable, nutritious diet and then forcing a choice between being able to afford a nutrient-full 
meal or malnourishment.  We must ask why this conflict between poverty and vegetarianism 
seems to exist.  Until very recently, historically speaking, meat eating was considered an 
expensive luxury.  Only members of the nobility regularly included meat in their meals.  We 
might ask ourselves, therefore, why meat protein has now become more affordable than 
vegetable protein.  What agricultural methods and global economic pressures make the world’s 
poor unable to afford a meatless diet and are these practices sustainable in the long term?  
Philosopher John Lawrence Hill, for example, suggests that a significant reduction in industrial 
scale meat consumption would actually make a vegetarian diet more plentiful and affordable.  
“In short, a move to vegetarianism in the First World would not only lead to lower grain prices 
on a worldwide basis, it would also mean an end to the use of the Third World as giant feedlots 
for the First World, thereby returning the land to those who need it most - the hungry living in 
these countries.”896  The third option in this case could mean working to end the practices of 
large-scale, industrial animal farming, the agricultural remnants of colonialism that have reduced 
poorer nations to mono-crop economies vulnerable to crop blight, the economic factors that 
leave farmers at the mercy of volatile, distant food commodity markets, and the debt that forces 
poorer nations to choose between feeding their own people and exporting food crops to repay 
debts.  Only after Christians have pursued all other options to the point that they have become a 
“forlorn hope” can we be in a position to faithfully hear and obey the command of God to kill 
animals for food in a way that cannot be described as mass murder. 
 
The second problem with Barth’s use of the Grenzfall argument in war comes from his 
assumption that once we know the preconditions for going to war, we should make preparations 
for those condition.  He says that a nation “may and must prepare for [war] even in 
peacetime.”897  Barth also approves of compulsory military service as a way to prevent 
individuals from thinking they can avoid the problem of war by passing it off on those who 
chose to be a part of a volunteer military.898  These recommendations, however, are at odds with 
Barth’s earlier assertion that Christian faith and ethics requires the Church to tell nations that 
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“peace is the real emergency to which all our time, powers and ability must be devoted from the 
very outset.”899  Along these lines we can agree with Barth’s insistence of the good in 
compelling individuals to make a decision with regard to the problem of war, yet still question 
whether military conscription represents the best way to force this choice.  Why, we may ask, 
must we be trained to do what should not normatively be done?  A state could instead train its 
citizens to do what it is actually supposed to be doing in the first place, rather than preparing 
them for the exceptional case.  Compulsory diplomatic or humanitarian aid service would seem 
more appropriate if peace, rather than war, truly represents the emergency to which all our time, 
powers and ability must be devoted.  Clough notes that making preparations for war represents 
the exact opposite of Barth’s recommendations for self-defense.  “Barth does not follow this path 
in the case of killing in self-defence because it is so obviously counterproductive.”900  Spending 
time in deadly self-defense training and always carrying a firearm in preparation for the extreme 
case, Clough asserts, makes it difficult if not impossible to retain a commitment to peace.   
 
We again find obvious parallels with the killing of animals for food.  To keep and raise 
animals for the sole purpose of killing them for food makes it very difficult to retain a 
commitment to living peaceably with them.  Keeping an animal for food ‘just in case’ we might 
receive the divine command to slaughter obscures our ability to hear the divine command to 
protect life as normative.  “Careful preparation for the exceptional case guarantees that it will be 
unexceptional,” Clough remarks.901   Yoder makes a similar criticism: “If the church as a matter 
of habit tolerates the use of force and planning for warfare on the part of the state, then she will 
not even know when the exceptional time has come when it would be justified for her to say a 
Christian ‘yes.’”902  Furthermore, Yoder writes, “even if the justified war is thought of as the 
extreme exception, to prepare for war demands a solid institution.”903  The same holds true with 
regard to modern meat eating.  To keep animals in preparation for slaughter requires solid 
institutions.  From farming land for grain, to feedlots, to slaughterhouses, to advertising 
agencies, the modern, industrial meat industry commandeers an extensive amount of resources.  
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Similar to preparations for war, keeping animals for food requires putting more effort into 
preparing for the extreme case than trying to avoid it.904  
 
In the end, the question that Christians are faced with in regard to the killing of animals 
for food is this: ‘What is the normative command of God for human relationships with other 
animals?’  If, as I have argued, we place this killing under the category of Grenzfall in an 
analogous way to other forms of killing, then the vegetarian meal becomes more than a radical 
protest or wanton anticipation for Christians.  It becomes the normative dietary practice.  Yoder 
claims, “To say that the state should be constantly prepared for war is like saying an honest man 
should always be prepared for lying or a faithful husband for divorce; it confuses an extreme 
eventuality with normality.”905  Christian eating is no different.  An example of this confusion 
can be found by surveying the menus of various church-run cafés.  A recent survey of these cafés 
in Britain showed that while many are restricted to serving coffee, tea, and desserts, several also 
include light meals.  These meals inevitably include meat, although some cafés also include 
vegetarian options.  For example, the Open House Coffee Shop in Bath offers both meat and 
vegetarian dishes of the day; the Gap Café in Kent serves beef, lamb, and ham; and the Manna 
Café in London serves pancakes with bacon.906  Yet, providing a vegetarian meal as an option or 
alternative is precisely the problem.  It confuses an extreme possibility with normality.   
 
Carol Adams has made a similar argument with regard to the food served at feminist 
conferences and much of what she has to say applies to our present discussion of Christian eating 
practices.  “Feminist conference organizers often think they are assuming a neutral role in the 
debate about the consumption of animals by offering a vegetarian option that can be adopted 
personally if desired.”907  This is comparable to Barth’s support of military conscription.  
Forcing individuals to choose not to participate in military preparedness or meat eating 
constitutes an inversion of the proper Grenzfall argument.  The proper order of choice should be 
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choosing to step outside of the normal frontiers of our ethical thought and practice into the 
extreme case.  The vegetarian option, however, reverses this order and “presumes corpse eating 
as normative.”908  Commenting on Adams, Rachel Muers writes, “Understanding vegetarianism 
as a restriction, particularly in the context of also calling it a choice, leaves in place the systems 
(ideological and cultural, as well as social and economic) that make meat part of the ‘normal,’ 
full and complete human diet.”909  Treating vegetarianism as a restriction makes peaceable 
relationships, rather than violence and death, the exceptional case.  By treating it as an option or 
choice we usurp God’s place as the Giver and Lord of all life. 
 
 Moreover, Adams asserts that the individual vegetarian option “is inadequate because it 
perpetuates the idea that what we eat and what we do to animals . . . are solely personal 
concerns.”910  As we have already noted, neither preparation for war nor food production are 
individual endeavors.  Both require solid institutions.  Grumett and Muers argue that because of 
the social, economic, and political impact of eating practices “the assumption needs to be 
challenged that, in choices about food, individual choice is sovereign.”911  The corporate nature 
of diet is particularly relevant for Christians.  We alluded to this earlier in our discussion of a 
vegetarian Eucharist as the most appropriate witness to Christ’s death and resurrection.  
Furthermore, Paul often describes the Church as the body of Christ (Rom. 12:4-5; 1 Cor. 12:12-
26; Eph. 5:30; Col. 1:18).  The corporate nature of these extreme cases (war and killing animals 
for food) means that it is the duty of the Church as a body, rather than as individuals, to “stick to 
its post” in favor of the normative command of God for peace.  Theologian Stephen Webb has 
written forcefully in favor of moral vegetarianism; yet, his final conclusion that vegetarianism 
represents only “one part of a wide range of dietary options”912 available to Christians betrays a 
failure to fully appreciate the corporate nature of diet.  Webb rightly observes that vegetarianism 
is not an exclusively Christian practice, but he also writes in places as if it is a secular practice 
that individual Christians can simply appropriate.913  While I do not want to argue that only 
Christians can be vegetarian, I do believe it is a fundamental mistake to talk about vegetarianism 
as a practice that Christians simply appropriate from other religions or secular society.  To speak 
                                                
908 Ibid. 
909 Muers, “Seeing, Choosing, Eating,” 187. 
910 Adams, Man nor Beast, 126. 
911 David Grumett and Rachel Muers, Theology on the Menu: Asceticism, Meat and Christian Diet 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 128. 
912 Webb, Good Eating, 220. 
913 Ibid., 218. 
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in this way assumes that vegetarianism is not normative for Christians.  Vegetarianism, 
therefore, is not simply an individual life style choice that individual Christians adopt as a protest 
against factory farming conditions or the social inequalities inherent in meat eating.  
Vegetarianism is rather the norm for the Church as a whole, for which meat eating represents a 
rare and tragic possibility.  That non-Christians also observe meatless diets has nothing to do 
with its normative function for Christians.  In spite of what he has to say about the importance of 
the Eucharist and Christian community, Webb ultimately turns vegetarianism into a private, 
deviation appropriate only for the spiritual elite.  “Heroes and saints lead the way and beckon us 
to follow by setting an example that is beyond our ordinary practices but not outside our moral 
reach.  Vegetarianism should be seen in the same light. . . . Not everyone can be a hero.”914  
Ironically, in his effort to veer away from the elitist mentality he has encountered among 
vegetarians, Webb’s acceptance of meat eating as the normative practice for Christians makes 
Christian vegetarianism itself elitist.  I agree with Webb that Christians should not be quick to 
condemn those who eat meat, but neither should we be overly apologetic for rejecting the killing 
of animals for food as a legitimate expression of our faith in the saving power of Christ’s 
incarnation, death, and resurrection.  Rather than seeing vegetarianism as an aberrant practice 
that only a few are called to, I have argued that meat eating represents the truly extreme case.  
By placing the killing of animals, like other forms of killing, under the category of Grenzfall the 
Church is forced to reconsider what it considers normative for human relationships with other 




 In this chapter we considered an argument for Christian vegetarianism that places it 
within the context of Karl Barth’s larger discussion of Grenzfall and the respect for life.  We 
began with a consideration of the potential difficulties inherent in making a biblical or Christian 
case for vegetarianism.  Rather than simply asking what Biblical characters ate and copying their 
actions, we found that a consideration of the overall thrust of the Biblical narrative toward 
peaceable relationships with animals provided a more fruitful way forward.  We then reflected 
on the problem of killing animals in the context of human freedom and responsibility.  Following 
Barth we determined that even though humans and animals share a common physical, creaturely 
                                                
914 Ibid., 227. 
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existence, human life and morality is not solely determined by biology.  Rather Christian ethics 
is founded on human responsibility before the command of God.  This led us to disagree with the 
environmental philosophy of Holmes Rolston and others that human hunting is equivalent to 
animal predation.  Rolston writes, “The hunter’s success is not conquest but submission to the 
ecology.  It is an acceptance of the way the world is made.”915  Christian ethics, however is not a 
submission to the present reality of the world, but a submission to the command of God for 
human lives in the midst of the present reality of the world.  Violence and killing are realities 
that characterize the historical caveat in which humans and other creatures presently live, but 
they do not constitute the original purpose or goal of God’s creation.  As Hauerwas and Berkman 
significantly observe, ‘nature’ and ‘creation’ do not refer to the same world.   
 
In light of this understanding we moved finally to see the human killing of animals for 
food as an extreme case that exists only on the frontiers of normal human ethical thinking.  We 
found this concept to be more appropriate than Barth’s introduction of sacrificial, substitutionary 
elements into the discussion of meat eating.   Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection render 
animal sacrifices an excessive concession to human sin and the present historical caveat.  We 
observed that a non-violent relationship with other animals serves as a much greater 
eschatological witness.  The vegetarian meal in this way represents “one concrete way for 
Christians to experience and practice God’s grace”916 and a “small and humble witness to the 
inbreaking of God’s reign of peace.”917  Categorizing the killing of animals as Grenzfall, we then 
observed similarities with Barth’s problematic use of Grenzfall for killing in war.  For the 
extreme case argument to be consistent in both instances, we can neither postulate foreseeable 
conditions that would justify going to war or eating meat nor make present preparations for these 
extreme cases.  These two cautions mark the most significant difference between our own 
position and that of Hauerwas and Berkman.  We can agree with them in their comparison of 
vegetarianism and pacifism up to the point where they conclude that killing animals for food is 
comparable to Christian just war theory.  “Christian just war theory is most appropriately 
understood as a theory of exceptions, exceptions for allowing Christians to engage in limited 
forms of violence in order to protect the neighbor. Analogously, those Christians who cannot 
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abstain entirely from eating animals need to develop similar criteria of ‘just’ meat-eating.”918  In 
both proposals, nonviolence and vegetarianism are considered the normal state of human 
relationships while war and meat eating represent exceptional or frontier possibilities.  Just war 
theory, however, insists that going to war can be justified if certain predetermined conditions are 
met.919  Emphasizing the divine ownership of all life, the Grenzfall argument maintains that only 
the command of God can specify when life may be protected “even in the strange form of its 
conclusion and termination.”920  Humans as finite creatures cannot make this decision 
themselves.  Thus, in contrast to a criterion of ‘just meat eating,’ Grenzfall meat eating cannot 
anticipate conditions in advance where the killing of animals will be justified.  Furthermore, 
because we cannot foresee this extreme case, we also cannot make preparations for it. 
Continuing to raise large numbers of domestic animals for the purpose of killing them for food 
as a preparation for the possibility of the extreme case, therefore, becomes ethically (and 
economically) problematic. 
 
 It is also problematic in terms of viewing animals as potential neighbors.  The vegetarian 
Grenzfall argument I have expounded in this chapter is consistent with my larger account of 
human-animal relationships viewed in light of the Christian love ethic as expressed in the 
parable of the Good Samaritan.  It seems inappropriate to associate the killing of animals, whom 
we saw from chapter one are best described as amoral agents, with the substitutionary sacrifices 
for human sin.  Created in the image of God it is human creatures that are responsible for their 
relationships with others.  The divine Word as incarnated in the human Jesus Christ is, thus, able 
to serve as an “innocent” sacrifice for human sin in a way that another animal is not.  
Furthermore, in chapters two and three we saw that just as the Samaritan in the parable was 
moved with pity to care for the fallen traveler (Luke 10:33), our common dependent and 
emotional natures provide grounds for establishing meaningful caring relationships between 
humans and other animals.  To view the killing of animals for food as normative, however, 
                                                
918 Hauerwas and Berkman, “Chief End,” 208. 
 919 Common just war criteria for the jus ad bellum, the right to go to war, include: “legitimate or 
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Priorities, and Functions of their Criteria,” Theological Studies 39, no. 3 (1978): 428.  See for example 
Paul Ramsey’s discussion of “just cause,” “just conduct,” and “proportionate grave reason,” or weighing 
the balance of the good and evil effects of a proposed war, in his The Just War: Force and Political 
Responsibility (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 1968). 
 920 Barth, CD III/4, 398. 
 224 
requires a degree of emotional detachment from those animals designated for slaughter.921  
Moreover, the intentional raising of animals for slaughter is inconsistent with certain insights we 
gained from looking at feminist caring ethics.  For care ethicists, upright moral action involves 
entering into relationships with the intent of promoting and growing the relationship rather than 
purposefully ending it for personal benefit.922  This does not mean, however, that humans may 
never make material or economic use of those animals that they are in caring relationships with.  
As we saw in chapter four, human relationships with animals vary according the degree of 
nearness enjoyed between the two parties.  For domestic working animals in particular, this 
nearness is constituted by a historic working partnership between human and animal in ways that 
acknowledge both species’ unique abilities and contributions to a given task.  As Val Plumwood 
writes, “We cannot give up using one another, but we can give up use/respect dualism, which 
means working towards ethical, respectful and highly constrained forms of use.”923  Finally as 
we saw in chapter five, both humans and other animals are classified in the bible as nephesh 
chayah so that human dominion over animals must be distinguished from human subduing of the 
earth.  The blood prohibition of Gen. 9 shows us that killing another “living being” is always a 
more dangerous endeavor than the destruction of plant food for human sustenance.  When each 
of these themes is taken together we are provided a compelling picture of other animals as 
potential neighbors to whom Christian neighborly love is due.  
                                                
921 See Appendix 4 on naming animals. “Whether they are to be found on family farms or in factory 
farms, the advice is the same: Do not give animals to be eaten by human beings any names that bestow 
individuality.” Adams, “Feeding,” 147.    
922 Palmer notes that this is particularly relevant for human relationships with domestic animals: “If 
animals are fed and looked after by humans, a relationships of trust is forged.  The slaughter of such 
animals is surely a breach of trust, which seems out of place in an ethical system based on relationship and 
community.”  Palmer, Animal Liberation, 22. 





1. Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37 NRSV) 
 
Just then a lawyer stood up to test Jesus. “Teacher,” he said, “what must I do to inherit 
eternal life?” 26He said to him, “What is written in the law? What do you read there?” 27He 
answered, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and 
with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbour as yourself.” 28And he said to 
him, “You have given the right answer; do this, and you will live.” 29But wanting to justify 
himself, he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?” 30Jesus replied, “A man was going down 
from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers, who stripped him, beat him, and 
went away, leaving him half dead. 31Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and 
when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. 32So likewise a Levite, when he came to the 
place and saw him, passed by on the other side. 33But a Samaritan while travelling came near 
him; and when he saw him, he was moved with pity. 34He went to him and bandaged his wounds, 
having poured oil and wine on them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, 
and took care of him. 35The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and 
said, ‘Take care of him; and when I come back, I will repay you whatever more you spend.’ 
36Which of these three, do you think, was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of the 
robbers?” 37He said, “The one who showed him mercy.” Jesus said to him, “Go and do 
likewise.”  
2. Interpreting the Image of God 
 
Interpretations of the imago Dei have fallen largely into two camps – substantial and 
relational.  In using these descriptions I am following Paul Ramsey’s terminology.924  Ramsey 
explains: “One view singles out something within the substantial form of human nature, some 
faculty or capacity man possesses,” and identifies this as the image of God – “that thing which 
distinguishes man from physical nature and from other animals.”925  The second, relational 
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approach assumes that “nothing within the make-up of man, considered by himself apart from a 
present responsive relationship to God, has the form or power of being in the image of God.”926  
Once the dominant interpretation, the first position has fallen prey to modern advances in 
scientific knowledge of the natural world.  Increasing awareness of the physiological and 
evolutionary continuity between humans and other animals has resulted in the substantialist 
approach appearing less and less valid.  On the other hand, the relational approach, at least as 
proposed by Emil Brunner, represents a clear reaction against the scientific incompatibility of 
substantialism.927  By identifying the imago Dei as ontological relatedness, the relational 
approach is able to uphold human uniqueness while avoiding the risk of becoming scientifically 
untenable.  Yet, this approach is not simply an attempt to conform theology to modern science; it 
holds significant theological merit on its own right.  According to the relational approach, 
humans cannot be thought of as separate entities that can be examined on their own.  Humans 
only exist as human in their relationships to God and others.  With respect to nonhuman animals, 
the substantialist approach erects a barrier between humans and other animals.  It defines 
humans by their distinction from animals.  Locating the imago Dei in human responsible 
relationships, on the other hand, draws humans closer to other animals.  Humans, in this way are 
defined not by the physiological or intellectual traits that separate them from animals, but by the 
responsibility they have for being in relationship with other animals.  
 
Forcing human uniqueness to depend on our differing capacities from animals is 
problematic in two ways.  First, “the actual trait that sets humans apart - the x that only humans 
have - varies for different thinkers, times, and cultures.”928  Along these lines, Douglas John Hall 
observes that throughout the history of theology, “there has been a conspicuous tendency to 
indentify the ‘gifts’ (‘characteristics,’ ‘traits,’ etc.) that the imago is thought to stand for with 
values embraced by the particular cultures within which the theologians were doing their 
work.”929  Gregory of Nyssa, for example, saw humanity’s ability to contemplate heaven in our 
unique upright stance.  The early Christian writer, Nemesius, similarly wrote that animals, 
                                                
926 Ibid., 254. 
927 Brunner’s argument in Man in Revolt, 18.3, “Man and the Animals,” attempts to take into account 
modern scientific knowledge of the world.  
928 Anna L. Peterson, Being Human: Ethics, Environment, and Our Place in the World (Berkeley, CA: 
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929 Hall, Imaging God, 91. 
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“whose attitude bent down to the earth indicates that they are slaves.”930  The human capacity for 
reason, however, holds primary position as that unique ability most commonly cited to 
distinguish humans from other animals.931  Ramsey traces this tendency to the influence of 
Aristotle’s definition of the human soul as rational.932  “Christians who follow in Aristotle’s train 
simply make use of the religious label, the imago Dei, for everything he intended to say.”933  
This Aristotelian tendency, however, predates Christian interpretations of the Genesis text.  Old 
Testament scholar James Barr, for example, notes that the inclination to interpret the image of 
God in humanity’s reason or immortal soul was already present in the Wisdom of Solomon 
(2:23).934  Similarly, for the ancient Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, the image of God 
referred to the human endowment of reason.935  Brunner cites Irenaeus as the first Christian 
writer to equate the image with human reason.  Irenaeus separated the image, which remained in 
humans, from the likeness, which was lost in the Fall.936  Brunner claims that in doing so 
Irenaeus outlined “the path the Church was to follow for nearly fifteen hundred years, and his 
solution is still that of the Catholic Church.”937  As a modern example, Catholic theologian 
Robert Spaemann, has argued that “reason is the one human capacity” separating humans from 
other animals.938   
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We must confess that a similar charge of historical relativism, at least to some extent, 
can be laid against the relational approach.  I-Thou theology was popular among many different 
theological circles, both Christian and Jewish, during the time when Brunner and Barth were 
writing.  Along these lines, J.R. Middleton claims that Barth’s “proposals are clearly 
conditioned, on the one hand, by Buberian, ‘existential’ I-Thou ontology, which predisposes him 
to read the image as (personal) relationship and, on the other hand, by his opposition to the 
appeal to nature in the German National Socialism of his day, leading to a resolute attempt to 
prevent any possible autonomous interpretation of the human condition.”939  The relational 
approach, however, distinguishes itself from previous attempts by explicitly beginning its search 
for a definition of humanity outside of the human being herself.  Robert Willis observes that the 
danger in beginning one’s theological anthropology  
 
from the side of the general human, aside from the fact that it involves an obvious 
ignoring of the christological point, is that it gives at best a partial, and therefore 
distorted, notion of man, and (more importantly) that it can lead to the emergence of 
rigid, inflexible interpretations that end by asserting and imposing conclusive ideologies 
within the context of human self-understanding.940 
 
Along these lines, the substantialist approach interprets human nature through the lens of a 
single, seemingly unique human capacity that one’s culture particularly prizes, such as tool use, 
language use, or reason.  In doing so it also creates a rigid boundary between humans and other 
animals.  The relational view of imago Dei avoids this danger by insisting that a human’s being 
is constituted by her relationships to God and others rather than something she, herself, 
possesses.  The various human capacities that substantialism would exemplify, according to the 
relational approach, exist solely for the sake of connecting, rather than distancing, the individual 
human to others.941  Substanialism, on the other hand, begins by looking at the human and 
therefore stands in particular danger of simply reflecting current historical, cultural trends. 
Locating human uniqueness in capacities that are categorically distinct from those in 
animals is problematic, secondly, because modern scientific study, as we have seen, increasingly 
                                                
939 Middleton, Liberating Image, 23-24. 
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blurs the line between human and animal capacities.942  Humans, for example, are not the only 
animals to walk upright.  De Waal observes that “when standing or walking upright – which the 
bonobo often does, especially when carrying food – the bonobo’s back seems to straighten better 
than that of the other apes, giving it a strikingly humanlike posture.”943  Jane Goodall’s 
observation of tool making in the wild chimpanzees of Gombi shattered the once popular notion 
of “Man the Tool Maker.”944  Wolfgang Köhler had reported tool making by apes in captivity 
even earlier in 1914.945  Because he does not base his understanding of the imago Dei in human 
capacities, Brunner finds no difficulty in asserting a biological, evolutionary continuity between 
humans and animals.  “We may assign to the animal a minimum amount of a certain kind of 
civilization, especially technical, the use of the artificial tools for the satisfaction of biologically 
existing needs,” Brunner claims.  “To be faber, ‘tool-user,’ is not the exclusive privilege of 
man.”946  Poking fun at this substantialist tendency to draw boundaries based on superior 
capacities, preacher and former priest Barbara Brown Taylor muses that if birds had written a 
creation story, they might have picked out wings, the ability to fly, as that special capability that 
marks them off as created in the image of God.  “Flying squirrels were pretty advanced, . . . but 
people – well.  It was really kind of pitiful watching them try – jumping off rocks, flapping their 
arms.”947      
 
In Augustine, however, we find early “intimations” of the relational interpretation of 
imago Dei.948  Augustine still locates the image of God in human intellect.949  Yet, he believes 
that these intellectual faculties cannot be viewed entirely in absence of their relation to God.  For 
Augustine, Ramsey notes, “being in the image of God requires not only unique intellectual 
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powers but correct posture; . . . it consists of the spirit of obedience.”950  Augustine writes, “For 
the true honor of man is in the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in 
relation to him by whom it is impressed.”951  In this way, Augustine locates the imago Dei in 
human intellectual capacities, but finds it lacking full expression outside of a human relationship 
with God.  Yet, a decisive break with the substantialist tradition did not occur until the 
emergence of the Reformers of the sixteenth century, most notably Martin Luther.952  It was not 
until Luther, Brunner asserts, that Irenaeus’s doctrine of the imago and the similitude, that “two-
storied edifice” (Zweistockwerkbau), was finally shaken.953  Luther’s emphasis on “salvation by 
faith alone” led him to reject any human capacity that might in itself lead sinful humanity to 
God.954  For this reason, Luther regarded the image “as entirely determined by man’s response to 
God.”955  It is then within the legacy of the Reformation that Brunner and Barth see their own 
expositions of the imago Dei developing.      
 
3. Interpreting Dominion 
 
In his controversial 1967 article, Lynn White, Jr. places the blame for Western societies’ 
historic and current exploitation of the natural environment on the dominion mandate of Gen. 
1:26-28.  The biblical creation story, he claims, defines humans as “superior to nature, 
contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim.”956  Dominion, in this sense, is taken 
to denote a free reign of exploitation by superior humans toward inferior nature.  White’s 
criticism, however, is actually a critique of how the Genesis dominion mandate has been 
interpreted in late medieval and modern Western cultures than an analysis of the text itself.  
Scottish biblical scholar, James Barr, critiques White along these lines when he writes that “even 
if the original sense . . . laid little stress upon exploitation, nevertheless the general effect of the 
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passage in the history of ideas has been one which encouraged ideas of human force and 
exploitation.”957  I have argued in chapter five for a non-exploitative view of dominion in light of 
the responsible relationship humans have for their animal neighbors.  In this appendix section I 
show that the actual career of this text in Christian thought and practice represents a far more 
complex picture than White’s short article implies.958  
 
When Christians first interpreted the dominion text they did not immediately assume that 
the most important meaning of the text referred to human relationships with animals at all, much 
less a freedom to exploit animals at our slightest whim, as White assumes.  As Cohen 
demonstrates, early interpretations of this text rarely, if ever, construed this verse as a license for 
selfish exploitation of the nonhuman environment.  Patristic and medieval theologians showed 
far more interest in Gen. 1:28’s call for sexual reproduction than in the question of human 
dominion.959  During the patristic period, the force of the injunction to “have dominion” was also 
directed to teachings concerned with bringing humans’ rebellious, carnal impulses under the 
control of reason.960  Many interpreters read this text allegorically by internalizing the idea of 
dominion and directing it toward the faculties of the human soul.  Origen, for example, 
interpreted the animals that humans were given dominion over as inward fleshly desires to be 
conquered by the spirit.961  Many of the Greek Fathers also upheld a belief in the human mastery 
over other animals and the natural environment, even if their ethical interests were captivated 
primarily by the possibility of a spiritual or rational mastery over physical passions.  Both 
Clement of Alexandria and John Chrysostom included these two levels of dominion in their 
readings of Gen. 1:26-28.962  Patristic interpreters in the Latin West also exhibited an affinity for 
allegorical interpretation of this text.  Jerome identified various categories of beasts within the 
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962 Ibid.  For example, Chrysostom writes in his Homilies 8.9 and 8.14: “God created the human being 
as having control of everything on earth. . . . Abstinence from food, after all, is undertaken for this 
purpose, to curb the exuberance of the flesh and bring the beast under control.”  John Chrysostom, 
Homilies on Genesis 1-17 in The Fathers of the Church, trans. Robert C. Hill (Washington D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 110, 113. 
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“irascible and concupiscible passions.”963  In his Confessions, Augustine offers an allegorical 
interpretation of dominion to mean the power by which “a person endowed with the Spirit . . . 
exercises judgment by approving what he finds proper and rebuking what he finds amiss in the 
activities and conduct of the faithful.”964  This kind of interpretation largely continued into the 
early middle ages as well.  Thus, while the ancients and medievals participated, to be sure, in the 
subjugation of animals and the natural environment, these actions may be attributed, for the most 
part, to pragmatic rather than ideological concerns.965 
 
 More contemporary reflection has largely abandoned this allegorical approach and 
instead emphasized human dominion as a uniquely human relationship to other animals.  This 
relationship is connected to the idea of imago Dei and is, thus, of particular relevance to my 
discussions in chapters one and five.  The correlation between being made in the image of God 
and being given dominion was noted, even if not largely expounded on, by early Christian 
interpreters such as Tertullian, Basil, and Chrysostom.966  Some modern scholars have, however, 
been tempted to equate the two in such a way that humanity’s dominion over animals is the 
imago.  As such, David Asselin writes, “Man does not rule over the animal kingdom because he 
is God's image: rather, he is God's image precisely because he rules over the animal kingdom, 
thus sharing God's universal dominion.”967  Similarly, though slightly more cautious, J. 
Middleton understands dominion as “virtually constitutive of the image.”968  Yet, such a reading, 
I contend, misunderstands the true relationship between humanity’s being created in the image of 
God and being given dominion.  Dominion is not equivalent to the image; it is derivative of the 
image.  In Genesis 1 dominion (rādâ) is a verb, not a noun.  Therefore, dominion consists of an 
action that humans perform rather than the idea that “dominion points to the ontological 
foundation for the human superiority over nature.”969 
 
                                                
963 Harrison, “Subduing,” 91. 
964 Augustine, Confessions 13.21.  Commendable practices include almsgiving, gentleness, chastity, 
and fasting. 
965 Harrison, “Subduing,” 96. 
966 Jobling, “‘And Have Dominion,”102-03. 
967 David T. Asselin, “Notion of Dominion in Genesis 1-3,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 16, no. 3 
(1954): 283. 
968 Middleton, Liberating Image, 55. 
969 Steffen, “Defense of Dominion,” 68. 
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The majority of modern interpreters fall within this derivative camp.970  In opposition to 
an equivalence interpretation, Biblical scholar James Barr writes, “There is of course a 
connection between the image and the dominion . . . [but] it is likely rather to be a consequential 
relation: since man is the image of God, let him have dominion.”971  Dominion, as a consequence 
of being created in the image of God, refers to “that which man is capable because of it,” von 
Rad maintains.972  The image, in other words, qualifies humanity to have dominion.973  Old 
Testament professor, W. Towner, proposes that Gen. 1:26 might correctly read “so that they may 
have dominion…”974  Along these lines, theologian David Cairns, suggests that “without the 
image, the dominion would never have been given.”975  Similarly, Karl Barth, who along with 
Emil Brunner greatly influenced Cairns’s thinking, rejects an equivalent correspondence 
between imago Dei and dominion.  Rather, “it is the consequence of their divine likeness that 
men are distinguished from all other creatures . . . by a superior position.”976  Thus we have 
identified two ways in which the image of God can be misidentified.  The first, the focus of 
chapter one, locates the image in specific human capacities like reason.  The second, reviewed 
above, identifies the image with the command to have dominion.  Both of these represent 
examples of confusing the image with its effects.  The imago Dei expresses the human summons 
to responsible relationship with God and others.  Human capacities aid in the enactment of this 
summons and dominion represents the consequent disposition that this summons effects on 
human relationships with nonhuman animals.  Dominion, in this way, “identifies not an 
anthropology of human superiority, but a mode of activity that manifests a particular 
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4. Naming the Animals 
 
 In the Yahwist account of Gen. 2 we find a different articulation of human dominion 
over animals than that expressed in the later Priestly account of Gen. 1.  Westermann writes that 
“P says this in a more abstract way, namely that the creator has appointed man to be the master 
of the animals, 1:26, 28; J tells how this came about.”978  In Gen. 2:18-20 God sees that Adam, 
the first and presumably only living creature, is alone.  God deems this isolated state of existence 
“not good” and consequently creates land and air animals out of the ground as potential partners 
for Adam, who is also created out of the ground (adamah).  So “the man gave names to all cattle, 
and to the birds of the air, and to every animal of the field; but for the man there was not found a 
helper as his partner” (Gen. 2:20).  Although naming in the Old Testament could signify the 
despotic power of a dominant nation or ruler over its conquered foes, this is not the connotation 
intended in Gen. 2.  For example in 2 Kg. 24:17, after Nebuchadnezzer defeated Jerusalem, he 
appointed Mattaniah king of the city and renamed him Zedekiah.   Nebuchadnezzer raided the 
Jerusalem Temple and later slaughtered Mattaniah’s children, put out his eyes, and led him in 
chains through Babylon.  Roger Nash contrasts Nebuchadnezzer’s naming of Mattaniah with 
Adam’s naming of the animals.  Where as Adam names what had been unnamed before, the king 
of Babylon renames his conquered enemy in an expression of his sovereignty.  “This makes 
Adam’s naming more like that of parents naming a newborn child. Then, just as a parent has 
responsibilities to care for the child, so there will be moral constraints on Adam’s use of animals, 
and the expectation of a kind of love.”979  Thus, far from exploitative control over, Adam’s 
naming in Gen. 2 connotes a unique relationship with and responsibility for the animals.  This is 
particularly clear given the reason the text provides for the animals’ creation – because God saw 
“it is not good for man to be alone” (Gen. 2:18)        
 
 Commenting on these verses Dietrich Bonheoffer concludes,  
 
As far as I know, nowhere else in the history of religions have animals been spoken of in 
terms of such significant relation.  At the point where God wishes to create for the 
                                                
978 Westermann, Genesis: A Commentary, 28. 
979 Roger Nash, “Adam’s Place in Nature: Respect of Domination?” Journal of Agricultural Ethics 3, 
no. 2 (1990): 105. 
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human being, in the form of another creature, the help that God is as God - this is where 
the animals are first created and named and set in place.980   
 
Elsewhere in the bible, he explains, God alone is the partner and helper of humans.  Yet, 
perhaps, these other creatures created from the ground, “these “brothers” as Bonheoffer calls 
them, can serve as suitable creaturely companions for Adam.981  That they ultimately do not 
prompts Adam’s first occasion of pain and sorrow, Bonheoffer claims.  Adam later discovers a 
more complete partner in Eve, the female human – “bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh.” 
(2:23).982  The story, however, passes no judgment on this fact.983  Human partnership with 
animals is not viewed as negative, or a failure; it is simply incomplete.  Once Adam finds Eve, 
he does not discard his former animal companions.  They still represent a unique relationship to 
which Adam has entered into by naming them.  The naming episode in Gen. 2 demonstrates both 
the importance and limitations of humanity’s relationship with other animals.984  The animals are 
distinguished in this way from the vegetation that serves as humanity’s food.  Rabbi Umberto 
Cassuto notes that “man had not the right to name everything that had been created, but only . . . 
the living beings, over which he was granted dominion, that is, every living creature.”985  
Westermann makes a similar observation on this point: “Names are given primarily to living 
beings because they stand closest to men: what is originally named is not what exists, but what is 
encountered.”986  These two quotations have particular resonance with the main arguments I have 
drawn out in chapters three and five.   
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Bonhoeffer Works, Vol 3, ed. Martiin Rüter and Ilse Tödt, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2004), 97. 
981 “diesen Brüdern.”  He later refers to the “brotherly world of animals” (die brüderliche Welt der 
Tiere) that, like humans, had also been created from the ground.   Dietrich Bonheoffer, Schöpfung und 
Fall (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1989), 90. 
982 This is a point of particular importance for Barth.  One commentator notes that for Barth, “the 
divine Word initiates the provision of a helpmeet or partner who can be freely hailed as such.  The animals 
do not fulfill the need and their naming brings this to light.” Geoffrey W. Bromiley, An Introduction to the 
Theology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1979), 116. 
983 Carol A. Newsom, “Common Ground: An Ecological Reading of Genesis 2-3,” in The Earth Story 
in Genesis, ed. Norman C. Habel and Shirly Wurst (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 66. 
984 Webb also notes the unique fellowship these verses imply between humans and other animals.  
Webb, God and Dogs, 20. 
985 Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis: Part 1, From Adam to Noah, trans., 
Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1961), 131.  Cassuto’s arguments against the Documentary 
Hypothesis lay beyond the scope of this thesis.  They do not, however, greatly affect my current argument.  
The above quoted passage still proves a significant observation of humanity’s unique relationship with 
animals in Genesis. 
986 Westermann, Creation, 85. 
 236 
 
Westermann asserts that, by naming the animals, Adam does not acquire power over 
them, but places them in his world; he “incorporates them into his life.”987  The naming 
establishes them as companions, if not the kind of equal partner that he finds in woman.  Yet, 
many of the relationships humans have with other animals typify exploitative or subject-object 
relationships rather than the kind of love and responsibility that should characterize a community 
of other living beings created because God saw that it was not good for humanity to be alone.  
We can describe these exploitative relationships as the false or misnaming of animals.  This is 
particularly dangerous because of the ease in which we are able to falsely name animals.  
William C. French writes, “Animals are very easy to name falsely because they are unable to 
protest the names we give them.”988  He notes that Kant misnamed animals when he described 
them as merely nonrational things.  Another tradition, with its roots in Cartesian philosophy, 
misnames animals as machines or automata.  I observed in chapter five a tendency of lumping 
together, and thus misnaming, animals with plants and other inanimate natural phenomena in 
stewardship and environmental ethics.  Each of these misnamings obscures the commonalities 
between humans and other animals as fellow relational, emotional, living creatures.   
 
Tragically, false naming continues to plague many of our modern relationships with 
animals.  “In agribusiness terms, farm animals are disguised as being-less ‘objects’ by innocuous 
phrases such as ‘livestock,’ ‘protein harvester,’ ‘converting machines,’ ‘crops,’ and 
‘biomachines.’”989  Such naming reduces animals to things or commodities, denying them their 
true status as companions to humanity.  Carol Adams takes particular issue with the naming of 
animals as “meat.”  She describes “meat” as a “mass term.”  “Objects referred to by mass terms 
have no individuality, no uniqueness.”990  When we turn an animal “into ‘meat,’ someone who 
has a very particular, situated life, a unique being, our neighbor, is converted into something that 
                                                
987 Westerman, Genesis: A Commentary, 229. 
988 William C. French, “Beast-Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life,” in Good News for 
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379. 
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has no distinctiveness, no uniqueness, no individuality.”991  Meat naturalizes the eating of 
animals in such a way that people think they are simply making a choice about food rather than 
interacting with an animal, she claims.  This is why animals designated for slaughter are rarely 
given personal names.  “False naming means that we can avoid responsibility.  False naming 
creates false consciousness.”992  Mass terms such as “meat,” “livestock,” and “crop” place an 
immediate barrier to the possibility of entering into caring relationships with individual animals.  
They set up an artificial remoteness that hides the animals’ physiological closeness, relationality, 
and historic nearness to humans and human society.  Naming animals in these ways precludes, or 
at least severely obscures, naming them as fellow companions or neighbors.  Grumett and Muers 
contend that “to remove meat completely from the menu would radically alter human 
understandings of nonhuman animals, because changing the menu changes the ontology of the 
animal.”993  In other words, to name an animal as meat locates its existence primarily as a 
commodity for human consumption. Such a presumption necessarily colors the kind and degree 
of relationship possible between the human diner and the animal dessert.  It is perhaps no 
wonder, therefore, that when Adam was called upon to enter into relationship with and name the 
animals he was also confined to a diet of plants (Gen. 1:29; 2:16). 
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